UC-NRLF 


DbS 


NEW  YORK  UNIVERSITY 


Congressional  Control  of  Foreign 

Relations  During  the  American 

Revolution  1774-1789 


BY 

GEORGE  C.  WOOD 


A  THESIS 

PRESENTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE   SCHOOL 
IN   PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOB 
THE   DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

AT 
NEW  YORK   UNIVERSITY. 


H.  RAY  HAAS  &  CO. 

Printers  and  Publishers 

Allentown,  Pa. 

1919 


COPYRIGHT,  1919 

BY 
GEORGE  C.  WOOD 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  Genesis  and  Development  of  the  Chief  Factors  of  Con 
trol  in  the  First  Continental  Congress  of  1774. 

The  core  of  the  question,  1 — The  folk -mote  and  its  significance,  1 — The 
Plymouth  and  Massachusetts  colonies  contrasted,  2 — Early  demands  for 
full  representative  government,  2 — Evolution  of  the  town-meeting,  3 — Adap 
tation  to  new  conditions,  3 — Significance  of  the  growth  of  towns,  4 — Devel 
opment  of  the  decentralization  of  power,  4 — Causes  of  passage  of  Naviga 
tion  Acts,  4 — Struggles  with  Royal  prerogatives,  5 — The  problem  an  economic 
one,  5 — Basis  of  protests  raised  to  higher  grounds,  6 — The  significance  of 
the  colonial  agent,  7 — Growth  of  his  executive  powers,  8 — Origin  of  the  com 
mittees  of  correspondence,  9 — Their  growth  and  development,  10 — Their 
originator,  1] — Their  purpose,  12 — Their  significance  and  their  results,  14 — 
Chapter  Summary,  15. 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  Formation  of  Parties  in  Congress  as  a  Result  of  Con 
flict  between  Factors  of  Control  and  Their  Perpetuation  through 
Committees. 

The  task  of  the  Massachusetts  delegates,  17 — Formation  of  committees, 
17 — Opposition  to  Independence,  18 — Work  accomplished,  18 — Leadership 
of  Galloway  and  Samuel  Adams,  18 — Plan  of  Union,  19 — Adoption  of  Res 
olutions,  19 — Similarity  to  Massachusetts  resolutions,  20 — Assumption  of 
new  powers  by  Congress,  20 — Crystallization  of  opinion  in  colonies,  20 — 
Drawing  of  party  lines  in  Second  Congress,  21 — Compromise  between  Vir 
ginia  and  New  England,  21 — The  working  majority,  22 — Increased  power 
of  the  "Radicals,"  22 — Growth  of  idea  of  Independence,  23 — Declaration 
of  Independence,  23 — Chapter  Summary,  24. 


IV  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Rise  and  Significance  of  the  Committee  System  in  Con 
gress. 

Kelation  of  the  committees  of  correspondence  to  Congressional  commit 
tees,  26 — Reasons  for  the  adoption  of  the  committee  system,  27 — Nature 
and  distribution  of  early  committees,  29 — Special  committees  of  1776,  1777, 
1778,  30 — Special  committees  of  1779,  30 — The  "letter"  committees  of 
1780,  30 — Growing  inefficiency  in  Congress,  31 — Distribution  of  member 
ship  of  committees  of  1775,  33 — Political  combination  of  the  Lees  and 
Adams's,  33 — Distribution  of  membership  of  the  committees  of  1776,  34 — 
Significance  of  this  distribution,  35 — Distribution  of  membership  of  the 
committees  of  1777,  34 — Increasing  control  of  the  committee  system  by  the 
Eadicals,  34 — Distribution  of  membership  of  the  committees  of  1778,  35 — 
Distribution  of  membership  of  the  committees  of  1779,  36 — Absolute  control 
of  Congress  by  a  minority  of  the  colonies  through  control  of  the  committee 
system,  37 — Distribution  of  committee  membership  in  1780,  37 — Decline  in 
the  power  of  Virginia,  38 — Beginning  of  the  development  of  executive 
power  in  Congress,  38 — Distribution  of  committee  membership  in  1781,  38 — 
The  ' '  steering ' '  committees,  39 — Rapid  decline  of  the  committee  system  of 
control,  40 — Chapter  Summary,  40. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Immediate  Effects  of  the  Committee  System  upon  the 
Conduct  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

First  foreign  affairs  committee,  42 — Congressional  restrictions,  42 — 
Work  of  the  committee,  43 — Not  considered  a  diplomatic  committee,  43 — 
Opposition  of  Samuel  Adams  and  the  Radicals,  45 — Beginning  of  the  ' '  mil 
itia"  policy  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  relations,  45 — Democratization  of  all 
diplomatic  activities,  46 — Establishment  of  a  Committee  of  Foreign  Af 
fairs,  47 — An  attempt  to  place  executive  powers  in  the  hands  of  the  Com 
mittee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  47- -Attempt  of  Radicals  to  control  for 
eign  relations  through  the  selection  of  special  committees,  48 — Struggle  be 
tween  the  Radicals  and  the  ' '  Constructionists ' '  over  the  membership  of  the 
Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs,  49 — Struggle  over  censure  and  recall  of  the 
American  Commissioners  in  France,  50 — Constructionists  control  the  Com 
mittee  of  Foreign  Affairs,  52 — Decline  in  the  importance  of  the  Committee 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  52 — Enumeration  of  special  committees  functioning  as 
Committees  of  Foreign  Affairs,  53 — Political  principles  of  Samuel  Adams, 
56 — The  committees  overworked,  57 — Poor  selection  of  committees,  58 — 
Changes  in  personnel,  59 — Development  of  States  Rights,  59 — State  consti- 


TABLE  OP  CONTENTS  V 

tutions   adopted,   60 — Decentralization   of  power   in  the   states   the  result, 
60 — Chapter  Summary,  61. 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Crucial  Period  in  the  Conduct  of  Foreign  Affairs  as  a 
Result  of  the  Weakness  and  Indecision  of  Congress  Working 
through  Its  Committee  System. 

Perilous  situation  of  foreign  affairs  in  1777,  63 — Party  animosities, 
63 — Election  of  envoys  to  France  in  1776,  64 — Details  of  their  instructions, 
64 — Evidence  of  Radical  influences,  65 — Difficulties  of  Silas  Deane,  65 — Lack 
of  instructions  and  communications,  66 — Deane  assumes  executive  powers. 
66 — Condemnation  of  his  activities,  67 — The  work  of  M.  Beaumarchais,  67 — 
Misunderstandings  and  suspicions,  67 — Troubles  between  Deane,  Franklin 
and  Arthur  Lee,  68 — Activities  of  the  English  ministry,  69 — Franklin's 
difficult  position,  70 — His  diplomatic  policy  contrasted  with  that  of  Deane, 
70 — Inefficiency  of  the  Committee  of  Correspondence  at  home,  71 — Envoys 
ignorant  as  to  whom  they  are  responsible,  70 — Adams 's  complaints,  73 — 
Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs  practically  non-existent,  74 — Intrigues  of  the 
English  ministry  in  France  and  America,  74 — The  envoys  in  France  in  des 
perate  straits,  75 — Appeals  to  Franklin  by  English  ministry,  76 — Proposed 
reconciliation,  76 — Beaumarchais  and  Vergennes  turn  tide  to  America,  76 — 
The  Treaty  of  Alliance  signed,  76 — Imminence  of  diplomatic  disaster, 
77 — Chapter  Summary,  77. 

CHAPTER  VI. 
The  Influence  of  France  in  the  Conduct  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Early  French  influence  in  America,  79 — Gerard  sent  as  first  minister 
to  America,  80 — His  purposes,  80 — His  instructions,  80 — His  observations  on 
America,  81 — Problems  which  he  was  obliged  to  solve,  81 — His  relations 
with  Congress,  82 — His  increasing  influence  in  Congress,  82 — Chevalier  de 
la  Luzerne  is  sent  to  America  as  minister  from  France,  83 — Attacks  on 
Franklin  in  Congress,  83 — Luzerne 's  influence  in  his  behalf,  83 — Selection 
of  peace  envoy,  84 — Luzerne 's  active  part  in  drawing  up  instructions,  84 — 
Adams's  attitude  to  French  ministry,  85 — The  paper  money  resolution  in 
Congress,  85 — Increasing  dislike  of  Adams  by  French  Court,  85 — His  rebuff 
by  Vergennes,  86 — Franklin's  delicate  position,  87 — Bribery  used  by  Lu 
zerne  to  influence  selection  of  peace  envoys,  87 — Opposition  of  the  Radicals 
to  Luzerne 's  influence,  88 — Luzerne  checks  cabals  against  Washington  and 
Franklin,  88 — Luzerne  seeks  the  appointment  of  a  committee  to  act  in  pros 
ecuting  the  war,  89 — Luzerne  seeks  to  establish  a  Department  of  Foreign 


VI  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Affairs,  90 — He  seeks  to  appoint  Robert  Livingston  as  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  90 — French  ultimatum  to  Congress,  91 — Congress  stirred  to  action 
by  the  French  ministry,  91 — Chapter  Summary,  92. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

The  Beginning  of  the  Centralization  of  Power  in  the  Con 
duct  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Importance  of  the  recall  of  Deane,  Lee  and  Adams,  94 — Attempts  of 
Congress  to  send  envoys  to  all  Courts  in  Europe,  94 — Results,  95 — Franklin 
given  new  powers,  95 — His  instructions  and  limitations  placed  upon  him, 
95 — His  gradual  assumption  of  executive  powers,  96 — Adams's  attitude  as 
peace  envoy,  96 — Chafes  under  limitation  of  his  powers,  97 — Increase  of 
Franklin's  executive  powers,  97 — Jay's  instructions,  98 — He  disobeys  his 
instructions,  99 — Causes  and  results,  99 — Chapter  Summary,  100. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

The  Establishment  of  a  Definite  Policy  in  the  Conduct  of 
Foreign  Affairs. 

Beginnings  of  the  development  of  executive  power  in  Congress,  102 — Es 
tablishment  of  Departments,  103 — Establishment  of  a  Department  of  For 
eign  Affairs,  103 — Duties  of  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  104 — The 
Secretary  limited  in  power,  104 — Congress  appoints  special  committees  to 
conduct  foreign  relations  activities,  105 — Livingston  resigns  as  Secretary 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  105 — Commendation  of  Livingston,  107 — Development 
of  executive  powers  in  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  107 — Enlarge 
ment  of  the  powers  of  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  108 — John  Jay 
elected  Secretary  of  the  United  States  for  the  Department  of  Foreign  Af 
fairs,  100— Chapter  Summary,  109. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

The  Election  of  a  Secretary  of  the  United  States  of  America 
for  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Formation  of  a 
Department  of  State. 

John  Jay  a  new  type  of  Secretary  for  the  Department  of  Foreign  Af 
fairs,  111 — His  policies,  112 — Seconded  by  the  leaders  of  "strong  govern 
ment"  in  Congress,  112 — Struggle  between  Jay  and  the  Radicals  over  the 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  VII 

appointment  of  envoys  to  France,  113 — Sectional  jealousies  and  the  devel 
opment  of  States  Rights  in  connection  with  the  proposed  treaties,  113 — In 
creased  power  delegated  to  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  114 — Complete 
downfall  of  the  committee  system  of  control  in  Congress,  114 — Adams  s 
failure  as  Minister  to  England,  115 — Jay  empowered  to  treat  with  Spain  on 
the  boundary  and  Mississippi  river  questions,  115 — Increased  prestige  of 
the  Secretary  and  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  116 — More  powers 
delegated  to  Jay,  116 — Jay  refuses  to  assume  full  responsibility  in  con 
cluding  a  treaty  with  Spain,  117 — His  suggested  compromise,  117 — Oppo 
sition  to  plan  and  struggle  between  states,  118 — Congress  fears  Jay's  powers 
and  seeks  to  limit  him,  118 — Jay  pleads  for  a  definite  and  fixed  policy  by 
Congress  in  the  conduct  of  the  negotiations  with  Spain,  119 — Jay  multiplies 
his  recommendations  to  Congress,  120 — Congress  defers  action  on  Jay 's  re 
commendations,  120 — The  new  constitution  provides  for  executive  depart 
ments  by  implication,  121 — Hamilton's  plan  for  executive  departments, 
122 — Pinckney's  plan,  122 — Powers  of  the  President,  122 — Madison's  plan, 
123 — Establishment  of  a  new  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  124 — Duties 
and  powers  of  the  Secretary,  124 — 'Establishment  of  a  Department  of  State, 
125 — Election  of  Thomas  Jefferson  as  the  first  Secretary  of  State,  126 — 
Chapter  Summary,  126.  GENERAL  SUMMARY,  128. 

Bibliographical  Index — p.  131. 
Topical  Index— p.  133. 


INTRODUCTION 

The  history  of  any  nation  is  ordinarily  divided  into  periods 
or  epochs.  This  arbitrary  division  is  made,  partly  for  the  con 
venience  of  the  reader  or  student  of  history ;  partly  because  some 
event  or  series  of  events  seem  to  have  given  a  new  direction  to 
the  current  or  continuity  of  history,  resulting  in  a  marked  ex 
pansion  or  diminution  of  control  or  power  in  national  life.  Such 
periods  are  commonly  observed  in  the  treatment  of  American 
history. 

However,  beneath  the  records  of  events,  there  is  always  a 
strong  current  of  motives,  of  causes  and  of  effects,  which  is  or 
dinarily  obscure  to  the  casual  reader  of  history. 

If  this  idea  is  kept  constantly  in  mind,  it  is  not  an  easy 
task  to  properly  divide  American  history  into  periods.  This  diffi 
culty  obtains  for  two  important  reasons.  (1)  Causes  are  often 
slow  in  producing  results;  (2)  Causes  are  often  complex.  In 
any  field  of  research,  it  is,  therefore,  evident  that  changes  take 
place  very  gradually,  especially  in  the  social  and  industrial 
fabric.  Sudden  changes  may  take  place  in  the  political  life  of  a 
nation,  but  the  ordinary  man,  unless  such  changes  are  catastro 
phic,  is  left  unaltered  in  his  daily  life. 

Granted  that  changes  in  the  political  life  of  a  people  may 
be  slow  as  well  as  in  other  lines  of  institutional  growth,  it  fol 
lows  that  the  tracing  of  the  causes  and  effects  of  the  events  and 
movement  cited  as  a  basis  of  discussion  in  this  thesis,  will  be 
somewhat  difficult.  To  determine  how  Congress,  from  1774  to 
1789,  controlled  our  foreign  relations,  is  to  take  for  granted  at 
once,  that  the  dates  mentioned  are  selected  merely  for  the  sake 
of  convenience.  The  trend  of  events  between  these  dates  had 


I  INTRODUCTION 

their  beginning  long  before  the  year  1774  and  their  final  outcome 
is  not  yet  seen. 

Men  who  lived  in  1790,  lived  in  about  the  same  way  as  the 
men  of  1730,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  coun 
try  had  radically  changed  during  the  intervening  period.  The 
fact  is,  the  governmental  changes  had  come  so  gradually 
that  the  common  citizen  was  little  affected  by  them.  This  fact 
illustrates  in  a  marked  way,  the  essential  unity  and  continuity  of 
history. 

However,  in  America,  momentous  changes  did  occur.  It  is 
the  problem  of  this  thesis  to  show,  if  possible,  how  and  why 
these  changes  occurred  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  This 
thesis  appears  to  admit  of  but  one  valid  method  of  treatment. 
That  method  is  the  tracing  out  through  the  careful  study  of  con 
gressional  committees,  the  causes  and  growth  of  those  activ 
ities  favorable  to  or  opposed  to  the  formation  of  a  definite  policy 
in  the  conduct  of  foreign  relations  during  the  American  revolu 
tion. 

The  attempt  is  here  made  to  show  the  gradual  evolution  of  a 
Department  of  State,  having  its  inception  in  a  Committee  of 
Secret  Correspondence.  Based  primarily  upon  private  commun 
ications,  secret  memoirs,  facsimiles  and  a  study  of  the  composi 
tion  of  the  Congressional  committees,  a  thread  of  continuity  has 
been  found  running  through  all  of  them,  gradually  developing 
from  a  condition  of  chaos,  through  one  of  uncertainty  and  vacil 
lation,  to  a  final  definite  policy  and  assumption  of  power  by  In 
dividuals  and  departments,  having  executive  functions  of  wide 
application  in  a  strong  centralized  government.  In  short,  it  is 
hoped  that  it  will  have  been  shown  how  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
American  colonies,  as  regards  its  initiation,  activity,  method  of 
control,  degree  of  control  and  results  of  that  control,  was  de 
veloped  by  Congress  from  1774  to  1789. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  GENESIS  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  CHIEF  FACTORS  OP  CON 
TROL  IN  THE  FIRST  CONTINENTAL  CONGRESS  OP  1774. 

The  causes  of  the  American  revolution  were  many  and 
varied.  The  problem  here  presented  is  not  that  of  discovering 
these  causes,  except  in  so  far  as  they  coincide  with  the  factors  of 
control  in  Congress  from  1774  to  the  adoption  of  the  constitution 
in  1789.  With  the  problem  limited,  the  core  of  the  question  is — 
What  were  the  factors  that  caused  the  development  of  methods  of 
control  and  how  did  these  methods  work  to  control  resolves  and 
the  policy  of  Congress,  especially  with  respect  to  the  conduct  of 
foreign  relations? 

I.     THE  FOLK-MOTE. 

The  early  and  successful  struggles  for  individual  freedom  in 
England  were  only  possible  through  the  existence  of  the  insti 
tution  known  as  the  folk-mote.  This  was  a  form  of  local  self- 
government  possessing  an  enormous  importance  in  the  polity  of 
even  the  primeval  Teutons.  It  was  a  fixed,  frequent,  accessible 
meeting  of  the  individual  freemen  for  the  purpose  of  discussing 
and  deciding  upon  public  matters.  This  same  folk-mote,  modi 
fied  in  large  measure,  conditioned  the  events  which  culminated  in 
the  American  revolution.  The  folk-mote,  therefore,  may  be  said 
to  be,  biologically,  at  least,  the  primordial  cell  of  every  Anglo- 
Saxon  body  politic. l 

This  primordial  institution  was  evolved  and  developed  into 
a  somewhat  complex  organism  in  England,  but  it  was  reborn  in 

1  Freeman:  Growth  of  the  English  Constitution,  p.  17. 


2         CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

New  England  with  a  greater  vitality  in  two,  at  least,  of  the 
original  colonies  and  expressed  itself  finally  in  the  New  England 
town-meeting. 

The  people  of  the  Plymouth  colony  were  primarily  re 
ligious  refugees.  But  they  possessed  a  keen  political  sense, 
nevertheless.  This  political  acumen  expressed  itself  in  a  remark 
ably  homogeneous  social  and  political  system.  The  Plymouth 
compact,  signed  on  board  ship,  was  a  democratic  frame  of  gov 
ernment.  -  Though  tinged  with  theocracy,  the  little  company  had 
hardly  set  foot  upon  the  new  continent  before  it  began  to  con 
duct  its  affairs  in  a  thorough-going  democratic  manner. 3 

In  contrast  to  the  Plymouth  colony,  the  Massachusetts  Bay 
colony  of  ten  years  later,  was  in  reality  a  commercial  enterprise. 
However,  soon  after  the  colony  was  settled,  a  clean-cut,  consti 
tutional  system  was  evolved,  based  upon  its  charter.  4  This  sys 
tem  was  composed  of  a  governor,  deputy-governor,  assistants  and 
others,  clothed  with  power  to  make  and  execute  laws. 5 

Opposition  to  the  manner  of  conducting  this  form  of  govern 
ment  soon  arose,  however.  It  was  charged  that  the  primary  prin 
ciple  of  the  folk-mote  was  being  gradually  violated.  In  1631, 
the  freemen  of  Massachusetts  Bay  demanded  that  the  whole  body 
of  freemen  choose  the  body  of  assistants  and  that  the  executive 
officers  be  then  chosen  by  these  assistants. 6  The  demand  was 
reluctantly  granted.  In  1634,  a  representative  body,  composed 
of  delegates  elected  by  the  freemen,  formed  an  assembly  which 
acted  with  the  assistants,  forming  a  General  Court.  7 

The  people  thus  controlled  the  selection   of  the  governor 


2  MacDonald:   Documentary  Source  Book  of  American  History,  p.  19. 

3  Bradford:   History  of  Plymouth  Plantation,  p.   110. 

*  MacDonald :  Documentary  Source  Book  of  American  History,  p.  23-26. 
6  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts  (1620-1820),  p.  25. 
6  Ibid.  p.  29. 
T  Ibid.  p.  30. 


DEVELOPMENTS  OF  THE  CHIEF  FACTORS  OF  CONTROL  o 

through  their  power  of  selecting  the  assistants.  Thus  was  the 
governor  made,  in  large  measure,  responsible  to  the  people. 

The  steps  from  1631  down  to  the  demand  by  the  people  for 
complete  independence  of  legislative  power  are  many  and  intri 
cate.  But  this  much  stands  out  clearly.  The  people  continu 
ously  claimed  all  power  necessary  for  the  conduct  of  a  separate 
government,  except  that  they  recognized  their  dependence  upon 
the  Crown  and  passed  no  laws  contrary  to  those  in  existence  in 
England. 8  Massachusetts,  in  particular,  asserted  its  liberties 
because  composed  of  Englishmen.  Upon  this  ground,  and  this 
alone,  the  people  claimed  the  political  power  of  self-govern 
ment.  9 

The  point  to  be  emphasized  here  is  most  important.  The 
original  folk-mote  was  brought  bodily  to  the  North  American 
continent,  modified  and  embodied  in  a  colonial  government 
scheme,  called  a  town-meeting,  yet  its  essence  always  remained 
the  same.  Every  freeman  had  an  equal  liberty  of  delivering  his 
opinion,  without  fear  or  favor.  Moreover,  he  gave  or  withheld 
his  vote  upon  any  question  as  he  saw  fit  and  every  vote  weighed 
equally. 10  In  a  word  the  folk-mote  was  the  central  hereditary 
institution  of  the  colonial  governments  of  New  England.  It 
gave  by  its  very  nature,  homogeneity  to  the  successive  periods  of 
New  England  political  life.  It  was  the  foundation  of  the  spirit 
of  true  democracy. 

II. 

GROWTH  AND  DIFFERENTIATION  OF  THE  REPRESENTATIVE 
ASSEMBLIES. 

There  is  evidence  that  environment  and  opportunity  were 
important  factors  in  developing  the  new  colonies.  Rapid  differ- 


8  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts  (1620-1820),  p.  42. 

•  Ibid.  p.  42. 

10  Ibid.  pp.  25,  26. 


4        CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

entiation  occurred  in  the  industrial,  educational,  religious  and 
social  life  of  the  people.  Political  changes  were  also  inevitable. 
New  towns  were  founded  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Boston.  As 
time  passed,  others  were  founded  far  removed  from  the  mother 
colony.  Such  were  Portsmouth,  Newport,  Providence,  Hartford, 
Windsor  and  others.  Each  developed  in  accordance  with  its  own 
needs.  Each  venture  was  an  objective  illustration  of  an  innate 
desire  for  independence  in  thought  and  action.  The  ultimate 
result  was  a  marked  modification  of  the  original  town  meeting. 
Representation  was  only  possible  through  the  selection  of  dele 
gates,  properly  instructed  in  their  respective  town-meetings  as 
to  what  they  should  do  and  say  at  the  General  Court. J1  The  pur 
pose  of  this  procedure  was  to  effectively  check  the  possible  in 
crease  of  central  authority.  These  men  were  Englishmen 
jealous  of  their  liberties.  They  considered  that  the  power  of 
government  still  resided  in  the  individual  freeman  living  in  the 
most  remote  cabin  in  the  wilderness.  Hereditary  characteristics 
were  more  powerful  here  than  environmental  factors.  The  im 
mediate  effect  was  the  rise  of  a  true  representative  system  to 
gether  with  a  marked  decentralization  of  power. 

III.     ECONOMIC  CONSIDERATIONS. 

The  rapid  differentiation  in  political  and,  above  all,  in  in 
dustrial  life  resulted  in  the  passage  by  the  British  Parliament 
of  a  series  of  Navigation  Acts  in  order  to  control  the  laws  of 
trade.  With  the  passing  of  the  Molasses  Act  in  1733,  a  colonial 
policy  was  rapidly  formulated  in  England.  Its  most  important 
features  were  the  following : 

(1)  The  enforcement  of  the  Navigation  Acts. 

(2)  The  enforcement  of  uniformity  in  the  colonial  govern 
ments. 

"  Fundamental  Orders  of  New  Haven  Colony  (MacDonald),  p.  36. 


DEVELOPMENTS  OF  THE  CHIEF  FACTORS  OF  CONTROL  0 

(3)  The  increase  of  Parliamentary  control  over  colonial  in 
ternal  affairs. 

The  Navigation  Acts  were  said  to  be  examples  of  " external' 
policies,  but  their  influence  soon  became  '  *  internal. ' '  The  royal 
governor  in  Massachusetts  Bay  attempted  to  enforce  his  royal 
prerogatives  in  the  assembly.  Opposed  by  the  assembly,  he  re 
fused  to  sign  their  bills.  The  assembly  retaliated  by  holding  up 
the  governor's  salary.  This  method  of  procedure  soon  became 
common  in  most  of  the  colonies.  In  every  colony  the  principle 
was  the  same.  In  every  colony  leaders  of  the  opposition  were 
being  developed.  These  leaders  opposed  the  will  of  the  proprie 
tor,  the  arbitrary  actions  of  the  royal  governors  or  unjust  trade 
restrictions.  In  all  colonies  the  control  of  the  revenues  by  the 
assemblies  effectively  blocked  royal  aggression.  The  crux  of  the 
whole  situation  was  fast  becoming  an  economic  one. 

The  passing  of  the  Sugar  Act  of  April  5,  1764,  caused  the 
calling  of  the  Boston  Town-meeting  on  May  25,  1764,  at  which 
a  committee  of  five  men  was  appointed  to  prepare  instructions 
to  its  newly  elected  delegates  in  the  provincial  assembly.  Samuel 
Adams  drew  up  the  instructions  and  made  it  very  plain  that  the 
delegates  were  limited  in  their  actions. 12  Furthermore,  the  dele 
gates  were  enjoined  to  use  "their  influence  in  maintaining  the 
inalienable  rights  and  privileges  of  the  province"  and  "to  pre 
serve  that  independence  in  the  house  of  representatives  which 

characterize  a  free  people  " "  Our  trade  has  for  a  long  time 

labored  under  great  discouragement  and  it  is  with  the  greatest 
concern  that  we  see  such  further  difficulties  coming  upon  it,  as 
will  reduce  it  to  the  lowest  ebb,  if  not  totally  obstruct  and  ruin 
it."13 

In  addition,  the  assembly  was  rebuked  for  not  having  taken 


12  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts  (1620-1820),  p.  157. 

18  Hutchinson :  History  of  Massachusetts  Bay,  III,  pp.  106,  107. 


6         CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

earlier  action  in  view  of  the  ' '  intention  of  the  ministry  to  burden 
us  with  new  taxes."  Here  was  a  protest  based  ostensibly  upon 
the  desire  for  a  redress  of  grievances  resulting  from  an  arbitrary 
policy  in  the  control  of  the  colonial  assembly,  but  actually 
founded  in  a  deep  resentment  at  the  restriction  of  trade.  The 
problem  was  an  economic  one,  when  seen  in  its  true  light. 

James  Otis,  in  the  colonial  assembly,  was  quick  to  pick  up 
the  thread  of  the  argument  and  deliver  a  speech  on  the  Rights  ol 
the  British  colonies.  "If  our  trade  may  be  taxed,"  he  said, 

"why  not  our  lands? This  annihilates  our  charter  rights  to 

govern  and  tax  ourselves It  strikes  at  our  British  privileges 

If  taxes  are  laid  upon  us  in  any  shape  without  our  having 

a  legal  representation  where  they  are  laid,  are  we  not  reduced 
from  the  character  of  free  subjects  to  the  miserable  state  of 

tributory  slaves? As  His  Majesty's  other  northern  American 

colonies  are  embarked  with  us  in  this  most  important  bottom  (a 
sheer  assumption)  we  further  desire  you  to  use  your  endeavors, 
that  their  might  may  be  added  to  that  of  this  province ;  that  by 
the  united  application  of  all  who  are  aggrieved,  all  may  happily 
obtain  redress. ' ' 14 

Based  originally  upon  trade  restrictions,  this  speech  at  once 
raised  the  issue  to  higher  grounds.  It  included  three  principles 
destined  to  be  of  great  importance.  (1)  It  asserted  the  doctrine 
of  no  taxation  without  representation.  (2)  It  claimed  for  the 
colonists  the  full  rights  of  Englishmen.  (3)  It  suggested  a 
united  protest  of  the  colonies.  Evidence  seems  to  point  to  Sam 
uel  Adams  as  the  author  of  the  fundamentals,  especially  the  last 
one  named. 

Two  great  questions,  then,  confronted  the  colonists : 

(1)  Should  the  English  imperial  policy  extend  to  America 
or  should  America  rule  herself  and  still  be  united  to  England? 

14  Otis:   Rights  of  British  Colonies,  pp.  100-105. 


DEVELOPMENTS  OF  THE  CHIEF  FACTORS  OF  CONTROL  7 

(2)  Should  the  English  idea  of  representation  be  allowed  or 
obstinately  opposed? 

The  first  question  was  an  economic  one ;  the  second  political. 
The  first  situation  conflicted  with  American  property  and  pros 
perity;  the  second  conflicted  with  American  independence  of 
thought  and  action  as  expressed  in  the  folk-mote  and  subsequent 
town-meeting. 

IV.     THE  COLONIAL  AGENT. 

A  factor  which  largely  contributed  to  the  development  of 
concerted  action  by  the  colonies  against  the  prerogatives  of  the 
crown  was  the  colonial  agent.  The  practical  negation  of  a  true 
representative  form  of  government  through  the  excessive  use  of 
the  veto  power  by  the  royal  governors,  developed  a  most  serious 
situation.  While  the  colonial  assemblies  could  and  did  check  in 
large  measure  the  coercive  plans  of  the  governors  by  refusing 
to  pay  them  their  salaries,  yet  they  could  not,  on  the  other  hand, 
secure  the  passage  of  measures  benefiting  the  colonists. 

The  obvious  temporary  solution  of  the  problem  was  the  ap 
pointment  of  a  representative  of  the  colonies  who  could  go  to 
England  and  lay  before  Parliament  and  the  king,  the  needs  and 
grievances  of  the  various  sections  of  the  country.  The  plan  was 
an  attempt  to  follow  the  line  of  least  resistance  in  obtaining 
certain  ends  which  could  not  be  secured  in  the  colonial  assem 
blies. 

The  colonial  agent  became  the  embodiment  of  the  represen 
tative  system,  modified  by  existing  circumstances.  He  was  a  com 
mittee  system  reduced  to  its  lowest  terms. 

As  early  as  1764  Franklin  represented  Pennsylvania  in 
England.  He  petitioned  the  crown  to  relieve  the  colony  of  the 
burden  of  excessive  taxation.  Successful  in  this,  he  remained  in 
England  as  the  leading  representative  of  the  colonies.  It  was 


8         CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

through  his  influence  that  the  Stamp  Act  was  repealed.  That 
he  did  not  always  reflect  the  true  spirit  of  the  colonies  up  to  the 
year  1775  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  he  urged  the  payment  of 
the  tea  tax  by  the  colonists,  in  a  letter  to  Thomas  Gushing,  Feb. 
5,  1771. 15 

Massachusetts  had  been  represented  in  England  by  Dennys 
De  Berdt  from  1765  to  the  time  of  his  death  in  1770. 16  Franklin 
was  at  once  appointed  in  his  place,  but  only  after  strong  oppo 
sition  from  Samuel  Adams,  who  suspected  him  of  lukewarmnesb 
towards  the  idea  of  independence. 17  Adams  succeeded  in  ob 
taining  the  appointment  of  Arthur  Lee  as  his  associate  and  for 
warded  to  Franklin  a  long  and  very  explicit  set  of  instructions 
to  guide  him  in  his  activities  as  colonial  agent. 

In  1775,  Franklin  having  returned  to  America,  Lee  became 
the  sole  agent  of  Massachusetts  in  England.  The  next  step  was 
his  selection  as  secret  agent  of  the  Committee  of  Secret  Corre 
spondence  of  the  Continental  Congress  in  1775. 

That  the  leaders  in  the  colonies  kept  the  colonial  agents  well 
informed  of  the  trend  of  events  in  America  after  1765  is  shown 
by  the  numerous  letters  of  Adams  directed  to  De  Berdt  and  Lee. 
These  letters  go  into  details  of  events,  circumstances,  policies 
and  instructions.  Especially  illuminating  are  the  accounts  of 
the  growth  of  the  committees  of  correspondence  in  the  towns  of 
the  colony  of  Massachusetts. 18  This  function  of  the  colonial 
agent  changed  and  became  more  important  from  1770  to  1775 
due  primarily  to  the  rapid  development  of  differences  between 
the  governors  and  the  assemblies  and  the  consequent  growth  of 
intercolonial  committees.  In  fact,  the  colonial  agent  became  in 
large  measure  an  executive  in  function  and  it  was  but  a  slight 


u  Franklin:  Works,  VII,  p.  505. 

16  Samuel  Adams's  Writings,  I,  p.  61. 

"  Ibid.  II,  p.  46. 

18  Samuel  Adams's  Writings,  I,  II,  III. 


DEVELOPMENTS  OF  THE  CHIEF  FACTORS  OF  CONTROL 

transition  from  the  office  of  the  colonial  agent  to  that  of  a  con 
gressional  envoy  after  the  Declaration  of  Independence  had  made 
the  appointment  of  such  a  person  necessary. 

V.     ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  OF  THE  COMMITTEES  OF  CORRRESPOND- 
ENCE  AS  ORGANS  OF  RESISTANCE  TO  ROYAL  POWER. 

A  study  of  the  history  of  Massachusetts  Bay  colony  gives 
unmistakable  evidence  that  from  1764  until  the  meeting  of  the 
first  Continental  Congress  in  1774,  the  successful  resistance  to 
the  colonial  policy  of  England  was  instituted  and  maintained  by 
a  well  organized  committee  system.  This  system  may  have  had 
its  origin  in  the  standing  committees  of  the  English  Parliament, 
but  it  was  certainly  modified  and  adapted  to  new  conditions  in 
America  under  the  stress  of  coercion.  It  became  necessary  early 
in  the  disputes  between  governor  and  assembly  to  appoint  com 
mittees  which  could  hold  over  the  intervals  between  sessions,  in 
order  to  keep  at  white  heat  the  one  idea  of  a  redress  of  griev 
ances.  As  soon  as  the  assembly  met,  differences  inevitably  de 
veloped.  Foreseeing  prorogation,  it  appointed  a  committee  to 
work  until  such  time  as  it  could  present  its  report  on  the  pro 
gress  of  its  task.  In  June,  1764,  the  House  of  Representatives 
chose  a  committee  to  write  to  the  other  colonies  informing  them 
of  the  measures  adopted  in  Massachusetts. 19  The  House  was  at 
once  prorogued  and  met  again  in  October.  At  once  a  large  com 
mittee  was  appointed  to  prepare  a  memorial  to  the  king,  assert 
ing  the  rights  of  the  colonists  as  Englishmen.  In  January,  1765, 
Governor  Bernard  recommended  moderation  and  submission  to 
the  law  of  Parliament,  as  expressed  in  the  Stamp  Act.  In  reply, 
the  assembly  chose  a  committee  to  consider  the  state  of  the  prov 
ince,  which  proposed  the  Stamp  Act  Congress  at  New  York. 

"  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts  (1620-1820),  pp.  159-60. 


10      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

From  1765  to  the  time  of  the  revolution,  the  governor  kept 
the  General  Court  in  session  as  little  as  possible. 20  Often,  on 
calling  the  assembly,  he  suddenly  dismissed  it,  on  the  discovery 
that  it  was  deliberating  upon  resistance  to  his  power.  In  1767, 
the  town  of  Boston  requested  the  governor  to  call  the  assembly, 
but  he  declined. 21  At  a  meeting  of  the  citizens  of  that  town, 
a  committee  was  chosen  to  obtain  subscribers  to  an  agreement 
to  refuse  to  use  British  goods.  The  subscribers  were  numerous 
and  many  other  towns  adopted  measures  and  similar  resolutions 
through  the  action  of  committees. 22 

So  marked  was  this  movement,  that  the  amount  of  goods 
imported  from  England  in  1767  was  165,000  pounds  less  than 
in  1764.  In  1768  a  large  ship  was  sent  back  without  unload 
ing,  23  The  General  Court  of  1768,  chose  a  large  committee  to 
consider  the  state  of  the  province.  Prominent  members  of  this 
committee  were  Gushing,  Samuel  Adams,  James  Otis  and  John 
Hancock.  This  committee  prepared  three  circular  letters 
through  its  secretary,  Samuel  Adams. 24  One  was  sent  to  the 
colonial  agent  in  England,  one  to  the  English  ministry  and  one 
to  the  king.  In  addition,  a  letter  was  sent  to  each  House  of 
Representatives  on  the  continent  with  a  final  expression  as  fol 
lows:  "The  House  is  fully  satisfied  that  your  assembly  is  too 
generous  and  enlarged  in  sentiment  to  believe  that  this  letter 
proceeds  from  an  ambition  of  taking  the  lead  or  dictating  to  the 
other  assemblies.  They  freely  submit  their  opinion  to  the  judg 
ment  of  others  and  shall  take  it  kind  in  your  House  to  point  out 
to  them  anything  further  it  may  be  thought  necessary. ' ' 25 


20  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts   (1620-1820),  p.  178. 

21  Ibid.  p.  189. 
*  Ibid.  p.  190. 
M  Ibid.  p.  181. 
14  Ibid.  p.  190. 

24  Bradford:  History  of  Masscahusetts  (1620-1820),  p.  190. 


DEVELOPMENTS  OF  THE  CHIEF  FACTORS  OF  CONTROL  11 

This  Communication  was  couched  in  the  most  reserved  terms, 
but  it  aimed  to  influence  the  other  assemblies,  nevertheless,  and 
the  adroitness  of  the  wording  had  just  the  desired  effect.  Digni 
fied  by  the  seal  of  approval  of  the  Massachusetts  assembly  in  the 
writing  of  Samuel  Adams,  it  was  a  clarion  call  to  action. 

The  General  Court  was  at  once  requested  to  rescind  the  let 
ters.  It  refused  to  do  so  and  was  at  once  dissolved  by  Bernard, 
the  governor,  but  not  before  a  committee  drew  up  charges  against 
him,  accompanied  by  a  petition  for  his  early  recall. 26 

It  had  long  been  suspected  that  the  real  instigator  of  these 
radical  moves  in  the  Massachusetts  assembly  was  Samuel  Adams. 
Plans  were  set  on  foot  by  Royalists  to  suppress  him  or  take  him 
to  England  for  trial  as  an  incendiary. 27  Hutchinson  wrote,  "A 
man  Adams  is  rather  considered  as  the  opposer  of  government 
and  a  sort  of  Wilkes  in  New  England."  28  Adams'  plan  of  ac 
tion  seemed  to  be  to  provoke  Hutchinson  into  making  hostile  and 
arrogant  answers  to  the  resolutions  of  the  assembly.  In  this  he 
admirably  succeeded.  To  one  of  these  resolutions  Hutchinson 
replied,  "That  the  charter  reserved  to  the  governor  the  full 
power,  from  time  to  time,  to  adjourn,  prorogue  or  dissolve  the 

assembly To  yield  to  them  (assembly)  this  prerogative 

there  would  be  danger  of  encouraging  the  inhabitants  of 

other  towns  in  the  province  to  similar  procedure which  the 

law  had  not  made  the  business  of  town-meetings. ' ' 29 

This  reply  accomplished  two  things  which  Adams  had  fore 
seen.  It  provoked  the  assembly  to  greater  opposition  and  it  de 
veloped  co-operation  among  the  towns  of  the  province.  Hutch 
inson  's  communication  was  repeatedly  read  in  the  assembly  and 
scattered  broadcast.  At  the  psychological  moment  Adams  pro- 


58  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts  (1620-1820),  p.  184. 

27  Hutchinson 's  Letters,  I,  p.  183. 

28  Ibid.  I,  p.  167. 

n  Hutchinson:  History  of  Massachusetts  Bay,  III,  p.  363. 


12      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

posed  "that  a  Committee  of  Correspondence  be  appointed  to 
consist  of  twenty-one  persons,  to  state  the  rights  of  the  colonists 
and  of  this  province  in  particular,  as  men  and  Christians  and 
as  subjects  and  to  communicate  the  same  to  the  several  towns 
and  to  the  world  as  the  sense  of  this  town,  with  the  infringe 
ments  and  violations  thereof,  that  have  been,  or  from  time  to 
time,  may  be  made. 30 

The  size  of  this  committee  as  proposed  by  Adams  was  sig 
nificant.  He  was  evidently  fearful  of  the  possibility  of  the  lodg 
ing  of  too  much  power  in  the  hands  of  a  few  men.  Yet  when 
the  committee  met  on  November  3,  1772,  and  took  up  its  work, 
it  at  once  delegated  the  work  of  preparing  a  statement  to  three 
men.  To  Adams  was  assigned  the  task  of  stating  the  rights  of 
the  colonists;  the  enumeration  of  infringements  was  delegated 
to  Joseph  Warren,  while  the  letter  to  be  sent  to  the  neighboring 
towns  was  to  be  drawn  up  by  Benjamin  Church. 

The  results  of  the  work  of  this  committee  were  instantan 
eous.  Several  towns  (Marblehead,  Koxbury,  Cambridge,  Ply 
mouth)  planned  to  adopt  similar  resolutions  and  appoint  simi 
lar  committees. 31  By  June,  1773,  Hutchinson  reported  that 
eighty  towns  had  appointed  such  committees. 

The  ostensible  purpose  of  these  committees  was  to  forward 
information  of  all  kinds  from  one  town  to  another.  Such  was 
the  import  of  the  letter  of  the  Committee  of  Correspondence  of 
Boston  to  Cambridge,  Dec.  29,  1772, 32  to  Plymouth  on  the  same 
day  and  to  Worcester,  Sept.  11,  1773.  The  emphasis  soon 
changed,  however,  and  we  find  the  most  important  principle  de 
veloped  in  subsequent  letters  to  be  the  independence  of  the  judi 
ciary.  33  A  letter  to  Marblehead  from  Boston  dated  Nov.  24, 


30  Hutchinson :  History  of  Massachusetts  Bay,  III,  p.  368. 

81  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  369. 

82  Writings  of  Samuel  Adams,  II,  p.  392. 
•  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  50. 


DEVELOPMENTS  OF  THE  CHIEF  FACTORS  OF  CONTROL      13 

1774,  proposed  a  Continental  Post. 34  A  letter  to  Franklin  as 
agent,  Mar.  31,  1774,  emphasized  the  same  principle,  and  de 
veloped  at  length  the  wonderful  effects  of  the  Committees  of 
Correspondence.  Adams  informed  Franklin  that  the  people  are 

' '  wonderfully  enlightened  and  aroused They  are  united  in 

sentiment  and  their  opposition  to  unconstitutional  measures  of 

the  government  is  become  systematic colony  communicates 

fully  with  colony There  is  a  common  affection All 

colonies  are  become  one,  because  united  in  sentiment  and  opposi 
tion  to  tyranny. ' ' 35 

In  a  letter  to  Arthur  Lee,  as  colonial  agent,  dated  April  4, 
1774,  Adams  indicates  the  final  result  to  be,  "the  entire  separa 
tion  and  independence  of  the  colonies. 36  On  May  12.  1774,  the 
Committee  of  Correspondence  of  Boston  wrote  to  a  like  committee 
at  Portsmouth  asking  aid  in  opposition  to  the  Boston  Port  Bill. 37 
On  May  13,  1774,  a  letter  was  forwarded  to  the  Committee  of 
Correspondence  of  Philadelphia  on  the  same  matter, 38  and  to 
Silas  Deane  on  May  18,  1774,  suggesting  that  the  towns  of  Con 
necticut  voluntarily  and  at  once,  refuse  to  purchase  British  goods 
and  further  suggested  the  formation  of  a  conference  of  Commit 
tees  of  Correspondence  of  the  neighboring  colonies. 39 

The  original  Committees  of  Correspondence  as  proposed  by 
Adams  had  developed  a  basis  for  local  confederation.  Closely 
associated  through  the  colonial  agent  with  other  colonies  having 
the  same  or  similar  grievances,  it  was  but  a  matter  of  time,  be 
fore  these  committees  began  to  take  on  an  inter-colonial  char 
acter  and  function,  resulting  in  a  definite,  organized,  continental 


84  Writings  of  Samuel  Adams,  III,  p.  80. 
35  Ibid.  Ill,  pp.  85-92. 

86  Ibid.  Ill,  pp.  97-100. 

87  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  106. 

88  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  109. 

89  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  114. 


14      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

resistance.  Indeed,  this  united  movement  began  as  early  as  the 
year  1770,  when  the  Massachusetts  assembly  appointed  a  com 
mittee  to  correspond  with  the  agent  in  England  and  with  com 
mittees  in  other  colonies  on  the  state  of  public  affairs. 40  Early 
in  1773  another  large  committee  was  chosen  to  correspond  with 
the  committees  of  other  colonies  on  political  subjects. 41  It  but 
needed  a  concerted  action  of  two  colonies  to  lead  the  movement. 
Virginia  furnished  the  link  by  also  proposing  in  1770,  a  corre 
spondence  with  Masachusetts  concerning  their  grievances  with 
a  view  to  union  .  On  March  12,  the  House  of  Burgesses  passed 
a  resolution  for  ascertaining  the  views  of  the  other  colonies. 42 

On  June  12,  Samuel  Cooper  wrote  to  Franklin,  "Virginia 
has  led  the  way  by  proposing  correspondence  between  all  the 

colonies so  that  New  England  is  now  united  with  Virginia, 

etc."43  The  Massachusetts  House  at  once  voted  to  correspond 
with  all  the  colonies. 44 

This  concerted  action  by  these  two  colonies  led  at  once  to  a 
better  understanding  among  all  the  colonies  and  hastened,  with 
out  doubt,  the  calling  of  the  First  Continental  Congress  at  Phila 
delphia  in  September,  1774. 

That  Hutchinson  realized  the  full  importance  of  the  work 
of  the  committees  is  evidenced  by  his  characterizing  their  letters 
as  "highly  improper,  and  a  glaring  attempt  to  alter  the  con 
stitution  of  the  colonies that  it  was  a  procedure  which 

should  have  been  considered  an  avowal  of  independence  and 
could  be  justified  only  on  the  principle  of  independence. 45 

The  result  of  this  committee  work  was  foreseen  by  Adams, 


40  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts  (1620-1820),  p.  232. 

41  Ibid.  p.  232. 

43  Virginia  State  Papers,  VIII,  p.  1. 

43  Franklin:   Works,  VIII,  pp.  49-50. 

44  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts  (1620-1820),  p.  232. 

«  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts  (1620-1820),  p.  233. 


DEVELOPMENTS  OP  THE  CHIEF  FACTORS  OF  CONTROL  15 

Hutchinson  and  all  other  discriminating  leaders.  On  June  17, 
1774,  at  Salem,  a  series  of  resolves  were  presented  providing  for 
the  election  of  seven  delegates  to  meet  with  delegates  from  other 
colonies  on  September  1,  1774,  at  Philadelphia  or  other  place  to 
be  determined  upon. 46  John  Adams  and  Samuel  Adams  were 
members  of  this  delegation.  Notice  was  at  once  sent  to  all  other 
colonies  informing  them  of  the  action  of  the  Massachusetts  assem 
bly.  Almost  immediately  similar  action  was  taken  by  them  all 
and  the  Congress  was  assured. 

SUMMARY. 

The  folk-mote  was  primarily  a  form  of  local  government 
functioning  as  a  committee  of  the  whole.  Transplanted  to  Amer 
ica,  it  became  a  town-meeting,  modified  into  a  representative 
form  of  government,  due  to  the  rapid  growth  of  towns.  The 
people,  always  jealous  of  their  rights  as  Englishmen,  still  con 
trolled  governmental  action  through  their  committees  of  dele 
gates,  who  were  definitely  and  uniformly  instructed  as  to  their 
actions. 

Increased  economic  restrictions  caused  a  rapid  crystalliza 
tion  of  public  sentiment  and  a  revulsion  of  feeling  against  the 
English  ministry.  This  resentment  was  reflected  in  the  assem 
blies  through  the  appointment  of  commttees,  with  power  to  in 
struct  delegates  or  to  draw  up  resolutions  relative  to  the  state  of 
affairs. 

Opposed  and  obstructed  by  the  royal  governors,  these  as 
sembly  committees  sought  partial  relief  through  the  appointment 
of  the  colonial  agent,  who  was  in  fact  a  committee  of  one  with 
delegated  powers  carefully  limited  by  instructions.  He,  in  a 

*  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts  (1620-1820),  p.  240. 


16      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

limited  way,  performed  some  of  the  duties  which  the  colonists 
believed  the  royal  governor  should  have  executed  in  their  behalf. 

The  next  movement  was  a  lateral  one.  Samuel  Adams  pro 
posed  the  selection  of  a  committee  of  correspondence  in  the  Bos 
ton  town-meeting.  The  idea  was  at  once  accepted  and  followed 
by  many  towns.  By  this  method  the  whole  public  was  kept  con 
stantly  informed  of  the  political  conditions  and  public  opinion 
was  thereby  rapidly  crystallized. 

The  next  step  was  the  formation  of  inter-colonial  committees 
of  correspondence.  The  work  of  these  committees  was  constantly 
enlarged,  but  it  was  always  limited  by  definite  instructions.  The 
result  of  this  inter-colonial  co-operation  was  the  development  of 
a  continental  spirit  of  resistance  to  coercion  and  a  simultaneous 
demand  for  a  redress  of  grievances. 

The  final  step  in  the  propaganda,  instigated  and  kept  alive 
by  the  Committees  of  Correspondence,  was  the  determination  of 
the  leaders  in  Massachusetts  to  secure  complete  independence. 

The  chief  factors  of  control  which  originated  in  the  colonial 
towns  and  assembly  and  were  carried  to  the  First  Continental 
Congress,  there  to  profoundly  influence  that  body,  were,  there 
fore  : — 

(1)  A  deep  seated  resentment  towards  the  English  minis 
try,  especially  by  the  Massachusetts  and  Virginia  delegates. 

(2)  The  fixed  determination  of  the  Massachusetts  delegates 
to  secure  independence  as  the  only  means  of  escaping  economic 
ruin  and  political  slavery. 

(3)  The  gradual  adoption  of  the  committee  system  as  a 
natural  and  effective  means  of  securing  this  independence  through 
the  control  of  the  legislative  and  executive  functions  of  Con 
gress. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  FORMATION  OF  PARTIES  IN  CONGRESS  AS  A  RESULT  OP  CON 
FLICT  BETWEEN  FACTORS  OF  CONTROL  AND  THEIR  PER 
PETUATION  THROUGH  COMMITTEES. 

1. 

The  delegates  from  Massachusetts  proceeded  to  Philadelphia 
irrevocably  committed  to  a  program  of  complete  independence. 
For  this  reason  a  large  majority  of  the  delegates  from  the  other 
colonies  regarded  them  with  deep  suspicion.  Met  at  Frankfort 
by  Dr.  Rush,  Mr.  Mifflin,  Mr.  Bayard  and  others,  they  were 
informed  that  they  were  regarded  as  four  desperate  adventurers. 
They  were  advised  against  assuming  the  lead  in  Congress,  since 
this  privilege  had  been  reserved  for  Virginia  as  the  leader  of 
the  southern  colonies.  "This  was  plain  speaking,"  said  Johi* 
Adams,  "but  it  made  a  deep  impression.  That  conversation  has 
given  a  coloring  to  the  whole  policy  of  the  United  States  down 
to  this  day. * 

The  supreme  task  of  Massachusetts  was  to  persuade  the  other 
colonies  to  approve  her  extreme  stand  against  England.  She 
had  gone  too  far  to  retrace  her  steps.  She  must  obtain  aid  or 
perish.  To  attempt  to  withstand  the  military  power  of  England 
alone  was  unthinkable. 

Committees  were,  therefore,  organized  through  the  influence 
of  Samuel  Adams,  with  a  nice  regard  for  the  susceptibilities  of 
the  various  delegates.  But  the  work  of  these  committees  was  so 
slow  that  all  delegations  were  soon  dissatisfied.  It  soon  developed 

1  Hosmer:  Samuel  Adams,  pp.  313-314. 


18      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

that  the  delegates  from  the  Middle  colonies  were  utterly  opposed 
to  any  move  which  favored  independence.  In  this  matter  they 
took  their  stand  beside  Virginia.  This  in  itself,  is  evidence  that 
the  Virginia  delegates  were  lukewarm  to  the  idea  of  independ 
ence  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  House  of  Burgesses  had  taken 
a  decided  stand  in  this  matter  some  time  before.  John  Adams 
wrote  relative  to  the  Congress  of  1774  as  follows,  "There  was  not 
one  member,  except  Patrick  Henry,  who  appeared  sensible  of  the 
precipice,  or  rather  the  pinnacle,  on  which  we  stood,  and  had 
courage  and  candor  enough  to  acknowledge  it. " 2 

After  two  weeks  of  constant  shifting,  practically  nothing 
was  accomplished.  Finally  on  Sept.  17,  the  revolutionary  re 
solves  of  the  Suffolk  convention  were  placed  before  Congress. 
Samuel  Adams  had  guided  them  through  the  provincial  assembly 
under  the  immediate  supervision  of  Joseph  Warren.  These  re 
solves  declared  that  "no  obedience  is  due  from  this  province 
(Massachusetts)  to  either  or  any  part  of  the  acts  of  Parlia 
ment."  3  They  further  advised  the  meeting  of  a  provincial  con 
gress  ;  directed  the  tax  collectors  to  pay  no  money  into  the  royal 
treasury  unless  the  constitution  should  be  restored  and  finally 
virtually  threatened  armed  resistance.  r 

The  direct  object  of  introducing  these  resolves  into  Con 
gress,  can  have  been  no  other  than  to  precipitate  discussion  or 
action  or  approval  of  the  radical  stand  of  Massachusetts,  thus 
placing  upon  Congress  the  responsibility  of  accepting  for  the 
whole  country  the  attitude  of  the  New  England  colonies. 

This  motive  was  at  once  suspected  and  caused  the  rapid 
formation  of  opposing  factions.  Joseph  Galloway  placed  him 
self  at  the  head  of  the  party  of  conciliation  in  opposition  to  the 
party  of  independence,  which  was  fast  forming  about  the  New 


3  John  Adams:  Works,  X,  p.  78. 
8  Journals  of  Congress,  I,  pp.  9-14. 


THE  FORMATION  OF  PARTIES  IN  CONGRESS  19 

England  delegates  as  a  nucleus.  The  leader  of  the  independence 
party  can  be  assumed  to  have  been  Samuel  Adams.  Galloway 
refers  to  Adams  as,  "by  no  means  remarkable  for  brilliant  abili 
ties,  yet  he  (Adams)  is  equal  to  most  men  in  popular  intrigue 

and  the  management  of  factions it  was  this  man,  who  by 

his  superior  application,  managed  the  factions  in  Congress  at 
Philadelphia  and  the  factions  in  New  England. ' ' 4 

Galloway's  Plan  of  Union,  presented  as  an  offset  to  the 
Suffolk  resolves  on  Sept.  28,  1774,  was  defeated  by  a  majority 
of  only  one  vote. 5  This  close  contest  conclusively  showed  the 
complexion  of  Congress.  Even  Franklin  approved  the  plan,  ably 
seconded  by  Duane  and  Jay  of  New  York.  This  vote  produced 
a  marked  effect  upon  the  New  England  delegates.  They  learned 
in  a  decisive  manner,  that  they  could  not  force  their  measures 
through  Congress.  They  determined,  therefore,  to  attempt  to 
control  measures  by  working  indirectly  through  others  and  thus, 
if  possible,  effect  their  plans. 

The  marshalling  of  forces  slowly,  but  inevitably  took  place 
The  leaders  were  Galloway  and  Samuel  Adams.  Reconciliation 
was  cherished  by  a  surprisingly  large  number  of  the  delegates. 
All  felt  union  to  be  essential.  All  felt  that  the  cause  of  Massa 
chusetts  involved  the  liberties  of  every  colony.  Yet  all  did  not 
see  the  urgency  of  engaging  in  active  measures  for  her  support. 

After  seven  weeks  of  debate  Congress  accomplished  three 
important  things.  (1)  It  approved  the  Suffolk  resolves,  which 
were  in  essence  a  declaration  of  war  against  England.  (2)  It 
drew  up  a  Declaration  of  Rights  and  (3)  adopted  the  outlines 
of  an  Association  of  the  Colonies. 6  This,  of  course,  was  the  re 
sult  of  much  compromise. 


4  Galloway:  Historical  and  Political  Reflections,  p.  67. 
6  Journals  of  Congress,  I,  pp.  43,  44ff. 
•  Ibid.  I,  pp.  19-22. 


20      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

Two  remarkable  facts  are  revealed  in  these  resolutions. 
(1)  The  Declaration  was  almost  identical  in  its  wording  with  the 
non-importation  resolutions  passed  in  the  Boston  town-meeting 
in  1772.  Furthermore  it  is  remarkably  similar  to  the  Suffolk 
resolves.  The  connection  is  obvious.  The  fact  that  these  simi 
larities  were  known  at  the  time,  shows  the  steady  growth  of  a 
strong  independence  party  in  Congress.  (2)  There  is  an  as 
sumption  by  Congress  of  legislative  powers.  Congress  was  os 
tensibly  a  mere  convention — a  debating  club.  Yet  it  adroitly 
developed  signs  of  nationality  and  union.  Furthermore  it  was 
clearly  assuming  executive  powers  of  a  most  momentous  na 
ture.  By  the  adoption  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights  urged  by 
John  Adams,  the  thirteen  colonies  were  nationalized. T 


2. 


The  second  Continental  Congress  was  to  meet  on  May  10, 
1775.  During  the  interval,  matters  rapidly  crystallized  in  the 
different  colonies,  especially  in  Massachusetts.  A  new  assembly 
resolved  itself  in  October  at  Salem  into  a  provincial  Congress 
and  drafted  resolutions  which  had  all  the  effect  of  law  through 
out  the  colony. 8  Meeting  again  in  November,  the  delegates  to 
the  First  Continental  Congress  made  their  report,  which  was 
approved.  The  same  delegates  (with  the  exception  of  Bowdoin) 
were  returned  with  the  addition  of  John  Hancock. 9  The  peo 
ple  were  exhorted  "to  consider  the  danger  and  to  be  prepared 
to  meet  and  avert  it,  by  their  love  of  liberty  and  of  their  coun 
try,  by  respect  for  the  memories  of  their  ancestors  and  by  regard 
for  posterity;  and  to  remember  that  they  must  stand  or  fall 


T  Chamberlain:  John  Adams  and  the  Kevolution,  p.  90. 

•  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts  (1620-1820),  p.  247. 

•  Ibid.  p.  247. 


THE  FORMATION  OF  PARTIES  IN  CONGRESS  21 

with  the  liberties  of  America, "  10  In  February,  1775,  a  third 
provincial  Congress  met.  The  committee  of  safety  was  con 
tinued  and  its  powers  enlarged.  General  officers  were  appoint 
ed  and  military  stores  were  deposited  at  Concord  and  Wor 
cester. 

But  there  was  a  far  different  feeling  in  some  of  the  other 
colonies.  In  Georgia,  the  independence  faction  could  not  gain 
acceptance  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights.  "  A  motion  of  approval 
was  also  defeated  in  New  York.  12  In  a  letter  to  Richard  Henry 
Lee,  Patrick  Henry  says,  ''Perhaps  I  am  mistaken,  but  I  fear 
too  great  a  bias  to  aristocracy  prevails  among  the  opulent.  I 
am  myself  a  democrat  on  the  plan  of  your  admired  friend  (Sam 
uel  Adams). 13 

It  would  be  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  delegates  to  the 
Second  Continental  Congress  would  be  very  definitely  instructed 
as  to  their  powers  and  actions  relative  to  independence.  It  was 
evident  that  the  most  that  could  be  expected  of  most  of  them 
was  an  acquiescence  to  a  decided  protest  to  the  English  ministry. 

From  the  moment  the  delegates  assembled  in  Philadelphia 
in  May,  1775,  party  lines  were  sharply  drawn.  The  Massachu 
setts  delegates  were  under  greater  suspicion  than  ever,  because 
of  the  recent  violent  trend  of  events  in  New  England.  The  first 
move  of  the  New  England  delegates  was  to  persuade  Congress 
to  adopt  the  army  before  Boston.  It  was  plain  to  the  independ 
ence  leaders,  however,  that  the  only  hope  of  success  in  this  move 
was  in  a  combination  with  the  Southern  colonies,  of  which  Vir 
ginia  was  the  recognized  leader.  Approached  upon  this  matter, 
the  southern  delegates  agreed  to  vote  for  the  adoption  of  the 
army,  if  they,  in  turn,  could  name  the  commander-in-chief.  To 


"  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts   (1620-1820),  p.  248. 
11  Candler:   Revolutionary  Records  of  Georgia,  I,  pp.  250-251. 
u  Lincoln:  Constitutional  History  of  New  York,  I,  pp.  473-477. 
"  Tyler:   Patrick  Henry,  p.  181. 


22      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

this  the  New  England  delegates  acquiesced  and  Washington's 
appointment  to  the  position  was  generally  understood  by  him 
and  the  delegates  to  be  conditioned  upon  political  bargaining. 

The  union  of  New  England  and  Virginia  developed  a  work 
ing  majority  in  Congress.  The  power  of  this  majority  was 
greatly  extended  by  enlarging  the  scope  of  the  work  of  the 
Committee  of  Correspondence,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  had  its 
origin  in  Massachusetts  and  was  one  of  the  most  important  fac 
tors  in  the  development  of  a  spirit  of  union  and  independence. 
Resolutions  were  also  presented  to  fire  the  patriot  mind.  To 
encourage  the  Radicals  in  the  hesitating  colonies,  Congress,  on 
June  10,  1775,  cut  the  Gordian  knot  by  urging  the  colonies  to 
set  up  their  own  independent  governments. 14 

In  October,  1775,  the  Rhode  Island  delegates  presented  a 
resolution  to  arm  a  fleet  at  the  expense  of  the  government. 15  A 
committee  was  appointed  consisting  of  New  England  delegates 
who  reported  that  each  New  England  colony  be  requested  to 
furnish  two  ships  to  be  placed  under  the  command  of  Washing 
ton.  The  Southern  and  Middle  colonies  opposed  the  plan,  but  it 
was  finally  passed. 

This  vote  was  a  blow  to  the  moderates.  The  Independence 
party  was  gaining  strength.  On  October  26,  the  New  Hampshire 
delegation  asked  the  advice  of  Congress  as  to  its  regulation  of  civil 
power  in  the  absence  of  a  government.  The  subject  was  referred 
to  a  committee  composed  of  men  favorable  to  the  cause  of  inde 
pendence.  This  committee  reported  that  New  Hampshire  should 
set  up  its  own  government. 16 

The  leader  of  the  opposition  to  all  measures  indicating  a 
trend  toward  independence  was  John  Dickinson.  To  him  has 


14  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  84. 
u  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  274. 
"  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  298. 


THE  FORMATION   OF  PARTIES  IN  CONGRESS  23 

been  ascribed  the  predominant  politico-literary  influence  in 
America  from  1765  to  1775.  But  the  radicals  had  now  gone  too 
far  for  him.  His  consent  to  a  concession  of  Parliamentary  con 
trol  over  America  in  matters  of  legislation  was  now  roughly 
discarded.  His  substitute,  that  an  allegiance  to  the  Crown  was 
the  only  just  stand  for  the  colonies  to  take  was  poison  to  the 
Independence  party.  Rutledge,  who  in  June,  1776,  agreed  with 
Dickinson  in  his  opposition  to  independence,  at  last  expressed 
impatience  with  his  intellectual  fastidiousness  and  nicety,  declar 
ing  that  the  vice  of  all  his  productions  was  the  "vice  of  refining 
too  much. ' ' 17 

On  June  7,  1776,  Richard  Henry  Lee,  of  Virginia,  moved 
in  Congress,  "that  these  united  colonies  are  and  of  right  ought 
to  be  free  and  independent  states. ' ' 18  John  Adams  seconded 
the  motion.  At  once  Dickinson  opposed  the  measure  because 
of  his  well  known  views  upon  independence  and  because  he  had 
been  instructed  to  vote  against  it  by  his  colony,  should  it  be  pre 
sented.  "Let  us  form  our  government,"  he  said,  "and  agree 
to  terms  of  a  confederation  before  assuming  sovereignty.  Settle 
the  existing  disputes  between  the  colonies  and  make  firm  our  na 
tion, then  let  America  advance  with  majestic  steps  and  as 
sume  her  station  among  the  sovereigns  of  the  world. ' ' 19 

But  Dickinson's  protest  fell  upon  deaf  ears.  The  opposition 
to  his  principles  was  now  too  strong  to  be  deterred  from  the 
execution  of  its  plans.  The  resolution  was  referred  to  a  com 
mittee  consisting  of  John  Adams,  Franklin,  Roger  Sherman  and 
R.  R.  Livingston,  and  resulted  in  the  promulgation  of  the  Decla 
ration  of  Independence,  on  July  4,  1776. 

On  July  3,  John  Adams  wrote,  "Yesterday,  the  greatest 


1T  John  Jay:  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  p.  67. 

18  Journals  of  Congress,  V,  p.  425. 

19  Stille:  Life  and  Writings  of  John  Dickinson,  I,  p.  1373. 


24      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

question  was  decided  which  ever  was  debated  in  America  and  a 

greater,  perhaps,  never  was  or  will  be  decided  among  men 

When  I  look  back  to  the  year  1761  and  recollect  the  arguments 

concerning  the  Writs  of  Assistance which  I  have  hitherto 

considered  as  the  commencement  of  the  controversy  between 
Great  Britain  and  America I  am  surprised  at  the  sudden 
ness  as  well  as  greatness  of  the  Revolution. ' ' 20 

SUMMARY. 

The  Massachusetts  delegates  went  to  Philadelphia  with  a 
fixed  idea  of  influencing  congressional  action.  Their  situation 
was  desperate  and  demanded  heroic  measures.  By  persuasion 
and  pressure,  they  were  able  to  induce  Congress  to  adopt  the 
Suffolk  resolves,  thus  committing  it  to  decisive  action.  The 
immediate  result  was  the  formation  of  opposing  factions.  Sam 
uel  Adams  as  leader  of  the  independent  faction,  was  able  to  con 
trol  most  of  the  minor  factions  through  his  powers  of  persuasion. 
Measures  were  passed  in  favor  of  the  independence  faction,  but 
always  with  a  small  majority.  Meanwhile,  Congress  unconscious 
ly  assumed  legislative  and  executive  powers.  The  appointment 
of  committees  followed  as  a  means  of  controlling  measures.  This 
method  of  conducting  congressional  business  served  two  distinct 
purposes.  (1)  It  put  an  effective  check  upon  any  tendency  to 
arbitrary  or  irresponsible  action,  so  much  feared  by  the  New 
England  delegates.  (2)  It  was  by  the  use  of  this  method  that 
Adams  was  able  to  get  through  Congress  the  measures  he  felt, 
necessary  to  assist  Massachusetts  and  to  accomplish  independ 
ence.  As  a  consummate  politician  he  used  his  powers  of  persua 
sion  on  the  floor  of  Congress  to  effect  the  selection  of  committee 
members  to  his  liking.  He  then  instructed  these  members  how 
to  act  in  the  committee  meetings. 

30  John  Adams:  Familiar  Letters  to  His  Wife,  p.  191. 


THE  FORMATION  OP  PARTIES  IN  CONGRESS  25 

Checked  in  this  work  by  the  decided  opposition  of  Galloway 
and  others,  Adams  concluded  a  combination  with  the  southern 
colonies  and  thereby  secured  a  working  majority  which  could 
control  action  even  on  the  floor  of  Congress.  The  work  of  the 
Committee  of  Correspondence  was  at  once  enlarged.  It  began 
to  instruct  the  colonial  assemblies  as  to  the  proper  procedure  in 
setting  up  independent  governments.  The  impetus  for  inde 
pendence  gained  in  the  colonial  assemblies  by  the  work  of  this 
committee  soon  had  its  reflected  effect  upon  the  congressional 
delegates.  The  sentiment  for  independence  in  Congress  rapidly 
crystallized  and  overcoming  a  fast  dwindling  opposition,  result 
ed  in  the  Declaration  of  July  4,  1776. 

The  greatest  factor  in  the  accomplishment  of  this  result 
was,  without  doubt,  the  elaborate  committee  system,  which  had 
its  origin  in  the  Massachusetts  towns  and  colonial  assembly  un 
der  the  inspiration  of  Samuel  Adams. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  RISE  AND   SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE   COMMITTEE   SYSTEM   IN 

CONGRESS. 

On  November  2,  1772,  the  Committee  of  Correspondence 
began  its  life  as  a  local  institution  of  the  Revolution. *  On  that 
date  a  committee  was  also  appointed  to  report  on  "The  Rights 
of  the  Province  as  men,  as  Christians,  as  subjects  of  the  British 
Empire. ' ' 2  Samuel  Adams,  a  member  of  this  committee,  drew 
up  a  set  of  resolutions.  He  expressly  developed  the  first  funda 
mental  positive  law  of  all  commonwealths  or  states  to  be  the 
establishment  of  the  legislative  power  and  the  first  fundamental 
natural  law  which  is  to  govern  the  legislative  power  itself  is  the 
preservation  of  society.  Therefore,  the  legislative  power  cannot 
justly  assume  to  itself  a  power  to  rule  by  extempore,  arbitrary 
decrees,  but  it  is  bound  to  see  that  justice  is  dispensed  and  that 
the  rights  of  the  subjects  be  decided  by  promulgated  standing 
and  known  laws  and  by  authorized  independent  judges. 3 

This  exposition  seems,  on  the  face  of  it,  extremely  theoreti 
cal.  To  include  it  in  the  same  resolution  providing  for  the  for 
mation  of  a  Committee  of  Correspondence  seems  incongruous, 
but  it  seemed  to  be  the  exact  thing  needed  at  the  time.  It  ap 
pealed  to  the  keenest  and  most  dignified  personages  in  the  colony. 
It  placed  the  basis  for  redress  of  grievances  upon  a  high  plane 
of  political  thought.  It  gave  impetus  to  action  once  it  had  been 
expressed  in  correspondence. 

1  Collins:  Composition  of  Committees  of  the  American  Revolution, 
Amer.  Hist.  Association  Report,  1901,  V,  p.  247. 

*  Bradford:   History  of  Massachusetts    (1620-1820),  p.  225. 
8  Old  South  Leaflets,  VII,  p.  419ff. 


THE  RISE  OP  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  27 

The  importance  of  the  Committee  of  Correspondence  can 
not  be  overestimated  as  a  piece  of  revolutionary  machinery.  It 
was  not  merely  a  channel  through  which  public  opinion  might 
flow.  It  created  public  opinion  and  played  upon  it  to  fashion 
events.  It  was  the  mother  of  committees  and  these  subsequent 
committees,  local  and  inter-colonial,  worked  up  the  war.  It  in 
cluded  measures  in  its  scope  of  work  and  its  activities  compre 
hended  executive,  legislative  and  judicial  functions.  It  formed 
the  germ  of  government.  4 

After  the  organization  of  the  Second  Continental  Congress 
in  May,  1775,  it  was,  therefore,  natural  that  the  appointing  of 
committees  should  be  the  first  plan  adopted  for  the  carrying  on 
of  the  business  of  Congress.  There  were  several  very  good  rea 
sons  why  this  method  of  procedure  should  have  been  followed. 

(1)  In  Massachusetts  and  to  some  extent  in  Virginia,  this 
had  been  the  accepted  method  of  accomplishing  business  of  im 
portance.     This  method  had  been  the  development  of  years.    It 
had  fitted  in  with  the  circumstances.     It  had  been,  in  many  in 
stances,  a  sheer  necessity  as  a  means  of  successfully  combating 
the  arbitrary  actions  of  the  royal  governors.     The  system  was  a 
direct  product  of  the  times. 

(2)  In  several  of  the  colonies  the  plan  had  been  successful 
in  accomplishing  decisive  results.     Successive  committees  based 
their  resolutions  upon  the  arguments  and  findings  of  previous 
committees.     Ground  had  thus  been   gradually  won   and  this 
ground  was  never  surrendered  again.  The  non-importation  agree 
ments,  the  Stamp  Act  Congress,  the  Committee  of  Correspond 
ence  were  all  results  of  a  system  of  opportunism.    The  First  Con 
tinental  Congress,  itself,  was  the  best  evidence  of  its  success. 

(3)  It  was  fitting  that  as  many  of  the  colonies  as  possible 


4  Collins:    Composition    of   Committees    of    the    American    Revolution, 
Amer.  Hist.  Association  Report,  1901,  V,  1,  p.  247. 


28      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

be  represented  in  the  conduct  of  the  important  affairs  of  Con 
gress.  This  procedure  would  work  out  for  a  greater  unity  of 
purpose.  It  was  more  democratic.  It  would  silence  criticism 
and  prevent  the  formation  of  factions  and  oppositions. 

(4)  It  was,  furthermore,  a  politic  move  on  the  part  of  the 
New  England  delegates  to  strive  to  have  the  power  in  commit 
tees  divided  among  the  several  delegates,  so  as  to  eliminate,  as 
far  as  possible,  the  well  founded  suspicions  of  the  Middle  and 
some  of  the  Southern  colonies  that  the  New  England  delegates 
were  determined  upon  independence. 

(5)  In  the  interval  between  the  First  and  Second  Conti 
nental  Congress,  public  opinion  had  crystallized  among  the  peo 
ple  of  the  colonies.    This  opinion  was,  of  course,  reflected  in  the 
colonial  assemblies.     These  assemblies,  in  turn,  instructed  their 
new  delegates  as  to  what  they  should  do  or  say  in  the  new  Con 
gress.     It  would  be  necessary,  therefore,  to  throw  matters  of  im 
portance  into  committees  in  order  to  prevent  constant  deadlocks 
upon  the  floor  of  Congress. 

(6)  Deadly  afraid  of  an  executive  in  Congress,  with  pow 
ers  of  control,  the  very  absence  of  such  a  leader  made  it  neces 
sary  that  some  assumption  of  executive  power  should  take  place. 
This  could  best  be  done,  with    the    least    amount    of    friction, 
through  committees. 

During  the  First  Continental  Congress,  the  Journals  reveal 
but  10  committees.  All  of  these  had  to  do  with  the  Associa 
tion;  the  statement  of  the  rights  of  the  colonies;  the  address  to 
the  king;  to  the  people  of  Great  Britain;  the  non-importation 
agreements,  etc. 

The  membership  of  these  committees  was  evenly  distribut 
ed  among  the  colonies.  On  the  first  committee  two  members  were 
contributed  by  each  colony.  Both  John  and  Samuel  Adams 
represented  Massachusetts. 5  The  second  committee  was  com- 

6  Journals  of  Congress,  I,  p.  28. 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  29 

posed  of  one  representative  from  each  colony.  Patrick  Henry 
represented  Virginia. 6  On  the  eight  succeeding  committees, 
the  different  colonies  were  represented  as  follows :  Massachusetts 
6 ;  New  Hampshire  1 ;  Connecticut  0 ;  Rhode  Island  0 ;  New  York 
3 ;  Delaware  1 ;  Pennsylvania  4 ;  Maryland  2 ;  Virginia  9 ;  New 
Jersey  1 ;  North  Carolina  1 ;  South  Carolina  2,  while  Georgia 
was  not  then  represented  in  Congress. 

There  is  evidence  here  that  the  Massachusetts  delegates  profit 
ed  by  the  advice  given  them  on  the  way  to  Philadelphia.  The 
deference  shown  to  Virginia  by  Massachusetts  in  the  selection 
of  these  delegates  was  not  lost  upon  her.  The  combined  com 
mittee  membership  of  the  two  colonies  upon  the  eight  committees, 
was  18  against  11  for  the  Middle  colonies,  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  were  moderate  in  their  stand  on  independence. 

The  serious  selection  of  committees  began  after  the  organi 
zation  of  the  Second  Continental  Congress.  During  the  re 
mainder  of  the  year  1775,  102  special  committees  were  counted. 
Most  of  these  committees  range  from  3  to  13  members.  Of  51 
committees  taken  at  random  during  this  period,  the  average 
membership  of  each  committee  was  five  and  a  fraction. 

The  objects  for  which  these  committees  were  appointed  were 
as  varied  and  as  numerous  as  their  number.  There  were,  besides, 
some  dozen  standing  committees,  all  composed  of  a  large  number 
of  men.  The  work  of  these  committees,  in  general,  seems  ex 
tremely  trivial,  in  view  of  the  importance  of  the  work  confront 
ing  Congress  at  the  time. 

It  is  plain  that  the  work  could  and  should  have  been  sepa 
rated  and  grouped  into  well  defined  departments  having  more 
or  less  executive  powers.  But  nowhere  is  there  any  indication 
that  such  a  course  was  even  contemplated  during  the  years  1775, 
1776  or  1777. 

8  Journals  of  Congress,  I,  p.  29. 


30      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

During  the  year  1776,  169  special  committees  were  appoint 
ed  or  elected,  besides  those  which  held  over  from  1775.  There 
were  also  14  standing  committees.  Of  35  committees  taken 
chronologically  during  1776,  one  consisted  of  13  members,  14 
of  three  members,  while  the  average  number  of  members  in  each 
committee  was  four  and  a  fraction. 

During  1777,  95  special  committees  were  appointed  or  elect 
ed.  There  were,  besides,  17  standing  committees.  Of  19  com 
mittees  taken  in  a  chronological  order  during  this  year,  the 
largest  number  of  members  on  any  committee  was  5  and  the 
lowest  3,  while  the  average  number  of  members  in  each  com 
mittee  was  three  and  a  fraction. 

During  1778,  210  special  committees  were  appointed  or  elect 
ed.  Of  these,  151  were  noted  as  to  their  nature  and  purpose.  89 
were  selected  to  consider  personal  or  public  communications  sent 
to  Congress  by  individuals,  committees  or  colonies.  It  would  be 
difficult  to  classify  all  these  communications  as  to  their  nature 
and  requirements,  but  it  is  plain  that  they  all  might  have 
been  properly  turned  over  to  one  committee  as  a  clearing  house, 
which  could,  in  turn,  have  distributed  them  to  the  proper  stand 
ing  committees  or  to  departments,  had  such  departments  been 
in  existence.  Instead,  these  communications  were  placed  in  the 
hands  of  89  separate  committees.  With  the  existence  of  proper 
departments,  but  six  would  have  been  necessary,  with  the  pos 
sible  addition  of  six  standing  committees. 

During  1779,  but  104  special  committees  were  appointed  or 
elected.  Of  64  of  these  committees  observed,  39  were  selected  to 
consider  communications  alone. 

This  sudden  reduction  in  the  number  of  committees  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  many  letters  were,  during  this  year,  referred  to 
other  previously  appointed  "letter"  committees.  However, 
there  was  no  change  in  the  idea  or  method  of  conducting  the  work 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  31 

of  Congress.  During  this  year,  of  the  104  committees  noted,  but 
10  consisted  of  5  members,  2  of  4  members,  1  of  6  members,  1  of  2 
members  and  1  of  13  members,  while  the  average  number  of  mem 
bers  in  each  committee  was  about  three. 

During  this  year,  there  was  a  marked  change  in  the  person 
nel  of  the  committees.  It  was  constantly  changing,  either  through 
absences  which  forced  the  appointment  of  new  members  to  fill 
vacancies ;  through  the  transfer  of  men  from  one  committee  to  an 
other  or  through  other  reasons  not  easy  to  determine. 

During  1780,  193  special  committees  were  elected.  There 
were,  besides,  8  standing  committees.  Of  these  193  committees, 
just  100  were  selected  to  consider  special  communications  in  the 
form  of  letters.  The  marked  reduction  in  the  number  of  stand 
ing  committees  was  due  to  the  formation  of  some  ill-defined  de 
partments,  such  as  War,  Treasury,  Commerce,  etc.  The  nature 
of  the  special  committees  outside  of  the  " letter"  committees  still 
varied  greatly.  Of  the  193  committees  observed  during  this  year, 
131  were  noted  as  to  their  membership.  Two  committees  con 
sisted  of  6  members  each :  17  of  5  members  each ;  6  of  4  members ; 
104  of  3  members ;  2  of  2  members,  while  the  average  number  of 
members  in  each  committee  was  3.2. 

The  result  of  the  adoption  of  the  committee  system  in  con 
ducting  the  business  of  Congress  soon  became  apparent.  Ineffi 
ciency  of  an  extreme  nature  inevitably  followed.  It  was  an  ex 
cellent  example  of  the  effect  of  the  decentralization  of  power  so 
often  exemplified  by  the  town-meeting  and  advocated  by  Samuel 
Adams  and  others  as  the  essence  of  democracy. 

Even  when  Boards  were  elected  to  perform  the  work  which 
would  naturally  be  delegated  to  them,  special  committees  were 
elected  to  do  such  work.  Centralization  of  power  and  responsi 
bility  was  bitterly  opposed,  even  though  its  admitted  corollary 
was  efficiency  and  the  dispatch  of  a  vast  amount  of  work. 


32      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

During  the  years  1775  to  1780,  the  committee  system,  while 
showing  improvement  in  some  minor  respects,  was  still  the  most 
important  factor  in  the  conduct  of  business.  The  result  was  an 
almost  total  inability  to  get  things  done  and  this  weakness  was 
reflected  in  all  the  departments  of  the  Congress. 

The  distribution  of  the  membership  on  these  special  com 
mittees  among  the  colonies  and  their  personnel  may  well  claim 
our  attention  and  may  throw  some  light  upon  the  persistence  of 
the  committee  system  through  so  many  years,  in  spite  of  its  ineffi 
ciency.  In  the  year  1775,  of  10  committees  selected  because  of 
their  importance,  the  representation  of  the  different  colonies  on 
these  committees  was  as  follows :  Massachusetts  6 ;  Connecticut  3, 
making  9  in  all  from  New  England.  Pennsylvania  had  7,  New 
York  11  and  Maryland  2,  making  20  in  all  from  the  Middle  colo 
nies.  Virginia  had  10,  North  Carolina  2,  and  South  Carolina  4, 
making  16  in  all  from  the  Southern  colonies.  The  percentage  of 
representation  of  each  group  of  colonies  on  these  10  committees 
was  as  follows :  New  England  20% ;  Middle  colonies  45% ;  South 
ern  colonies  35%. 

If  a  second  period  in  the  same  year  is  selected  beginning 
June  25,  a  study  of  the  committees  in  a  chronological  order  re 
veals  a  marked  change  in  proportionate  representation  among  th« 
colonies. 

The  distribution  among  the  colonies  was  now  as  follows : 
Massachusetts  7,  Connecticut  6,  Rhode  Island  3,  New  Hampshire 
3,  making  19  in  all  from  New  England.  Delaware  was  repre 
sented  by  2  members,  New  York  by  8,  Pennsylvania  by  8,  Mary 
land  by  6,  and  New  Jersey  by  2,  making  26  in  all  from  the  Middle 
colonies.  Virginia  was  represented  by  6  members,  South  Caro 
lina  by  6,  and  Georgia  by  3,  making  15  in  all  from  the  Southern 
colonies.  These  figures  would  show  that  the  representation  was 
very  evenly  distributed  among  the  colonies. 


THE  RISE  OP  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  33 

It  has  been  intimated,  however,  that  the  New  England  and 
Southern  colonies,  if  combined,  would  always  have  a  balance  of 
power  in  Congress,  even  if  all  the  delegates  from  these  two  groups 
of  colonies  did  not  follow  the  majority  of  their  fellows  in  acting 
together.  The  following  statement  gives  some  light  on  the  possi 
bility  of  such  a  combination.  "The  Adams's  of  Massachusetts 
and  the  Lees  of  Virginia  were  the  dangerous  minority,  who  had 
all  along  aimed  at  independency  but  whose  purposes  had  never 
been  so  openly  exposed  as  now.  Mr.  Dickinson,  Mr.  Jay  and  Mr. 
Deane  were  the  exponents  of  the  majority.  During  the  month  of 
September,  1775,  the  committees,  if  nothing  else,  show  with  tol 
erable  clearness,  the  temper  prevailing  in  the  body. "  7  John 
Adams  himself  said,  ' '  Mr.  Samuel  Adams  and  myself  were  very 
intimate  with  Richard  Henry  Lee  and  he  agreed  with  us  per 
fectly  in  the  great  system  of  our  policies  and  by  this  means  we 
kept  a  majority  of  the  delegates  of  Virginia  with  us.  Harrison, 
Pendleton  and  some  others  showed  jealousy  of  this  intimacy  at 
times.  Harrison  courted  Hancock  and  others  of  our  colleagues, 
but  we  had  a  majority  and  gave  ourselves  no  trouble  about  their 
little  intrigues. ' ' 8 

These  statements  are  significant.  They  appear  to  be  a  clear 
indication  of  the  trend  of  events  and  they  clearly  show  that  an 
attempt  was  being  made  to  control,  absolutely,  the  actions  of 
Congress  through  the  committee  system. 

In  the  beginning  of  1776,  a  chronological  list  of  ten  commit 
tees  was  noted.  Either  Samuel  or  John  Adams  are  found  on 
every  one  of  them.  Five  of  these  committees  had  to  do  with  the 
army,  with  General  Washington  or  with  the  regulation  of  trade 
or  foreign  affairs.  The  distribution  of  the  colonies  upon  these 
committees  was  as  follows :  Massachusetts  was  represented  by  19 


1  Charles  Francis  Adams:  Life  of  John  Adams,  I,  p.  183. 
*  John  Adams:  Works,  III,  p.  32. 


34      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

members ;  Rhode  Island  by  3 ;  Connecticut  by  5 ;  New  York  by  4 ; 
New  Jersey  by  2 ;  Pennsylvania  by  1 ;  Delaware  by  1 ;  Maryland 
by  1 ;  Virginia  by  7 ;  North  Carolina  by  1 ;  South  Carolina  by  4. 
The  New  England  colonies  alone  controlled  19  of  the  total  mem 
bership  of  40  members  on  these  10  committees;  the  Southern 
colonies  controlled  12,  while  the  Middle  colonies  controlled  9. 
The  combined  membership  of  the  New  England  and  Southern 
colonies  was  31  out  of  a  total  membership  of  40. 

During  the  latter  part  of  1776,  the  distribution  and  per 
sonnel  of  10  committees  taken  in  a  chronological  order  were 
noted.  John  Adams  or  Samuel  Adams  or  Richard  Henry  Lee 
were  found  on  every  one  of  them.  Lee,  alone,  served  on  7  of  thest 
committees.  Nine  of  these  committees  had  to  do  with  executive 
functions.  In  these  10  committees  the  colonies  were  represented 
as  follows:  Massachusetts  was  represented  by  10  members;  New 
York  by  2 ;  New  Jersey  by  2 ;  Maryland  by  1 ;  Virginia  by  10  and 
South  Carolina  by  1.  The  total  for  New  England  was  10  mem 
bers;  for  the  Middle  colonies  5  and  for  the  Southern  colonies  11. 
Combined,  the  New  England  and  Southern  colonies  controlled  21 
out  of  a  total  membership  of  26. 

Three  things  of  marked  significance  are  here  revealed.  (1) 
The  number  of  members  on  these  special  committees  had  been  ap 
preciably  reduced.  (2)  The  number  of  colonies  represented  on 
these  committees  had  been  reduced,  on.  the  average,  by  half.  (3) 
There  is  evidence  of  a  centralization  of  power  in  the  hands  of  a 
few  men  with  increased  executive  functions. 

The  ulterior  functions  of  the  committee  system  now  begin  to 
be  revealed.  By  this  system,  and  this  system  alone,  could  the 
destinies  of  the  united  colonies  be  controlled  by  the  Radical  or 
Liberty  party  in  Congress.  The  work  of  Congress  was  placed  in 
the  hands  of  committees,  consisting  of  a  membership  whose  ma 
jority  was  unalterably  opposed  to  any  centralization  of  power 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  35 

whatsoever.  Yet,  these  men,  under  the  leadership  of  the  Adams's 
and  the  Lees,  were  actually  attempting  to  accomplish  centraliza 
tion  of  power  under  the  very  eyes  of  Congress.  Opposition  to 
this  procedure  was  another  factor  which  aided  in  producing  in 
efficiency  and  chaos  in  Congress. 

During  1776,  there  were  169  special  and  14  standing  com 
mittees.  Samuel  Adams  served  upon  22  special  and  4  standing 
committees.  John  Adams  served  upon  13  special  and  2  standing 
committees.  Of  a  total  of  43  committees  taken  chronologically 
from  June  17,  1776  to  Dec.  28,  1776,  all  of  which  had  to  do  with 
important  national  affairs,  Massachusetts,  alone,  controlled  14 
of  them,  while  in  a  combination  with  the  Southern  colonies,  she 
controlled  32  of  the  total  of  43  committees.  Of  these  32  commit 
tees,  11  had  to  do  with  the  control  of  the  army  and  instructions 
to  Washington  and  8  with  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  Samuel 
Adams  served  on  7  and  John  Adams  served  on  4  of  the  army  com 
mittees,  while  each  served  on  4  of  the  8  committees  relative  to 
foreign  affairs. 

Of  the  95  special  committees  elected  during  1777,  besides  the 
17  standing  committees,  Samuel  Adams  served  on  16  special  and 

I  standing  committee  (Board  of  War)  ;  John  Adams  served  on 

II  special  committees  and  one  standing  committee,  while  Richard 
Henry  Lee  served  on  18  special  committees.    Most  of  these  spe 
cial  committees  were  those  upon  which  the  Adams's  were  not 
serving,  so  that  if  the  two  colonies  of  Massachusetts  and  Virginia 
did  not  actually  control  every  committee,  they  used  their  pow 
erful  influence  in  almost  every  special  committee.     They,  with 
out  doubt,  actually  controlled  45  of  the  95  special  committees  and 
knew  exactly  what  was  going  on  in  all  the  rest  of  them. 

Of  158  of  the  210  special  committees  elected  in  1778,  which 
have  been  observed  in  detail,  66  were  elected  to  consider  letters. 
Of  the  remaining  92  committees,  it  was  found  that  the  represen- 


36      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

tation  of  the  different  colonies  on  the  more  important  committees, 
such  as  those  elected  to  prepare  instructions  to  the  American 
Commissioners  in  France  or  to  Washington ;  to  act  upon  the  mat 
ter  of  foreign  relations,  etc.,  or  to  receive  communications  from 
the  French  minister, — was  as  follows:  Massachusetts  had  14 
members ;  Connecticut  27 ;  Rhode  Island  4 ;  Virginia,  24  and 
South  Carolina  15.  From  the  Middle  Colonies  the  membership 
was  as  follows :  New  York  18 ;  New  Jersey  13 ;  Pennsylvania  3 ; 
Delaware  3  and  Maryland  8.  The  total  membership  of  the  New 
England  and  Southern  colonies  was  84  as  compared  to  45  from 
the  Middle  colonies.  This  would  seem  natural,  since  two  groups 
would  necessarily  more  than  outvote  a  third  group.  But  the  sig 
nificant  fact  is  that  five  colonies  of  the  first  two  groups  had  near 
ly  double  the  representation  of  the  third  group  of  five  colonies. 
Thus  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  Virginia  and  South  Carolina 
dominated  practically  every  committee.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
majority  of  the  memberships  of  the  unimportant  committees, 
such  as  those  relative  to  seals,  petitions,  celebrations,  accounts, 
letters,  etc.,  went  to  the  Middle  colonies. 

During  1779,  26  different  men  were  represented  244  times 
on  the  total  of  104  special  committees  elected.  Of  these  26  dif 
ferent  men,  4  were  from  Massachusetts,  5  from  Connecticut,  1 
from  Rhode  Island,  2  from  New  York,  1  from  Delaware,  4  from 
New  Jersey,  2  from  Pennsylvania,  4  from  Maryland,  2  from 
Virginia  and  1  from  South  Carolina.  It  should  be  noted  that  the 
New  England  colonies  furnished  10  of  the  26  men;  the  Middle 
colonies  furnished  13,  while  only  3  came  from  the  Southern  colo 
nies.  Now  a  most  remarkable  fact  is  discovered,  when  it  is  con 
sidered  in  the  light  of  what  has  been  said  concerning  committee 
control.  The  three  men  of  the  Southern  colonies  served  on  51 
of  the  104  committees ;  the  13  from  the  Middle  colonies  served  on 
35,  while  the  10  men  from  the  New  England  colonies  served  on 


THE  RISE  OP  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  37 

81.  The  New  England  and  Southern  colonies  thus  had  a  com 
bined  membership  of  132  as  compared  to  36  from  the  Middle 
colonies  and  these  132  memberships  were  contributed  by  only 
one-half  of  all  the  men  represented  on  the  104  committees.  Here 
is  clear  proof  of  the  increasing  determination  and  power  to  con 
trol  national  affairs  by  a  very  few  colonies  represented  by  men 
who  entertained  very  definite  views  concerning  the  proper  invest 
ment  of  power  in  the  hands  of  a  few  men. 

The  committees  on  military  and  foreign  affairs  were  dis 
tributed  as  follows:  New  England  colonies,  28  members  repre 
sented  by  S  men ;  the  Middle  colonies,  20  members  represented  by 
7  men,  while  the  Southern  colonies  had  17  members  represented 
by  2  men.  The  New  England  and  Southern  colonies  had  together 
45  members  represented  by  10  men,  while  the  Middle  colonies  had 
20  members  represented  by  7  men.  The  tendency  here,  relative 
to  the  control  of  executive  functions  in  the  more  important  af 
fairs  of  the  colonies,  is  plain. 

During  1780,  of  the  131  committees  noted  in  a  chronological 
order,  the  membership  was  limited  to  48  men.  The  distribution 
of  these  men  among  the  colonies  was  as  follows:  Massachusetts 
68,  Connecticut  60,  Rhode  Island  28,  New  Hampshire  2,  making 
158  in  all.  New  York  contributed  73,  New  Jersey  27,  Delaware 
28,  Pennsylvania  21  and  Maryland  25,  making  174  in  all,  while 
Virginia  contributed  11,  South  Carolina  15,  North  Carolina  38 
and  Georgia  2,  making  66  in  all.  Here  is  shown  for  the  first  time, 
the  growing  power  of  the  Middle  colonies.  This  means  that  the 
conservative,  constructive  policy  of  men  like  Morris,  Franklin, 
the  Livingstons  and  others  was  gaining  strength.  Furthermore, 
there  is  evidence  of  the  beginning  of  a  coalition  between  Massa 
chusetts  and  the  Middle  colonies.  Witherspoon  of  New  Jersey, 
for  example,  was  an  able  aid  of  Samuel  Adams  during  the  years 
1779,  1780  and  1781.  There  is  also  noted  a  distinct  falling  off 


38      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

in  the  power  and  influence  of  Virignia  and  the  other  Southern 
colonies.  The  ways  had  begun  to  part  and  Richard  Henry  Lee 
was  practically  the  only  member  from  Virginia  who  openly  sup 
ported  what  may  with  propriety  be  called  the  '* militia"  policy 
of  the  New  England  or  Liberty  party. 

Coincident  with  this  change,  there  appears  a  gradual  de 
velopment  of  executive  power  in  spite  of  the  large  number  of 
committees  still  appointed.  Much  work  was  now  being  done  by 
the  Boards  of  War,  Admiralty,  Commerce,  and  even  a  Committee 
of  Foreign  Affairs  was  given  some  work  to  do  in  connection  with 
the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs. 

It  is  further  noticeable  that  letters  from  Washington  are 
now  referred  to  committees  representing  in  their  membership  no 
one  colony  or  group  of  colonies.  Even  the  Committee  of  For 
eign  Affairs  was  not  now  under  the  control  of  the  New  England 
delegates.  Above  all  there  is  a  remarkable  falling  off  in  the 
original  membership  of  Congress,  only  Sherman,  McKean,  Sam 
uel  Adams,  Dana  and  Bland  having  retained  their  membership 
in  Congress  from  1775  to  1780. 

During  1781,  261  special  committees  were  elected.  Of  these 
127  were  formed  for  the  purpose  of  considering  communications. 
But  45  of  these  seemed  to  have  as  their  function  the  consideration 
of  important  and  constructive  work.  This  seems  to  point  to  the 
fact  that,  in  spite  of  the  increased  number  of  special  committees, 
the  important  work  of  Congress  was  being  gradually  concentrated 
in  the  hands  of  Boards  or  standing  committees.  Aside  from  the 
committees  elected  to  consider  the  reports  of  the  different  Boards 
and  standing  committees,  the  membership  of  the  remaining  com 
mittees  was  very  much  scattered,  no  colony  or  set  of  colonies  hav 
ing  any  decided  advantage.  But  one  of  all  these  special  com 
mittees  was  elected  to  consider  matters  relative  to  foreign  rela 
tions  and  this  committee  was  to  make  proper  arrangements  to 
receive  the  French  minister. 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  39 

On  May  15, 1781,  a  new  feature  in  the  election  of  committees 
was  developed.  The  weakening  of  the  control  of  the  special  com 
mittees  by  the  New  England  and  Southern  colonies  has  been 
noted.  Coincident  with  this  we  note  a  marked  increase  in  the 
number  of  special  committees  during  1781.  In  desperation,  the 
constructive  elements  in  Congress  proposed  a  weekly  committee, 
whose  functions  should  be  the  distribution  of  all  business  to  the 
proper  channels  for  consideration  and  action.  This  committee 
was,  in  reality,  a  steering  committee. 

Here  seemed  to  be  another  chance  for  the  New  England 
leaders  to  gain  control  of  the  conduct  of  Congressional  actions. 
By  controlling  the  selection  of  the  steering  committees  each  week, 
they  could  check,  promote  or  divert  measures  to  their  liking. 
Observation  shows  that  some  such  attempt  was  made.  In  the  34 
committees  of  this  kind,  elected  from  the  15th  of  May  to  the  end 
of  the  year  1781,  the  New  England  colonies  contributed  28  mem 
bers;  the  Southern  colonies  31  members,  while  the  Middle  colo 
nies  contributed  34  members.  The  New  England  and  Southern 
colonies  had,  combined,  59  members  as  compared  to  34  from  the 
Middle  colonies.  While  the  combination  between  the  New  Eng 
land  and  the  Southern  colonies  did  not  mean  so  much  in  1781  as 
in  1778,  yet  the  totals  show  that  the  power  of  the  Radicals  in 
Congress  was  still  formidable.  Of  these  34  committees,  New 
England  and  the  Southern  colonies  absolutely  controlled  7  by 
having  every  member  on  them  from  these  colonies.  They  con 
trolled  two  of  the  three  members  of  the  committee  in  16  of  the  34 
weeks,  leaving  11  weekly  committees  exclusively  controlled  by  the 
members  from  the  Middle  colonies.  During  the  last  six  weeks  of 
the  year,  the  Middle  colonies  seem  to  have  obtained  control  of  the 
majority  of  the  membership  in  this  weekly  committee.  But  this 
was  apparently  of  little  consequence,  for  according  to  the  rec 
ords,  not  one  special  committee  was  appointed,  outside  of  the 


40      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

steering  committees,  from  the  31st  of  October  to  the  last  day  of 
the  year. 

The  reason  for  such  an  omission  of  committees  is  not  appar 
ent.  The  committee  system,  as  a  scheme  of  Congressional  con 
trol,  was  fast  running  its  course.  The  war  had  been  concluded. 
The  specific  aims  of  the  Radicals  had  been  accomplished,  but 
the  amount  of  time  and  the  number  of  opportunities  lost  which 
might  have  been  used  to  shorten  the  war  through  solidifying  the 
efforts  and  powers  of  an  efficient  government  were  beyond  com 
putation. 

The  nature  and  personnel  of  Congressional  committees, 
leaves  no  room  for  doubt  concerning  the  purpose  of  the  commit 
tee  system  and  its  inevitable  tendencies.  Whether  the  leaders 
perceived  the  final  results  of  such  a  policy  is  beside  the  question. 
The  system  worked  for  a  relatively  long  period  and  the  system 
was  the  necessary  cause  of  inefficiency  and  the  forerunner  of  ex 
ecutive  powers  in  responsible  governmental  departments. 

SUMMARY. 

The  committee  sj'stem  had  its  origin  in  Massachusetts  under 
the  guidance  of  Samuel  Adams.  This  system  was  at  once  adopted 
by  Congress  as  a  means  of  conducting  business,  because  it  had 
been  eminently  successful  in  accomplishing  results  in  the  colo 
nies.  It  was  also  a  democratic  method  of  carrying  out  the  func 
tions  of  government  and  effectually  prevented  the  centralization 
of  power.  It  was  an  elaboration  of  the  town-meeting. 

It  was  soon  found  by  the  Radicals,  however,  that  the  com 
mittee  system  was  the  only  method  by  which  their  ideas  of  inde 
pendence  could  hope  to  prevail.  The  next  step  was  a  political 
combination  between  the  New  England  and  Southern  colonies  in 
order  that  the  committee  system  might  be  absolutely  controlled 
and  used  for  the  ends  in  view. 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  41 

A  study  of  the  committee  system  from  1775  to  1781  shows 
how  this  process  of  control  was  gradually  evolved.  The  imme 
diate  effect  was  the  decentralization  of  power  and  inefficiency  in 
Congress  in  the  conduct  of  business,  but  marked  centralization 
of  power  in  the  hands  of  the  Radicals  for  furthering  their  own 
ideas  and  principles.  This  centralization  was  actually  accom 
plished  by  reducing  the  size  of  committees,  by  a  reduction  in  the 
number  of  colonies  represented  on  the  various  committees  and  by 
an  increase  in  the  number  of  representatives  from  particular  col 
onies  having  definite  principles  to  promulgate. 

Beginning  in  the  year  1780,  the  power  of  the  Radicals  in 
Congress  began  to  weaken.  The  Constructionists,  largely  repre 
senting  the  Middle  colonies,  were  able  to  break  the  selfish  hold 
of  the  Liberty  party.  Executive  power  began  to  develop  and  ex 
pressed  itself  in  well  defined  Boards  and  Departments.  By  1781, 
the  committee  system  as  a  scheme  of  control  of  Congressional 
actions  had  almost  completely  lost  its  power.  This  break-up  was 
hastened  by  a  change  in  old  party  alignments,  which  had  been  so 
effective  in  accomplishing  results  in  the  early  years,  and  the  equal 
distribution  of  representatives  from  the  different  colonies  on  most 
of  the  important  committees  or  in  the  executive  departments. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  IMMEDIATE  EFFECT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  UPON  THE 
CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS. 

The  first  committee  having  anything  to  do  with  the  conduct 
of  foreign  affairs  was  elected  on  November  29,  1775.  On  this 
date,  it  was  resolved  "that  a  committee  of  five  be  appointed  for 
the  sole  purpose  of  corresponding  with  our  friends  in  Great 
Britain,  Ireland  and  other  parts  of  the  world,  and  that  they  lay 
their  correspondence  before  Congress  when  directed."  The 
members  of  this  committee  were  Benjamin  Harrison  of  Vir 
ginia  ;  Benjamin  Franklin  of  Pennsylvania ;  Thomas  Johnson  of 
Maryland;  John  Dickinson  of  Pennsylvania  and  John  Jay  of 
New  York.  The  Middle  colonies  were  here  well  represented, 
having  four  of  the  five  members.  * 

Some  interesting  observations  may  be  made  concerning  this 
committee.  (1)  Congress  resolved.  This  was,  as  we  have  ob 
served,  its  accustomed  way  of  doing  business.  (2)  A  committee 
of  five  was  elected.  This  number  was  characteristic  of  most  of 
the  committees  formed.  They  ranged  from  three  to  thirteen, 
and  thus  centralization  of  power  was  prevented.  (3)  The  com 
mittee  was  appointed  for  the  sole  purpose,  etc.  Its  powers  were 
clearly  defined  and  limited.  (4)  Its  correspondence  was  to  be 
laid  before  Congress  ivhen  desired  by  that  body.  Thus  Con 
gress  was  to  have  absolute  and  continuous  control  of  its  ap 
pointed  committee. 

Party  politics  were  at  once  in  evidence  in  the  appointment 

1  Journals  of  Congress,  I,  p.  192. 


THE  IMMEDIATE  EFFECT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  43 

and  control  of  this  committee.  The  Liberty*  faction  was  not 
strong  enough  to  control  the  personnel  of  this  committee,  but 
did  manage  to  limit  and  define  its  powers. 

That  this  committee  was  not  considered  a  diplomatic  one  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  on  December  2,  1775,  Congress  resolved 
that  the  Committee  of  Correspondence  be  directed  to  use  their 
endeavors  to  find  out  and  engage  in  the  service  of  the  United 
colonies,  skillful  engineers,  not  exceeding  four,  to  be  paid  equally 
to  what  they  received  in  former  services. 2  On  May  10,  1776, 
it  was  resolved  that  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence  be 
directed  to  lay  their  proceedings  before  Congress  on  the  follow 
ing  Monday,  withholding  names  of  persons  they  have  employed 
or  with  whom  they  have  corresponded. 3  There  is  no  apparent 
evidence  to  show  just  how  the  committee  came  to  assume  the  new 
name  now  used  by  it.  There  is  a  possibility  that  the  name  was 
transferred  by  common  consent  or  usage  from  that  of  the  Secret 
Committee,  which  had  been  previously  appointed  to  purchase 
supplies  for  the  army.  At  any  rate,  there  is  little  reference  to 
the  Secret  Committee,  as  such,  after  this  time  and  increased  ref 
erence  to  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence.  The  latter 
did  all  the  work  of  the  first  committee,  together  with  much  cor 
respondence.  At  the  same  time  the  Committee  of  Secret  Corre 
spondence  was  beginning  to  take  on  some  of  the  functions  of  a 
diplomatic  committee,  yet  it  was  not  considered  as  a  foreign 
affairs  committee,  judging  from  the  attitude  of  Congress  to  it. 

This  observation  is  borne  out  by  the  fact  that  on  May  9, 


*Note:  The  terms  Independence  party,  Liberty  faction  and  Radicals  all 
refer  to  the  same  body  of  men  in  Congress.  The  differences  between  them 
were  due  to  differences  in  the  stage  of  their  development,  rather  than  to  dif 
ferences  in  principles.  The  Independnce  party  men  soon  became  Liberty 
men  and  the  Liberty  men  in  turn  became  Radicals  in  order  that  they  might 
insure  the  acceptance  of  Liberty  principles. 

*  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  I,  p.  66. 

*  Journals  of  Congress,  IV,  p.  345. 


44      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

1776,  it  was  resolved  that  an  order  for  $10,000  be  drawn  on  the 
treasurer  in  favor  of  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence 
for  the  purchase  of  two  vessels,  they  to  be  accountable.  *  That 
this  committee  was  performing  the  functions  of  a  Board  of  War 
is  here  evident. 

In  September,  1776,  Congress,  again,  in  a  committee  of  the 
whole,  worked  out  a  set  of  instructions  for  Franklin,  giving  de 
tailed  instructions  concerning  the  presenting  and  handling  of  a 
treaty  with  France,  indicating  in  the  minutest  details  what  ar 
ticles  to  insist  upon,  what  to  surrender  at  once  and  what  to  use 
as  "pawns"  in  the  game. 5  On  September  26,  1776,  a  commit 
tee  of  four  was  appointed  to  prepare  a  draft  of  instructions  to 
Franklin  and  his  two  colleagues  (Deane  and  Jefferson).6  On 
September  28,  Congress  accepted  the  draft  of  instructions  drawn 
up  by  this  Committee.  It  was  also  resolved  on  this  date  that  the 
Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence  be  directed  to  export  pro 
duce  or  remit  bills  equal  to  1,000  Ibs.  sterling,  subject  to  the  or 
der  of  the  Commissioners  in  France  for  their  support. 7 

Here  we  have  conclusive  evidence  of  the  unimportant  for 
eign  relations  functions  of  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspond 
ence.  All  such  relations  and  functions  were  given  into  the  hands 
of  a  special  committee.  But  this  is  just  what  should  be  ex 
pected,  in  view  of  what  is  known  concerning  the  fear  of  too 
much  concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of  a  few.  The  Com 
mittee  of  Secret  Correspondence  possessed  no  power  of  its  own 
to  decide  or  to  act  upon  any  war  measures  whatsoever,  and  prac 
tically  had  no  power  to  act  upon  measures  coming  within  its 
own  jurisdiction. 

On  December  24,  1776,  Congress  resolved  that  a  committee 

4  Journals  of  Congress,  V,  p.  529. 

•  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  pp.  27,  28,  29. 

•  Ibid.  II,  p.  31. 

'  Ibid.  II,  pp.  33,  34. 


THE  IMMEDIATE  EFFECT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  45 

of  five  be  appointed  to  prepare  and  report  on  a  plan  for  ob 
taining  foreign  assistance. 8  The  men  elected  to  this  committee 
were  Gerry  of  Massachusetts ;  Witherspoon  of  New  Jersey ;  Rich 
ard  Henry  Lee  of  Virginia;  Clark  of  New  Jersey  and  Samuel 
Adams  of  Massachusetts. 

The  name  of  Samuel  Adams  is  here  found  upon  a  foreign 
affairs  committee  for  the  first  time.  This  clearly  indicates  the 
increased  influence  of  the  Radicals.  Unable  to  control  the  per 
sonnel  of  the  original  Committee  of  Correspondence,  they  were 
able  to  limit  its  powers,  and  defeat  its  functioning  as  a  foreign 
relations  committee.  Here  we  find  a  special  committee  having 
for  its  definite  work  the  conduct  of  foreign  relations  and  it  is  con 
trolled  almost  completely  by  the  Radicals,  four  of  the  five  mem 
bers  coming  from  that  faction,  since  it  was  known  that  Wither 
spoon  was  in  sympathy  with  the  Radical  policies  and  it  is  entirely 
possible  that  he  might  have  influenced  Clark,  the  fifth  member 
of  the  committee. 

Even  before  this,  on  September  26,  1776,  a  committee  of 
four  had  been  elected  to  draft  letters  of  credence  to  the  Commis 
sioners  in  France,  another  piece  of  work  which  should  have  gone 
to  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence.  9  The  members  of 
this  committee  were  Morris  of  New  York ;  R.  H.  Lee  of  Virginia ; 
Wythe  of  Virginia  and  John  Adams  of  Massachusetts.  Here 
again  the  Radicals  controlled  three  of  the  four  votes  on  this  com 
mittee. 

The  very  presence  of  Samuel  Adams,  John  Adams  and  R.  H. 
Lee  on  such  committees  presages  the  beginning  of  a  so-called 
"militia"  policy  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  In  the  in 
structions  to  William  Lee  as  Commissioner  to  Vienna,  this  Radi 
cal  committee  directed  him  as  follows :  ' t  You  will  seize  the  first 
favorable  moment  to  solicit,  with  decent  firmness  and  respect,  an 

*  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  36. 

•  Journals  of  Congress,  V,  p.  827. 


46      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

acknowledgement  of  the  independence  of  these  states  and  the 
public  reception  of  their  commissioners  as  the  representatives 
of  a  sovereign  state. ' ' 10  The  instructions  to  Ralph  Izard,  Com 
missioner  to  Tuscany,  were  identical  in  language.  Here  was  the 
launching  of  a  policy  which  was  destined  to  cause  a  perilous 
situation  in  the  conduct  of  American  foreign  relations. 

These  men  of  the  Radical  section  or  faction  in  Congress, 
sought  to  democratize  all  efforts  to  secure  international  co-opera 
tion  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  They  feared  the  centrali 
zation  of  power  even  in  the  hands  of  envoys  and  they  were 
afraid  of  the  power  residing  in  the  crowned  heads  of  Europe. 
Despising  all  accepted  methods  of  diplomacy,  they  were  deter 
mined  that  whatever  work  of  a  foreign  nature  must  be  done, 
should  be  controlled  by  men  of  a  set  and  determined  purpose, 
who  would  make  aggressive  demands  upon  foreign  powers 
worthy  of  recognition.  It  is  worth  considering  whether  these 
men  saw  the  impending  danger  of  this  line  of  procedure.  They, 
apparently,  did  not  see  the  defects  of  an  elaborate  committee 
system.  It  cannot  be  assumed  that  they  were  alive  to  the  out 
come  of  the  committee  system  projected  into  the  conduct  of  for 
eign  affairs. 

On  December  27,  1776,  Congress  directed  the  Committee  of 
Secret  Correspondence  to  direct  the  Commissioners  in  France  to 
procure  100,000  stand  of  arms.  "  This  is  the  first  instance  where 
this  committee  had  anything  to  do  with  the  men  in  France  over 
whom  it  might  be  assumed  to  have  had  full  control.  Its  diplo 
matic  character  was  here,  for  the  first  time,  feebly  recognized. 
It  is  safe  to  conclude,  however,  that  the  work  of  the  committee 
consisted  mainly  in  the  securing  of  money,  munitions  and  sup 
plies,  while  the  real  work  of  foreign  relations  was  conducted  by 
the  special  committee  elected  three  days  before. 

w  Wharton:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  350. 
u  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  pp.  36,  37. 


THE  IMMEDIATE  EFFECT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  47 

On  April  17,  1777,  Congress  resolved  that  the  Committee 
of  Secret  Correspondence  be  altered  and  that  for  the  future,  it 
be  styled  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs. 12  It  was  further 
resolved  that  a  secretary  be  appointed  or  elected  to  said  com 
mittee  with  a  salary  of  $70  per  month.  The  secretary  was  to 
take  an  oath  of  secrecy.  After  some  debate  Thomas  Paine  was 
elected  secretary  of  the  committee. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  motion  to  change  the  name 
of  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence  was  made  by  its 
friends.  These  friends,  however,  were  not  the  Kadicals.  It  was 
thought  by  the  Constructionists  that  if  the  committee  were 
recognized  by  name  as  having  some  functions  of  a  diplomatic 
nature,  the  work  of  the  committee  along  this  line  might  eventu 
ally  become  of  more  importance.  It  will  be  interesting  to  note  if 
the  change  in  name  did  bring  to  it  more  work  of  a  diplomatic 
nature  than  before. 

Almost  immediately,  the  Radicals  tried  to  control  this  com 
mittee.  On  April  17,  1777,  the  same  day  upon  which  the  change 
in  the  name  of  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence  had 
been  effected,  it  was  moved  that  two  members  be  added  to  the 
Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs. 13  The  men  proposed  were 
Lovell  of  Massachusetts  and  Heyward  of  South  Carolina.  This 
recommendation  as  to  the  personnel  of  the  enlarged  committee 
was,  however,  scratched  out  of  the  journals.  On  May  26,  1777, 
the  same  names  were  again  proposed  and  this  time  they  were 
elected  to  the  committee. 14  Fearing  that  the  change  in  name 
actually  did  mean  a  change  in  the  nature  of  the  work  of  the 
original  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  the  Radicals  at 
tempted  to  change  the  personnel  of  the  Committee  for  Foreign 
Affairs  entirely,  and  in  this  they  largely  succeeded,  though  pre- 

"  Journals  of  Congress,  VII,  p.  274. 
"  Ibid.  VII,  p.  276. 
14  Ibid.  VIII,  p.  385. 


48      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

viously  the  committee  had  been,  under  the  leadership  of  Robert 
Morris  of  New  York,  overwhelmingly  conservative  and  construc 
tive  in  its  policy. 

The  addition  of  these  two  Radicals  to  the  Committee  for 
Foreign  Affairs  did  not  give  the  Radicals  complete  control  of  the 
committee,  however.  It  was  great  enough,  nevertheless,  to  limit 
to  a  large  degree,  the  power  of  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Af 
fairs  and  thus  minimize  its  importance.  The  Radicals  then  had 
recourse  to  the  election  of  special  committees  again  as  some  of  the 
following  will  show: 

(1)  On  May  1,  1778,  a  committee  of  three  (R.  H.  Lee,  Gov 
ern  eur  Morris,  Roger  Sherman)  was  elected  to  draw  up  proper 
instructions  to  the  Commissioners  to  foreign  courts. 15  Here  is  a 
clear  case  of  a  special  committee  assuming  the  functions  of  the 
Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs.  Two  of  the  three  men  composing 
the  committee  were  Radicals,  fully  pledged  to  the  " militia"  pol 
icy  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  (2)  On  May  4,  1778,  a 
committee  of  three  (R.  H.  Lee,  Dana,  Drayton)  was  elected  to 
prepare  a  form  of  ratification  of  treaties  already  suggested. lfl 
All  three  of  these  men  were  Radicals.  (3)  On  September  14, 
1778,  a  committee  of  five  (Morris,  Chase,  Drayton,  R.  H.  Lee, 
Samuel  Adams)  was  elected  to  prepare  a  letter  of  credence  to 
Louis  XVI,  notifying  him  of  the  appointment  of  Franklin  as 
minister  plenipotentiary  to  the  court  of  France. 17  The  Radi 
cals  controlled  three  of  the  five  members  of  this  committee  also. 
Previous  to  this,  in  October,  1777,  R.  H.  Lee,  Witherspoon  and 
Hooper  had  been  added  to  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs  in 
the  hope  of  completely  controlling  it.  By  this  new  addition  the 
Radicals  now  had  a  majority  of  one  in  a  total  membership  of 
eleven. 

u  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  488. 
19  Ibid.  II,  p.  490. 
"  Ibid.  II,  p.  504. 


THE  IMMEDIATE  EFFECT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  49 

On  June  1,  1778,  the  instructions  to  the  Commissioners  in 
France  having  been  reported  out,  they  were  found  to  be  unsat 
isfactory  on  account  of  their  extreme  aggressiveness  and  they 
were  ordered  recommitted. 18  At  the  same  time  three  more  mem 
bers  were  added  to  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs.  These 
men  were  Drayton  of  South  Carolina :  Duer  of  New  York  and  J. 
Smith  of  Pennsylvania.  Two  of  these  three  men  were  Conserva 
tives,*  thus  destroying  the  precarious  majority  of  the  Radicals  in 
the  committee. 

This  see-saw  work  in  Congress  relative  to  the  conduct  of  for 
eign  affairs  now  began  to  produce  its  evil  results.  On  August  13, 
1778,  it  was  resolved  "that  Congress  take  into  consideration  on 
the  following  Saturday  the  state  of  foreign  affairs  and  that  Mr. 
Silas  Deane  be  required  to  attend  Congress  on  that  day  and  give 
them  information  respecting  the  general  state  of  those  affairs 
and  a  particular  statement  of  the  funds  and  commercial  trans 
actions  in  Europe  and  especially  with  Monsieur  Beaumarchais. "  lg 
It  was  further  ordered  "that  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs 
lay  before  Congress  all  letters  and  other  public  papers  which 
they  have  received  from  the  commissioners,  agents  or  other  per 
sons,  who  have  transacted  business  for  the  United  States  in 
Europe  from  the  appointment  of  the  Committee  of  Secret  Corre 
spondence  to  this  day. ' ' 20 

The  leaven  of  inefficiency  due  to  party  politics  had  begun 
to  work.  Previous  to  this  order,  on  August  1,  1777,  a  committee 
of  three  had  been  elected  to  examine  the  letters  which  had  passed 
between  the  then  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence  and  Mr. 


*Note: — The  term  Conservative  is  here  used  to  indicate  all  men  who 
opposed  the  Radical  program.  The  Construct] onists  on  this  issue  were  in 
cluded  among  the  Conservatives. 

18  Journals  of  Congress,  X,  p.  559. 

"  Ibid.  XI,  p.  787. 

28  Ibid.  XI,  p.  788. 


50      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

Silas  Deane  and  report  thereon  to  Congress. 21  This  committee 
was  composed  of  Samuel  Adams,  J.  Wilson  and  Henry  Laurens. 
The  Radicals  again  controlled  this  committee.  By  January  20, 
1779,  matters  had  become  so  indefinite  and  embarrassing,  that 
it  was  resolved  that  a  committee  consisting  of  one  member  from 
each  state,  be  appointed  to  take  into  consideration  the  foreign  af 
fairs  of  these  United  States  and  also  the  conduct  of  the  late  and 
present  commissioners  of  the  States  in  Europe  and  report 
thereon. 22 

After  a  long  and  heated  discussion  in  committee,  it  was 
finally  decided  upon  the  floor  of  Congress  after  at  least  six  votes 
had  been  taken  upon  the  matter,  that  "  suspicions  and  animosi 
ties  have  arisen  among  the  late  and  present  commissioners,  name 
ly  Benjamin  Franklin,  Silas  Deane,  Arthur  Lee,  Ralph  Izard 
and  William  Lee,  highly  prejudicial  to  the  honor  and  interests 
of  these  United  States. ' ' 23  It  apparently  did  not  occur  to  the 
members  of  Congress  that  the  direct  cause  of  the  suspicions  and 
animosities  was  the  undecided  and  inefficient  methods  of  con 
ducting  important  business  through  the  committee  system  con 
trolled  by  the  Radicals. 

On  April  30,  1779,  Paca  and  Drayton,  as  a  special  commit 
tee  on  the  question,  "Shall  Arthur  Lee,  commissioner  of  the 
United  States  at  the  court  of  Madrid,  be  recalled?"  laid  upon 
the  table  a  report,  which  was  only  accepted  after  the  President 
had  appealed  to  the  House,  due  to  the  strenuous  objections  of 
Samuel  Adams  to  the  report  as  being  out  of  order. 24  This  re 
port  was  in  substance  as  follows:  Whereas,  by  intelligence  com 
municated  to  the  committee  by  the  minister  of  France Mr. 

Arthur  Lee  has  not  the  confidence  of  either  the  courts  of  Ver- 


n  Journals  of  Congress,  VIII,  p.  596. 

M  Ibid.  VIII,  p.  93. 

M  Ibid.  XIII,  pp.  479-487. 

14  Ibid.  XIV,  pp.  534-537. 


THE  IMMEDIATE  EFFECT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  51 

sallies  or  Madrid that  his  appointment  as  plenipotentiary 

to  the  court  of  Madrid  would  be  disgusting  to  that  court 

that  the  conduct  of  Arthur  Lee  was  disgraceful  to  those  courts 
and  prejudicial  to  the  honor  and  interests  of  the  United  States 

that  the  committee  was  astonished  to  hear  an  assertion 

made  in  Congress  on  the  15th  inst.  by  an  Honorable  Member 
from  Massachusetts  (Samuel  Adams)  as  from  the  highest  au 
thority  in  America  that  the  said  commissioner  had  the  confidence 
of  the  Court  of  Versailles  and  since  another  assertion  by  the 
Honorable  Member  from  the  same  state,  that  the  said  member  is 
the  most  proper  person  to  represent  the  said  state  at  the  court  of 
Madrid,  assertions  which  being  made  in  debate  upon  foreign  af 
fairs,  were  made  to  influence  Congress  to  continue  the  said 

Arthur  Lee  as  the  public  minister  at  the  Court  of  Madrid 

that  the  committee  has  been  compelled  to  apply  to  the  Minister 
of  France  residing  near  Congress  as  the  highest  source  of  infor 
mation  in  America and  that  he  produced  an  original  let 
ter  to  him  from  Vergennes,  in  which  was  said,  '  I  confess  to  you, 

that  I  fear  Mr.  Lee  and  those  about  him ' that  he  disgusted 

the  Court  of  France and  that  this  information  was  laid  be 
fore  Congress  to  the  end  that  they  may  not  be  misled  to  con 
tinue  said  commissioner  at  the  Court  of  Madrid that  if  this 

advice  is  disregarded,  the  committee  discharges  its  duty  and  will 
not  be  responsible  for  the  consequences,  ruinous  to  finances  and 
an  impediment  to  peace. 

On  May  3,  1779,  a  vote  was  taken  on  the  recall  of  Arthur 
Lee. 25  The  states  voted  as  follows :  Massachusetts  gave  three  of 
her  four  votes  against  recall  as  might  have  been  expected ;  Rhode 
Island  was  divided;  Connecticut  voted  No;  New  York  voted 
Yes ;  New  Jersey,  controlled  by  Witherspoon,  voted  No ;  Pennsyl 
vania  was  divided;  Delaware  voted  No;  Maryland  voted  Yes; 

85  Journals  of  Congress,  XIV,  p.  542. 


52      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

Virginia,  Yes ;  North  Carolina,  Yes ;  South  Carolina  was  divided. 
A  divided  vote  was  given  on  the  whole  question  and  no  decision 
was  reached.  The  vote  showed,  however,  an  unmistakable  divis 
ion  between  old  forces  formerly  standing  strongly  and  firmly  to 
gether,  namely,  the  New  England  and  Southern  colonies.  The 
explanation  is  to  be  found  in  the  extreme  aggressiveness  of  the 
methods  of  the  Radical  party  and  the  beginning  of  a  new  prob 
lem  in  Congress  soon  to  be  known  as  States  Rights. 

On  June  10,  1779,  a  second  vote  was  taken  in  Congress  on 
the  recall  of  Lee. 2G  There  was  not  a  dissenting  vote  on  the 
question.  Two  days  before,  on  June  8th,  a  vote  had  been  taken 
on  the  recall  of  Ralph  Izard. 27  Here  the  vote  was  almost  unani 
mous,  only  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  Pennsylvania  and 
South  Carolina  voting  No.  This  vote  showed  how  fast  the  senti 
ment  in  Congress  was  turning  against  the  tactics  of  the  Radical 
party.  The  vote  on  Lee  was  conclusive. 

On  November  29th,  1779,  two  more  members  were  added  to 
the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs — Houston  of  New  Jersey  and 
Robert  Livingston  of  New  York. 28  This  action  threw  the  balance 
of  power  still  more  into  the  hands  of  the  Conservatives,  in  so  far 
as  the  conduct  of  foreign  relations  was  concerned. 

From  this  time  on  until  June,  1781,  very  little  is  heard  of 
the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs.  There  are  two  explanations 
for  this:  (1)  Much  of  the  real  work  of  the  committee  was  car 
ried  on  by  Franklin  in  France.  (2)  The  Radicals  seeing  their 
power  in  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs  fast  disappearing, 
went  back  again  to  the  old  system  of  electing  special  committees, 
thereby  hoping  to  control  the  actual  work  of  the  committee. 

Previous  to  June,  1781,  the  following  special  committees 
were  elected  to  act  upon  foreign  relations: 

18  Journals  of  Congress,  XIV,  p.  714. 

27  Ibid.  XIV,  p.  700. 

28  Ibid.  XV,  p.  1302. 


THE  IMMEDIATE  EFFECT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  53 

(1)  On  Februa^  24,  1779,  papers  relative  to  negotiations 
with  the  Barbary  states  were  ordered  referred  to  a  committee  of 
three    (Carmichael,  Nelson  and  Burke).29     All  three  of  these 
men  represented  the  Radical  party. 

(2)  On  April  15,  1779,  a  committee  of  thirteen   (already 
mentioned)   was  elected  to  consider  the  report  on  the  Commis 
sioners  abroad. 30 

(3)  On  October  9,  1779,  a  committee  was  elected  to  prepare 
a  commission  for  the  secretaries  to  the  minister  plenipotentiary 
to  France. 31 

(4)  On  October  13,  1779,  John  Jay  asked  Congress  for  in 
formation  as  to  the  source  of  moneys  he  needed  to  carry  on  his 
diplomatic  work  in  Europe.     The  matter  was  referred  to  a  new 
special   committee   consisting  of   Henry   Laurens,   Jenifer   and 
Langdon,  two  of  whom  were  Radicals.  " 

(5)  On  the  same  day,  it  was  moved  that  Mr.  Witherspoon 
and  Mr.  Lovell  (both  Radicals)  be  added  to  the  above  commit 
tee.    As  both  these  men  were  also  members  of  the  Committee  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  the  motion  is  significant.  " 

(6)  On  November  8,  1779,  a  committee  was  elected  to  nego 
tiate  a  loan  from  the  United  Provinces  and  to  prepare  a  letter 
to  the  Courts  of  Versailles  and  Madrid,  informing  them  of  the 
appointment  of  Mr.  Jay  as  the  negotiator  of  a  loan  in  the  Low 
Countries  and  to  solicit  their  aid  to  that  end. 34    Here  is  a  plain 
example  of  the  workings  of  the  "militia"   system.     The  one 
thing  that  France  and  Spain  did  not  want  the  United  States  to 
do  was  to  attempt  the  negotiation  of  loans  among  neutrals. 

(7)  On  November  12,  1779,  a  committee  of  three  (Morris, 

M  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  IT,  p.  520. 

30  Ibid.  II,  pp.  525-544. 

"  Ibid.  II,  p.  273. 

32  Ibid.  II,  p.  275. 

38  Ibid.  II,  p.  276. 

*  Ibid.  II,  p.  295. 


54      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

Houston,  Dickinson)  was  elected  to  consider  the  draft  of  a  speech 
to  be  delivered  before  Congress  by  the  Chevalier  de  la  Luzerne. 35 
The  Conservatives  completely  controlled  this  committee,  but  it 
was  of  no  importance. 

(8)  But  on  January  25,  1780,  when  the  memorial  of  the 
French  minister  was  referred  to  a  committee  of  seven  members 
(Mathews,    Livingston,    Ellsworth,    Gerry,    Griffin,   Burke,   Mc- 
Kean),  the  Radicals  controlled  five  of  them. 36    The  work  on  this 
speech  was  in  just  that  proportion  deemed  to  be  important  from 
the  standpoint  of  foreign  affairs. 

(9)  On  October  18,  1780,  a  committee  of  four   (Hawley, 
VanDyke,  Ingersoll,  Henry)   were  elected  to  draft  a  memorial 
to  Versailles  for  procuring  aids  and  supplies  for  a  vigorous  pros 
ecution  of  the  war. 37    The  Radicals  controlled  this  committee. 

(10)  On  the  same  day,  another  special  committee  was  ap 
pointed  to  receive  and  report  on  letters  from  John  Adams  and 
was  directed  to  instruct  Adams  not  to  make  a  truce  with  Eng 
land.  88    This  work  ought  assuredly  to  have  been  placed  in  the 
hands  of  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(11)  On  December  11,  1780,  a  committee  of  three   (Sulli 
van,  Madison,  Mathews)   was  elected  to  prepare  a  draft  of  a 
commission  and  instructions  to  Henry  Laurens. 39    All  three  of 
these  members  were  Radicals. 

(12)  On  December  15,  1780,  a  committee  of  three  (Duane, 
Witherspoon,  Madison)    was  elected  to  draw  up  a  commission 
and  instructions  to  the  minister  to  Russia. 40    Two  of  the  three 
members  of  this  committee  were  Radicals. 

(13)  On  December  22, 1780,  a  committee  of  three  (Mathews, 


Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  296. 

Ibid.  II,  pp.  299-311. 

Ibid.  II,  p.  326. 

Ibid.  II,  p.  339. 

Ibid.  II,  p.  357. 

Ibid.  II,  p.  357. 


THE  IMMEDIATE  EFFECT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  55 

Madison,  Duane)  was  elected  to  confer  with  Mr.  Laurens  on  the 
subject  of  his  mission. 41  Two  of  the  members  of  this  committee 
were  Radicals. 

(14)  On  December  26,  1780,  a  committee  was  elected  to  pre 
pare  additional  instructions  to  Franklin. 42    The  Conservatives, 
for  the  first  time,  controlled  this  committee. 

(15)  On  December  26,  1780,  a  committee  was  elected,  com 
posed  of  five  members  (Witherspoon,  Sullivan,  Duane,  Mathews, 
Madison)  to  confer  with  the  French  minister  on  the  matter  of  Mr. 
Laurens'  mission. 4S    Here,  again,  the  Radicals  were  in  control. 

The  mere  enumeration  of  the  above  fifteen  committees  pro 
duces  an  accumulative  effect  upon  the  investigator,  inasmuch 
as  every  one  of  them  was  elected  to  perform  specifically  the 
duties  of  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs.  It  is  clear  that  the 
Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence  was  never  considered  as  a 
Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs  during  its  early  existence. 
Changed  in  name  on  April  17,  1777,  to  that  of  the  Committee  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  it  began  to  function  as  a  foreign  relations  com 
mittee.  Immediately  the  Radicals  sought  representation  on  this 
committee.  Failing  in  this  as  far  as  complete  control  was  con 
cerned,  they  had  recourse  to  the  election  of  many  special  com 
mittees,  some  of  which  have  just  been  mentioned.  The  result 
must  necessarily  have  been  extreme  chaos  in  the  conduct  of  for 
eign  relations  by  so  many  committees  working  at  cross  purposes. 
This,  we  will  find,  was  reflected  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  rela 
tions  abroad  and  nearly  caused  the  complete  break-down  of  all 
negotiations  for  money,  loans,  supplies,  munitions,  treaties  and 
alliances. 

The  difficulties  of  the  situation  were  further  complicated  by 
differences  in  individual  beliefs,  antagonisms  resulting  from 

41  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  373. 
41  Ibid.  II,  p.  373. 
*  Ibid.  II,  p.  373. 


56      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

these  differences  and  a  growing  importance  of  the  affairs  of  the 
individual  states. 

(1)  Samuel  Adams  believed  devoutly  in  the  liberty  of  the 
individual  and  the  absolute  overthrow  of  despotism.  He  was 
able,  in  Massachusetts,  to  control  political  power  through  the 
elections,  because  he  choose  men  of  his  own  stamp  to  aid  him  and 
because  his  austere  character  forestalled  all  opposition.  He  went 
to  Philadelphia  with  the  firm  conviction  that  Congress  was  a 
town-meeting.  Beyond  this  conviction  he  would  not  and  did  not 
go  during  his  active  period  in  Congress.  Here  we  see  how  one  of 
the  controlling  factors  developed  in  a  previous  chapter  influ 
enced  Congressional  action  for  nearly  six  years.  The  point  that 
Adams  could  not  see  was  that  a  homogeneous  party  in  Massachu 
setts  was  far  different  from  a  heterogeneous,  multi-partied  group 
of  men  from  different  colonies,  having  different  ideals  and  ex 
periences.  His  ideas  were  the  real  obstacles  to  the  working  out 
of  his  schemes  of  pure  democracy,  paradoxical  as  that  may  seem. 
The  explanation  of  this  is  found  in  the  fact  that  parties  out  of 
power  become  theoretical.  The  Liberty  party  in  Massachusetts, 
always  out  of  power,  stood  as  a  party  of  opposition  to  the  func 
tioning  of  executive  power.  Experience  in  leadership  was  lim 
ited  to  controlling  the  opposition  factions,  rather  than  in  amelio 
rating  and  solving  political  problems  of  expediency  and  govern 
mental  control.  44  The  type  of  Puritanism  which  subjects  public 
conscience  to  private  conscience  was  in  the  ascendency  and  rep 
resented  by  men  who  were  heroes  of  revolt,  but  weaklings  in 
organization  and  reconstruction. 45 

Samuel  Adams  was  opposed  to  the  scientific  principles  of 
war,  of  finance  and  of  diplomacy.  Thus,  he  fought  all  execu 
tive  power  and  trusted  to  the  committee  system  as  permanent 

44  Wharton:    Diplomatic    Correspondence   of   the   American    Rerolution, 
I,  p.  253. 

<•  Ibid.  I,  p.  253. 


THE  IMMEDIATE  EFFECT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  57 

in  itself.  He  never  considered  the  scaffolding  of  the  stronger 
government  to  follow,  as  did  Washington,  Franklin,  Jay,  and 
others,  but  at  all  times  attempted  to  subordinate  Boards  and  De 
partments  to  the  men  who  sympathized  with  his  views  or  by  po 
litical  moves,  tried  to  control  all  committees  by  choosing  their 
members. 48  Associated  with  Samuel  Adams  in  these  convic 
tions  were  John  Adams  and  R.  H.  Lee.  All  three  chafed  at  the 
Fabian  policy  of  Washington  in  the  conduct  of  military  af 
fairs  ; 47  all  three,  on  the  other  hand,  opposed  regulars  for  the 
militia,  declaring  that  a  standing  army  was  a  horrid  evil,  even 
against  invasion.  4i 

Gerard,  the  French  minister  to  the  colonies,  said,  ' '  Two  men 
led  in  maintaining  the  balance  of  power  so  that  they  could  profit 
by  it  in  case  of  capitulation  to  England — Witherspoon  and 
Samuel  Adams  were  those  men. ' ' 49  This  statement  is  borne  out 
in  our  observation  of  committees. 

(2)  All  the  committees,  regardless  of  their  political  com 
plexion,  were  greatly  overworked.  By  this  means  their  efficiency 
was  partly  destroyed.  John  Adams  said  that  he  was  incessantly 
at  work  from  four  in  the  morning  till  ten  at  night  and  that  he 
served  on  ninety  separate  committees  (though  I  can  find  no  evi 
dence  that  he  served  on  that  number  of  committees  at  one 
time). 50  If  he  served  on  half  that  number  of  committees,  it  is 
safe  to  say  that  he  could  not  have  possibly  attended  the  meetings 
of  even  a  majority  of  them,  on  account  of  unavoidable  conflicts 
and  the  necessity  of  spending  much  of  his  time  on  the  floor  of 
Congress,  as  well  as  the  executing  of  the  business  of  these  com 
mittees. 


Wharton:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  262,  263. 

Ibid.  I,  p.  263. 

Bancroft:  History  of  the  Constitution,  p.  537. 

Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  Revolution,  pp.  165-106. 

Morse:  John  Adams,  p.  144. 


58      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

(3)  No  time  was  spent  in  selecting  men  for  any  committee 
because  of  special  fitness  for  the  work  of  that  committee.    ' '  Most 
men  in  Congress, ' '  said  Gerard,  ' '  owe  their  positions  to  zeal  and 
patriotism.     Little  attention  is  paid  to  talent.     If  one  member 
happens  to  be  more  conspicuous,  private  jealousy  and  the  antic 
ipation  of  personal  ascendency  throws  him  in  the  background. 
Competent  merchants,  therefore,  are  placed  on  the  Committee 
for  Foreign  Affairs.     Many  colonels  and  generals  are  in  Con 
gress,  but  none  of  them  are  on  the  Board  of  War. ' ' 51 

(4)  Every  delegate  in  Congress  was  closely  watched  by  the 
colony  that  sent  him.     The  states  did  not  concede  to  Congress 
the  power  formerly  allowed  to  Great  Britain.    Congress  did  not, 
itself,  pretend  to  have  sovereign  powers.    It  merely  acted  as  the 
mouth  piece  of  the  Patriot  party  in  the  colonies.     It  resolved 
and  recommended  measures,  but  it  could  not,  or  at  least  did  not 
assume  to  enforce  these  resolves.    It  depended  upon  the  states  to 
approve  its  actions. 52     Everything  from  the  plan  of  a  hospital 
to  the  plan  of  a  seal  had  to  be  made  in  committees. 5S    War,  it 
self,  was  carried  on  by  a  debating  society. 

(5)  The  personnel  of  the  committees  was  constantly  chang 
ing.    Strong  men  who  were  unwilling  to  sacrifice  all  for  the  good 
of  the  country  at  large,  were  attracted  by  desirable  work  in  their 
own  states.    Pendleton  and  Hancock,  both  of  whom  became  gov 
ernors  of  their  own  states,  illustrate  this  feature.    All  of  the  thir 
teen  members  of  the  original  Committee  on  Confederation  (ex 
cept  Samuel  Adams)  had  left  Congress  before  debate  upon  the 
matter  had  even  begun. 

(6)  After  1779,  a  new  alignment  in  Congress  became  appar 
ent.     This  division  was  between  the  advocates  of  a  strong  cen 
tralized  government    (Constructionists)    and  the  States  Rights 

"  Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  Revolution,  pp.  174-175. 

0  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  458. 

w  Index  of  Committees,  Journals  of  Congress. 


THE  IMMEDIATE  EFFECT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  59 

or  Liberty  party.  The  former  was  developed  as  a  protest  against 
the  inefficiency  brought  about  by  the  Liberty  party  through  the 
use  of  the  committee  system.  Said  Gerard,  "There  are  two 
parties  in  Congress — States  Rights  and  National.  Debates  be 
tween  them  are  acrimonious  and  the  effect  of  this  is  a  certain 
paralysis  of  both  the  diplomatic  and  military  genius  of  the  coun 
try.  The  National  party  is  composed  of  Washington,  Jefferson, 
Franklin,  Harrison,  Robert  Morris,  Madison,  the  two  Living 
stons  and  the  Virginia  statesmen  generally.  The  States  Rights 

party  consists  of  the  Adams 's,  R.  H.  Lee  and  Arthur  Lee 

These  are  strong^  anti-French,  because  the  French  believe  in 
the  collective  power  of  the  states. ' ' 54 

When  in  the  First  Continental  Congress,  Patrick  Henry  as 
serted  that  distinctions  between  Virginia,  Pennsylvania,  New 
York  and  New  England  were  no  more,  men  shook  their  heads 
and  shrugged  their  shoulders. 5D  The  small  states  were  afraid  of 
the  large  ones.  Most  of  them  considered  the  union  but  a  tem 
porary  one.  This  idea  is  expressed  in  the  Constitutions  of  North 
Carolina  and  Pennsj^lvania  in  providing  for  their  delegates  to 
the  Continental  Congress,  "as  long  as  such  representation  shall 
be  necessary. ' ' 56  Connecticut  in  adopting  her  old  charter  as  a 
new  constitution  stated,  "This  republic  is  and  shall  forever  re 
main  a  free  sovereign  and  independent  state."57  On  July  2, 
1776,  New  Jersey  issued  a  constitution,  "to  be  inviolable"  in 
case  of  no  reconciliation;  "temporary  and  provisional,"  if  the 
reverse. 58  In  January,  1779,  Massachusetts  drew  up  the  first 
draft  of  a  constitution,  but  it  was  rejected  in  the  town-meetings, 


'*  Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  Revolution,  p.  194. 
95  John  Adams:   Works,  II,  p.  367. 
66  Ibid.  II,  p.  366. 

87  Rhode  Island  Calender  Records,  VII,  pp.  448-449. 
"  Minutes  of  the  Provincial  Congress  and  Council  of  Safetj  of  the  State 
of  New  Jersey,  p.  558. 


60      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

because  it  did  not  secure  equality  of  representation  and  con 
tained  no  bill  of  rights.  A  committee  of  three,  including  the  two 
Adams's,  was  elected  to  make  a  new  draft.  This  was  sent  to  the 
town-meetings  and  after  more  than  a  thousand  suggested 
changes  had  been  received,  digested  and  in  part  incorporated,  a 
constitution  was  finally  adopted  in  1780  by  the  assembly. 59 

The  power  in  most  states  was  placed  wholly  in  the  hands  of 
the  people.  Many  included  in  their  constitutions  a  bill  of  rights. 
Every  error  of  the  British  government  was  to  be  entirely  elim 
inated.  In  October,  1776,  Virginia  did  away  with  the  entailment 
of  estates. 60  Jefferson  was  optimistic  concerning  the  growth  ot 
republicanism,  but  Jay  wrote  to  Rutledge,  "We  have  a  govern 
ment,  you  know,  to  form,  and  God  only  knows  what  it  will  re 
semble."81 

The  governors  were  checked  and  limited  in  devious  ways. 
The  colonies  had  had  experiences  with  governors.  There  was 
universal  fear  of  a  one-man  power.  Consequently  short  terms  in 
office  were  popular.  In  eight  states  the  governor  was  elected  for 
one  year.  In  eleven  states  he  had  no  veto  power.  Others  had  a 
council  of  state  to  advise  him. 

By  1777,  all  states,  with  the  exception  of  Massachusetts,  had 
adopted  definite  governmental  plans.  The  fact  that  this  state 
was  the  last  to  do  so,  is  worthy  of  note.  First  in  demanding  in 
dependence  through  her  delegates  in  Congress,  she  was  the  last 
to  build  for  herself  a  constitution.  Most  zealous  of  her  position 
as  a  colony,  she  hazarded  all  in  a  conflict  of  arms.  Most  zealous 
of  her  democratic  liberties,  she  developed  a  remarkable  and  lofty 
idea  of  state  sovereignty. 

In  the  light  of  the  difficulties  enumerated  above,  together 
with  the  peculiar  growth  of  state  governments  and  the  ideals  of 

M  Bradford:  History  of  Massachusetts   (1620-1820),  pp.  277,  293,  291. 

"Morse:  Jefferson,  p.  39. 

81  VanTyne:  American  Revolution,  p.  157. 


THE  IMMEDIATE  EFFECT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  SYSTEM  61 

States  Rights,  the  actions  and  beliefs  of  the  Radical  leaders  in 
Congress  from  1775  to  1780  can  now  readily  be  explained.  Ex 
pressed  in  the  ponderous  and  inefficient  committee  system,  it  is 
remarkable  that  airything  of  moment  was  accomplished  in  the 
way  of  diplomacy  during  those  years. 

SUMMARY. 

The  Committees  of  Correspondence  began  life  as  local  insti 
tutions  in  1772.  When  Congress  met  in  1774,  the  election  of  com 
mittees  to  do  business  was  a  natural  procedure.  Committee  work 
really  began  with  the  second  Congress.  In  1775,  we  find  102  spe 
cial  committees  elected  to  do  work  which  should  have  been  done 
by  regularly  established  departments.  The  number  of  special 
committees  steadily  increased  until  1778.  In  this  year  the  so- 
called  '  *  letter ' '  committees  predominated  in  number. 

In  1779  and  1780,  the  "letter"  committees  still  led  in  num 
ber.  There  was  also  much  change  in  the  personnel  of  all  com 
mittees.  Nothing  of  any  moment  was  referred  to  Boards  or 
standing  committees,  although  such  now  existed.  The  direct 
result  was  a  marked  inefficiency  and  decentralization  of  power. 
This  was  at  first  a  natural  result.  But  by  1778,  it  had  come  to  be 
premeditated,  in  order  to  control  the  work  of  Congress. 

In  the  beginning,  the  personnel  of  committees  shows  New 
England  delegates  in  the  minority.  This  minority  gradually  in 
creased  during  the  latter  part  of  1775  and  by  the  middle  of  1776, 
the  Radicals,  with  the  help  of  Virginia,  were  able  to  control  Con 
gressional  actions  on  all  important  issues.  By  the  latter  part  of 
1776,  Massachusetts  and  Virginia  largely  controlled  the  special 
committees  on  foreign  affairs.  By  1777,  the  Adams's  and  Lees 
controlled  absolutely  the  majority  of  committees  on  foreign  af 
fairs.  During  1778,  their  power  was  still  increased  and  by  1779 
their  power  was  overwhelming.  This  climax  of  power  coincides 


62      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

with  the  rash  i '  militia ' '  policy  of  the  envoys  in  France  and  other 
countries  at  this  time. 

During  1780,  the  power  of  the  Radicals  temporarily  de 
creased.  More  work  of  importance  was  referred  to  Boards  and 
the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs.  This  was,  primarily,  the  re 
sult  of  the  disclosures  of  animosities  among  the  envoys  abroad. 
The  Constructionists  realized  the  cause  of  these  troubles  to  be 
the  committee  system,  and  were  now  attempting  to  find  means 
to  check  it. 

Not  until  April  17,  1777,  was  the  Committee  of  Secret  Cor 
respondence  recognized  as  having  foreign  relations  powers.  At 
once  the  Radicals  attempted  to  control  this  committee.  Failing 
in  this,  they  sought  to  nullify  its  actions  by  securing  the  election 
of  many  special  committees  to  do  its  work.  During  1778  and 
1779,  the  Radicals  were  able,  for  a  short  time,  to  control  the  Com 
mittee  for  Foreign  Affairs,  but  with  disastrous  results. 

During  1779  a  new  alignment  of  forces  began.  State  jeal 
ousies  and  States  Rights  doctrines  appeared  and  greatly  inter 
fered  with  the  proper  functioning  of  the  work  of  all  committees. 
Not  much  is  heard  of  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs,  there 
fore,  until  1781.  Meanwhile,  much  of  its  work  had  been  done  by 
Franklin  in  Europe. 

Other  factors  appeared  to  weaken  the  committee  system,  as 
well  as  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs,  at  this  time,  so  that  the 
power  of  the  Radicals  rapidly  waned.  At  this  juncture,  the 
Middle  states  were  given  an  opportunity  to  assume  control  of  af 
fairs  under  the  leadership  of  constructive  statesmen,  aided  by  the 
wiser  men  of  the  Southern  colonies.  This  change  in  control 
checked  the  inefficiency  and  chaos  resulting  from  the  committee 
system,  and  prevented  the  loss  of  French  aid  in  the  time  of  great 
est  need  and  assured  the  success  of  the  American  colonies  in  ob 
taining  and  retaining  independence. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  CRUCIAL  PERIOD  IN  THE  CONDUCT  OP  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  AS  A 

RESULT  OF  THE  WEAKNESS  AND  INDECISION  OF 

CONGRESS  WORKING  THROUGH  ITS  COMMITTEE 

SYSTEM. 

We  have  seen  that  the  committee  system  was  a  natural  and 
inevitable  result  of  the  times.  It  is  possible  that  nothing  better 
could  have  been  devised  to  check  aristocratic  tendencies  and 
effect  complete  decentralization  of  power.  A  form  of  democracy 
was  built  up  in  Congress,  but  it  soon  gave  evidence  of  a  lack  ol 
the  democratic  spirit.  Sectional  jealousies  and  suspicions  de 
veloped  and  the  final  outcome  was  most  uncertain. 

In  such  a  situation,  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs 
found  itself  in  an  extremely  perilous  position  by  the  latter  part 
of  1777.  The  colonies  were  desperately  in  need  of  money  and 
supplies  in  order  to  prosecute  the  war.  The  Radicals  claimed 
that  anything  beyond  this  in  the  way  of  help  meant  ultimate 
subservience  to  a  foreign  power.  This  belief  of  the  Radicals  was 
the  chief  basis  for  the  development  of  the  "militia"  policy  of 
demanding  direct  and  efficient  aid  from  France.  To  make  af 
fairs  more  difficult,  Congress  was  hopelessly  divided  by  party 
animosities.  According  to  de  Fleury,  these  parties  were  sub 
divided  into  infinity,  but  generally,  there  was  an  alignment  into 
two  wings, — the  Eastern  party  comprising  Pennsylvania,  New 
Jersey  and  South  Carolina,  led  by  Gates  and  Lee ;  the  Southern 
party  comprising  Virginia,  Maryland,  New  York,  North  Caro 
lina  and  Delaware.  The  Eastern  party  was  ably  seconded  by 
New  England  on  the  platform  that  no  man  of  influence  should 
have  power  over  all  the  forces  of  the  state.  This  party,  there- 


64      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

fore,  upheld  Gates  against  Washington  and  all  others  desiring  a 
strong,  centralized  government.  *  The  New  England  faction 
moreover,  formed  the  "militia"  wing  of  the  Patriot  or  Liberty 
party,  standing  for  decentralization  of  power  and  a  demand 
upon  Prance  for  immediate  aid  to  be  given  by  her  as  a  privilege 
and  duty. 

On  September  26,  1776,  Congress  elected  three  commission 
ers  to  the  Court  of  France  (Franklin,  Deane  and  Jefferson). 
Jefferson  declining,  Arthur  Lee  was  elected  in  his  place. 2  Their 
work  in  France  was  to  be  the  procuring  of  funds  and  ammuni 
tion  and  the  signing  of  a  treaty  of  alliance. 

Deane  had  been  sent  as  a  special  agent  to  France  as  early 
as  1775.  Lee  came  on  from  London,  where  he  had  been  acting 
as  a  special  agent  for  New  England,  appointed  through  the  in 
fluence  of  Samuel  Adams.  They  all  gathered  in  France,  De 
cember  15,  1776,  where  they  found  conditions  far  from  favor 
able,  due  to  the  previous  work  of  Deane.  He  had  been  instructed 
to  gain  an  audience  with  Vergennes,  Minister  of  Affairs,  when 
he  was  to  discuss  the  purchase  of  arms  and  to  intimate  that 
France  had  been  selected  as  a  source  of  help,  because  her  friend 
ship  would  be  fittest  to  obtain  and  cultivate,  in  the  event  of  a 
separation  from  England ;  that  mutual  commercial  advantages 
would  result  from  such  a  friendship,  but  that  arms  and  clothing 
were  needed  then  and  would  be  paid  for  as  soon  as  navigation 
could  be  protected  by  America  and  her  friends. 3 

Three  things  are  plain  in  this  suggested  line  of  action. 
(a)  A  demand  was  practically  made  upon  France  for  aid;  (b) 
Supplies  were  to  be  paid  for  at  some  future  date;  (c)  Payment 
depended  upon  free  navigation  which  was  to  be  controlled  and 

1  Stevens:  Facsimiles  of  the  American  Revolution,  XVII,  No.  1616. 
*  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  31. 

a  Sparks:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  I,  pp.  5-8;  Deane  Papers,  I. 
p.  123. 


THE  CRUCIAL  PERIOD  65 

protected  by  France,  the  creditor.  Such  extreme  assumptions 
are  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  New  England  party  was,  for 
the  time,  in  control  of  the  committee  which  drafted  these  in 
structions.  It  is  a  clear  demonstration  of  the  spirit  of  that 
faction. 

Deane  was  further  instructed  to  play  slowly  with  Vergen- 
nes;  to  look  for  opportunities  for  announcing  that  the  American 
colonies  were  anxious  to  know  if  France  would  acknowledge,  in 
the  event  of  separation,  these  colonies  as  independent,  receive 
their  ambassadors,  and  enter  into  treaties  or  alliances  with  them, 
and  if  so,  under  what  conditions.  4 

That  this  line  of  action  was  the  direct  result  of  committee 
rather  than  Congressional  deliberation  is  proved  by  the  fact 
that  as  late  as  September,  1777,  when  John  Adams,  one  of  the 
leaders  of  the  movement  to  demand  aid  from  France,  proposed 
such  procedure  upon  the  floor  of  Congress,  it  was  rejected.  "It 
was  too  much  for  the  nerves  of  Congress,"  said  Adams,  "The 
grimaces  and  the  convulsions  were  very  great. ' ' 5  Franklin  al 
ways  thought,  "a  virgin  state  should  preserve  its  virtue  and 
character  and  not  go  abroad  suitoring  for  alliances. ' ' 6 

This  conflict  in  Congress  on  the  question  of  alliances,  added 
to  the  growing  inefficiency  of  the  committee  system,  had  its  im 
mediate  effect  upon  the  labors  of  Deane.  In  several  letters  to 
Congress,  he  indicates  his  distress  in  not  receiving  word  from 
America. 7  He  is  finally  informed  by  the  Committee  of  Corre 
spondence  that  a  change  has  been  made  in  the  personnel  of  the 
Committee  and  that  Lee  and  Franklin  have  been  appointed  as 
commissioners  to  aid  him. 8  On  October  25,  he  complains  of  the 

4  Sparks:  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Eevolution, 
I,  p.  8. 

6  Clark:  Silas  Deane,  p.  41. 

8  Foster:  A  Century  of  American  Diplomacy,  p.  9. 

7  Deane  Papers,  I,  pp.  287-288;  325-326. 

8  Wharton:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  162. 


66      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

silence  of  Congress. 9  He  makes  the  same  complaint  on  Novem 
ber  9,  1776, 10  and  again  on  November  28,  1776.  n  On  Novem 
ber  28,  Deane  received  notice  of  the  Declaration  of  Independ 
ence.  The  letter  was  dated  August  7,  1776,  though  the  Declara 
tion  was  consummated  on  the  7th  of  July  preceding.  Deane 
complains  bitterly  that  the  announcement  was  not  made  in  a 
more  formal  way  and  in  the  form  of  a  document  of  some  import 
ance,  instead  of  a  three  or  four  line  letter  from  a  committee  ol 
Congress. 12  In  another  letter  he  complains  with  some  show  of 
resentment,  that  he  gets  no  instructions  from  Congress  and  that 
the  delay  in  issuing  the  Declaration  is  absolutely  destroying 
American  prestige  in  Europe. 13  Even  Lee  became  disgusted  with 
the  dilatory  methods  of  Congress  and  writes  to  that  body  in  these 
words,  * £  For  Heaven 's  sakes,  if  you  mean  to  have  any  connexion 
with  this  kingdom,  be  more  assiduous  in  getting  your  letters 
here.  I  know  not  where  the  blame  lies,  but  must  lie  somewhere, 
when  vessels  sail  from  Philadelphia  down  to  the  middle  of  Au 
gust  without  a  single  line  (instructions)."  14  As  late  as  March, 
1777,  Deane  writes  to  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence 
that  he  has  received  just  three  letters  since  he  arrived  in  France 
a  year  before. 15  It  should  be  kept  in  mind,  however,  that  Con 
gress  was  just  then  relying  upon  committees  in  the  conduct  of 
foreign  relations  and  with  these  committees  under  the  control  of 
Samuel  Adams,  nothing  else  could  have  been  expected. 

In   desperation,   Deane   assumed   powers   and   prerogatives 
which  Congress  had  never  granted  him.     He  proceeded  to  hire 


•  Deane  Papers,  I,  pp.  337-338. 

10  Ibid.  I,  p.  351. 

11  Ibid.  I,  pp.  371-372. 

12  Sparks:   Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolution,  V, 
p.  51. 

13  Ibid.  V,  pp.  40-45. 

14  Ibid.  V,  p.  33. 

18  Deane  Papers:  II,  p.  18. 


THE  CRUCIAL  PERIOD  67 

many  officers  in  Europe,  granting  them  commissions  of  high  rank 
in  the  American  army.  This  action  seriously  embarrassed  Wash 
ington  and  in  September,  1777,  Congress,  upon  a  report  of  the 
Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs,  condemned  such  action  as  with 
out  authority  by  Congress. 16 

Meanwhile,  a  personage,  destined  to  have  much  to  do  with 
American  history,  now  appeared  and  had  a  conference  with 
Deane.  This  man  was  Beaumarchais.  It  is  known  that  he  went 
to  London  to  confer  with  Arthur  Lee.  It  is  further  known  that 
Lee  sent  a  statement  to  Virginia  soon  after  this  conference,  in 
forming  that  colony  that  France  would  furnish  five  million 
livres  worth  of  arms  and  ammunition. ir  Beaumarchais,  on  his 
return  to  France  at  once  endeavored  to  secure  funds  from  the 
French  government,  but  without  success.  He  then  formed  an  in 
dependent  company  and  finally  succeeded,  through  the  instiga 
tion  of  Lee  and  an  agreement  with  Deane,  in  shipping  supplies 
in  large  quantities  to  America  with  explanatory  letters  and  bills 
signed  by  Rodriguez,  Hortalez  and  Company. 18 

Congress,  however,  relying  completely  upon  Lee's  statement 
to  Virginia,  accepted  the  supplies  with  grace  and  bothered  little 
concerning  the  bills,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Deane  had  rend 
ered  to  Congress  statements  as  to  the  exact  nature  of  the  goods 
shipped  and  the  amount  of  America's  indebtedness  for  them. 

The  results  of  this  misunderstanding  were  immediate.  Both 
Deane  and  the  French  king  fell  under  suspicion.  Here  is  clear 
evidence  of  the  fruits  of  the  committee  system.  Deane  had  re 
ceived  no  instructions.  He  knew  nothing  of  the  temper  or  de 
sires  of  Congress.  The  whole  situation  is  traceable  to  the  ina 
bility  of  Congress  to  adopt  a  definite  policy  in  the  conduct  of 
foreign  relations  and  adhere  to  it. 

u  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  481. 

17  Clark :  Silas  Deane,  p.  55. 

18  Wharton:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  276. 


68      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

France  was,  during  this  time,  maintaining  strict  neutrality. 
Ships  were  prevented  from  clearing  loaded  with  munitions  for 
America  and  officers  whom  Deane  had  hired  were  arrested  on 
board  ship  and  imprisoned.  The  situation  becoming  desperate, 
Deane  began  to  hold  the  French  government  responsible  for  his 
difficulties. 

At  this  juncture,  the  new  commissioners,  who  were  ap 
pointed  to  aid  Deane,  arrived  in  France.  At  once,  trouble  of  an 
other  form  developed,  due  to  the  fact  that  Lee  regarded  himself 
as  the  leader  of  the  commission.  He  took  issue  with  Beaumar- 
chais  because  he  treated  with  Deane;  with  Deane  because  he  con 
sidered  that  Deane  had  robbed  him  of  much  honor ;  with  Frank 
lin  because  of  his  great  welcome  in  France ;  with  France  because 
she  did  not  move  with  more  alacrity. 19  But  he  received  no  sat 
isfaction  in  any  of  his  tirades  and  becoming  disgruntled,  went 
to  Spain  with  promises  to  that  Court  that  America  would  con 
quer  Pensacola  in  return  for  Spanish  aid.  But  the  Spanish 
Court,  on  advice  from  Franklin,  kept  Lee  at  Vittoria.  Franklin 
strenuously  objected  to  Lee's  method  of  procedure.  "A  virgin 
state,"  he  said,  "should  wait  with  decent  dignity  for  the  appli 
cations  of  others while  we  are  asking,  it  is  necessary  to 

comply  with  the  humors  of  those  we  apply  to. '  '20 

The  leader,  then,  of  the  "militia"  policy  abroad  was  Arthur 
Lee.  Both  he  and  Samuel  Adams  were  unalterably  opposed  to 
the  two  fundamental  ideas  of  diplomacy  of  that  day,  namely, 
that  ambassadors  should  not  be  forced  upon  foreign  courts  and 
that  delicacy  was  to  be  always  used  even  between  politically 
equal  countries.  Lee,  true  to  his  ideas  of  the  efficacy  of  the 
"militia"  policy,  conveyed  to  Samuel  Adams  and  to  Congress 


19  Hale:   Franklin  in  France,  pp.  42-43. 

20  Wharton:    Diplomatic    Correspondence   of   American   Revolution,   II. 
p.  298. 


THE  CRUCIAL  PERIOD  69 

the  idea  that  Vienna,  Madrid,  the  Courts  of  Prussia,  Russia  and 
Tuscany  would  be  pleased  to  have  America  send  envoys. 21 

Deane,  also,  thought  himself  largely  superseded  by  Frank 
lin,  and  began  to  carry  on  negotiations  with  the  French  Court  on 
his  own  account.  In  a  letter  to  Vergennes,  April  8,  1777,  he  an 
nounced  that  the  people  and  Congress  of  America  expected  as 
sistance  from  France  and  urged  the  necessity  of  not  disappoint 
ing  them. 2i 

The  English  ministry  was  not  slow  to  suspect  that  all  was 
not  going  well  with  the  American  envoys.  Suspecting  a  luke- 
warmness  on  the  part  of  Deane  to  the  idea  of  complete  independ 
ence,  it  sent  secret  agents  to  influence  him.  On  December  12, 
1777,  Paul  Wentworth  wrote  to  Deane  asking  for  a  secret  inter 
view.  23  Deane  replied  arranging  for  such  a  meeting. 2*  Went 
worth  came  to  this  meeting  on  December  15,  bringing  memo 
randa  which  included  general  headings  for  the  preliminaries  to 
an  accommodation  and  perpetual  union  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  American  colonies. 25  It  must  be  said  to  the  credit  ol 
Deane,  however,  that  the  English  ministry  was  soon  convinced 
that  he  was  absolutely  opposed  to  peace.  It  was  then  planned 
to  compromise  him  by  implicating  him  in  the  trial  of  "John  the 
Painter. ' '  Failing  in  this  scheme,  it  was  next  planned  to  carry 
him  by  force  from  France  to  England,  there  to  intern  him  until 
peace  could  be  accomplished. 26 

Deane  had,  by  this  time,  done  enough  to  satisfy  Congress  of 
his  lack  of  reliability.  Accordingly,  it  was  resolved  on  November 
21,  1777,  to  recall  him  and  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs 
was  directed  to  take  measures  to  put  this  resolve  into  effect. 27 

21  Lee:  Life  of  Arthur  Lee,  II,  p.  113. 

22  Stevens:  Facsimiles,  VI,  No.  680. 

23  Stevens:  Facsimiles,  VI,  No.  719  (1). 

24  Ibid.  VI,  No.  719  (2). 
26  Ibid.  VI,  No.  719  (3). 

26  Ibid.  XV,  No.  1489. 

27  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  481. 


70      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

Franklin,  upon  taking  up  his  duties  in  France,  found  him 
self  the  minority  member  of  the  commission  in  all  matters  of 
diplomacy.  He  refused  to  press  matters  in  connection  with  sup 
plies  and  ammunition.  In  January,  1777,  he  was  prevailed  upon, 
however,  to  make  an  actual  demand  upon  the  French  king  for 
ships  of  war.  The  commission  intimated  that  such  demand  was 
' '  agreeable  to  our  instructions. ' ' 28  This  last  phrase  is  evidence 
that  Franklin  did  not  intend  to  assume  the  responsibility  for  the 
"militia"  policy.  He  would  not  take  a  high-handed  course  of 
action.  "It  is  my  purpose,"  he  said,  "to  procure,  while  I  stay 
here,  what  advantage  I  can  for  our  country,  by  endeavoring  to 
please  this  court. ' ' a9 

Franklin's  stand  upon  the  method  of  the  conduct  of  diplo 
matic  relations  had  its  effect  upon  the  French  Court.  This  may 
be  gathered  from  a  question  put  to  each  of  the  Commissioners  by 
the  French  ministry,  as  follows:  "What,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
American  Commissioners,  is  necessary  to  be  done  to  engage  them 
not  to  listen  to  any  propositions  from  England  for  a  new  connec 
tion  with  that  country?" 

Franklin  answered  as  follows: — "The  Commissioners  feel 
that  the  immediate  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  commerce  and  amity 

will  remove  uncertainty and  give  such  a  reliance  on  the 

friendship  of  France  as  to  reject  firmly  all  propositions  made 
to  them  by  England,  which  have  not  for  their  basis  the  entire 
freedom  and  Independence  of  America,  both  in  matters  of  gov 
ernment  and  commerce. ' ' 30 

Deane  answered  as  follows: — "There  must  be  a  guarantee 
by  France  of  the  present  American  possessions  with  others  to  be 
acquired  and  to  enter  into  war  with  England,  or  furnish  Con- 


88  Stevens:  Facsimiles,  VI,  No.  614. 

29  Wharton:    Diplomatic  Correspondence   of  the   American   Bcvolution, 
II,  p.  245. 

"°  Stevens:  Facsimiles,  VIII,  No.  774. 


THE  CRUCIAL  PERIOD  71 

gress  with  money  to  carry  on  the  war,  until  peace  or  the  con 
quering  of  all  English  possessions  in  America. ' ' 31 

The  contrast  between  these  two  answers  is  striking.  One  il 
lustrated  the  essence  of  the  Constructionist  party  which  Frank 
lin  represented.  The  other  was  the  core  of  the  "militia"  policy 
which  Samuel  Adams  fathered  in  America. 

During  the  whole  of  the  year  1777,  the  Committee  for  For 
eign  Affairs  did  nothing  but  correspond  with  the  Commissioners 
in  France.  Robert  Morris,  a  member  of  the  committee,  informed 
them,  "that  the  conduct  of  Congress  is  discouraging  and  that  as 
long  as  that  body  persists  in  executing  as  well  as  deliberating  on 
their  business,  it  will  not  be  done  right.  This  has  been  urged 
many  times,  but  some  do  not  want  to  part  with  power  (Radi 
cals)  or  pay  others  to  do  what  they  cannot  do  themselves."32 
He  adds  that  he  was  not  placed  on  the  committee  to  correspond, 
but  to  carry  out  the  conveyances,  but  he  has  done  nothing  but 
write  letters. 

It  must  have  been  encouraging  to  the  envoys  in  France  to 
receive  a  letter  from  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence 
that  through  an  accident  in  removing  from  Philadelphia  to  Bal 
timore,  the  Secretary  of  Congress  had  lost  the  instructions  to  the 
Commission,  by  which  it  was  empowered  to  negotiate  with  the 
Courts  of  other  neutral  nations. 33 

Henry  Laurens,  as  President  of  Congress,  informs  John 
Adams  on  November  28,  1777,  that  he  has  been  elected  Commis 
sioner  to  France  and  asks  pardon  for  the  omission  of  his  com 
mission  on  account  of  lack  of  instructions  and  a  knowledge  of 
precedents  in  such  matters. 34  Laurens  was  a  follower  of  Sam- 

81  Stevens  Facsimiles,  VIII,  No.   776. 

32  Sparks:    Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolution,  I, 
p.  179. 

33  Ibid.  I,  p.  181. 

34  Wharton:    Diplomatic   Correspondence   of   the   American   Revolution, 
II,  p.  432. 


72      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

uel  Adams,  who  gloried  in  the  fact  that  he  knew  nothing  of 
diplomatic  procedure  and  did  not  care  to  know. 

That  Congress  acted  often  on  diplomatic  matters  as  a  com 
mittee  of  the  whole,  is  shown  by  a  letter  from  Laurens  to  John 
Adams,  January  1,  1778,  in  which  he  says  that  he  had  received 
his  (Adams's)  letters  and  had  read  them  to  Congress. 35  Near 
ly  a  year  after  this  (December  8,  1778)  James  Lovell  wrote  to 
Franklin  (for  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs)  that  he  en 
closed  plans  of  operations,  but  that  his  letter  had  been  delayed 
for  alterations  to  be  made  by  Congress. 36 

This  indefiniteness  in  Congress  relative  to  diplomatic  af 
fairs,  was  reflected  in  the  work  and  correspondence  of  the  en 
voys  in  France.  They  knew  not  to  whom  they  were  responsible 
or  to  whom  they  were  to  address  their  complaints,  memorials  or 
reports.  On  July  1,  1777,  William  Lee  received  his  instructions 
as  Commissioner  to  Berlin  from  John  Hancock,  President  of 
Congress. 37  Lee,  replied,  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  his  com 
mission,  but  directed  his  letter  to  Charles  Thomson,  Secretary  of 
Congress. 38  In  many  of  Lee 's  letters  he  says  he  "is  pleased  to 
inform  Congress,  etc."  From  January  22,  1778  to  September, 
1778,  he  directs  his  letters  to  the  President  of  Congress.  After 
this  interval,  he  directs  them  to  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Af 
fairs.  Ralph  Izard,  as  Commissioner,  directs  his  letters  from 
July  1,  1777  to  April  1,  1778,  to  the  Committee  for  Foreign  At- 
fairs.  After  this  interval,  he  directs  them  to  Henry  Laurens, 
President  of  Congress. 

This  state  of  affairs  simply  affirms  the  fact  that  the  Ameri 
can  Commissioners  were  working  in  the  dark  through  a  lack  of 


*  WLarton:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  475. 

*  Sparks:    Diplomatic    Correspondence    of    the    American    Eevolutiou, 
V,  p.  147. 

"  Ibid.  I,  p.  591. 
M  Ibid.  I,  p.  595. 


THE  CRUCIAL  PERIOD  73 

a  definite  policy  in  conducting  foreign  affairs  by  Congress.  The 
Commissioners  as  a  body  wrote  to  Congress,  March  12,  1777,  and 
said,  "It  is  more  than  four  months  since  Mr.  Franklin's  depar 
ture  from  Philadelphia  and  not  a  single  line  from  thence  writ 
ten  since  that  time  has  reached  your  Commissioners  in  Europe. 
We  have  no  information  of  what  passes  in  America,  but  through 

England Our  total  ignorance  of  the  Truth  or  Falsehood  of 

Facts,  when  Questions  are  asked  of  us  concerning  them  makes 
us  appear  small  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  here  and  is  prejudicial 
to  our  negotiations. ' ' 89 

Even  John  Adams  wrote  from  Passy,  May  24,  1778,  to  the 
Commerce  Committee  of  Congress,  complaining  of  many  agents 
claiming  authority  from  many  different  sources.  He  intimated 
that  this  was  a  waste  of  energy  and  money  and  that  all  orders 
should  come  to  these  persons  from  one  person.  40  In  a  letter 
dated  July  9,  1778,  and  addressed  to  James  Lovell,  John  Adams 
said  that  he  had  heard  but  once  from  Congress  since  his  arrival 
in  France. 41  On  February  27,  1779,  he  wrote  to  John  Jay,  then 
President  of  Congress,  saying  that  he  believed  that  but  one  am 
bassador  was  necessary  in  France  and  since  he  had  heard  noth 
ing  from  Congress,  and  understands  that  Franklin  had  been  ap 
pointed  as  such,  he  was  coming  home.  " 

These  statements  from  a  man  who  had  always  been  zealous 
in  his  support  of  the  committee  system  and  the  "militia"  pol 
icy  of  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs,  is  somewhat  startling.  It  Is 
excellent  proof  that  he  began  to  see  the  futility  of  both  systems. 

But  the  climax  of  the  whole  matter  of  inefficiency  of  the 
committee  system  as  a  means  of  conducting  foreign  affairs  came 
in  1779,  when  James  Lovell  on  August  6th  of  that  year,  wrote  to 

"  Stevens:  Facsimiles,  XIV,  No.  1448. 

49  Wharton :    Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  595. 

41  Ibid.  II,  p.  642. 

«  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  69. 


74      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

Arthur  Lee  as  follows :  * '  There  is  really  no  such  thing  as  a  Com- 
inittee  for  Foreign  Affairs  existing.  No  Secretary  or  clerk 
further  than  I,  presumes  to  be  one  or  the  other.  The  books  and 
papers  of  that  extraordinary  body  lay  yet  on  the  table  of  Con 
gress,  or  rather  are  locked  up  in  the  Secretary 's  private  box. ' ' 43 
It  should  be  noted  that  this  statement  was  made  fully  two  years 
after  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  been  elected  to  exe 
cute  diplomatic  work.  It  is  now  plain  why  nothing  of  import 
ance  is  recorded  concerning  the  work  of  this  committee  after  the 
year  1778. 

The  English  ministry  by  the  latter  part  of  1777,  began  to 
suspect  that  Franklin  was  the  chief  obstacle  in  the  way  of  ef 
fecting  a  compromise  between  England  and  the  American  colo 
nies.  Strenuous  endeavors  were  made  to  discredit  him  in 
France. 44  Commissioners  were  also  sent  to  America  with  a 
plan  for  reconciliation.  On  June  9,  1778,  these  commissioners 
wrote  to  Henry  Laurens  as  President  of  Congress  intimating 
that  they  note  with  concern  the  insidious  interposition  of  a  power 
(France)  which  has  always  had  a  most  evil  intention  and  mo 
tives.  45  Laurens,  under  orders  of  Congress,  roundly  rebuked 
the  Commissioners  on  June  17,  1777. 46  The  Commissioners  then 
replied,  questioning  the  power  of  Congress  to  conclude  treaties 
without  the  delegation  of  power  from  the  states. 47  They  next 
declared  that  Congress  could  not  conclude  treaties  without  first 
referring  them  to  the  individual  states. 48 

This  procedure  of  the  English  .Commissioners  had  a  most 
subtle  bearing  on  the  whole  relation  between  France  and  Amer 
ica.  It  first  made  a  direct  appeal  to  the  States  Rights  Party, 

a  Wharton:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  III,  p.  288. 
44  Stevens:  Facsimiles,  XIV,  No.  1402. 

48  Ibid.  XI,  No.  1104. 

49  Ibid.  XI,  No.  1110. 
«  Ibid.  XI,  No.  1119. 
48  Ibid.  XI,  No.  1133. 


THE  CRUCIAL  PERIOD  75 

headed  by  Samuel  Adams  and  others.  It  was  an  attempt  to  di 
vide  the  union  of  the  colonies.  It  caused  great  anxiety  in  France 
because  the  French  ministry  could  not  decide  whether  they  were 
to  deal  with  a  union  of  the  states  in  America  or  with  independent 
republics.  In  short,  it  could  not  be  determined  where  sovereign 
ty  resided. 

Vergennes,  Beaumarchais  and  others  were  now  thoroughly 
aroused  to  the  seriousness  of  the  situation  and  made  frequent 
appeals  to  the  king  to  hasten  aid  and  recognition  to  America. 
They  had  reason  to  believe  that  the  American  envoys  were  be 
coming  thoroughly  discouraged.  In  a  letter  dated  October  1, 
1777,  Lord  Stormont,  the  English  ambassador  in  France,  in 
formed  Weymouth  that  the  American  Commissioners  (excepting 
Franklin)  openly  declare  that  American  privateers  will  make  no 
distinction  between  English  and  French  ships  hereafter.  49  Ver 
gennes,  in  a  letter  to  Marquis  D'Ossun  said  that  he  knew  that 
the  American  Commissioners  were  discouraged  and  that  they 
would  accept  England's  terms  if  not  efficiently  aided.  He  added 
that  the  existing  conditions  were  brought  about  by  their  own  in 
discretions,  however,  because  they  took  too  much  for  granted  or 
tried  to  involve  France  and  thus  gain  advantages  to  them 
selves.  50 

Beaumarchais  wrote  to  the  French  ministry  in  the  early  part 
of  1778  commending  three  lines  of  action,  namely, — to  remain 
passive;  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  America  or  to  recognize  her 
independence. 51  Vergennes  was  active  in  the  same  cause,  how 
ever.  In  a  letter  to  de  Montmoren,  January  8,  1778,  he  empha 
sizes  the  necessity  of  immediate  action. 52 

The   English  ministry,   having  obtained  knowledge  of  the 


*  Stevens:  Facsimiles,  XIX,  No.  1709. 
80  Ibid.  XVIII,  No.  1712. 

61  Ibid.  XXI,  No.  1814. 

62  Ibid.  XXI,  No.  1827. 


76      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

probable  action  of  the  French  ministry  were  desperate,  and  final 
ly  brought  pressure  upon  Franklin  himself.  On  June  16,  1778, 
Franklin  received  in  a  peculiar  fashion,  a  letter  signed  with  the 
name  of  Charles  de  Weissenstein,  which  he  declared  to  be  ac 
tually  in  the  hand  writing  of  George  III.  The  letter  made  a 
profound  plea  for  reconciliation. 53  A  second  was  received  on 
the  same  day  containing  plans  for  allaying  the  present  ferment 
in  America.  Secret  measures  were  proposed;  Franklin  was  of 
fered  a  pension,  as  well  as  John  Adams,  John  Hancock  and  Gen 
eral  Washington.  A  treaty  of  eighteen  articles  was  proposed, 
the  first  six  of  which  were  to  be  secret  and  the  people  were  never 
to  know  of  their  existence. 54  A  third  letter  from  the  same 
source  outlined  a  plan  of  government  after  the  event  of  recon 
ciliation.  55  But  to  all  of  these  brilliant  offers  Franklin  made  ab 
solutely  no  reply. 

The  success  of  Vergennes  in  keeping  the  English  ministry  in 
the  dark  concerning  the  relations  between  France  and  America 
is  fully  shown  in  a  study  of  the  correspondence  of  the  time  be 
tween  members  of  the  English  ministry.  While  keeping  up  this 
play,  Vergennes  and  Beaumarchais,  together  turned  the  tide  to 
America  by  means  of  a  famous  letter  to  the  king  under  date  of 
December  7,  1777. 56  On  February  6,  1778,  a  treaty  of  amity 
and  commerce  was  signed  by  the  American  Commissioners  at  the 
Court  of  France,  brought  to  America  *by  Gerard  and  presented 
to  the  American  Congress  on  May  4,  1778. 57  On  February  6, 
1778,  a  treaty  of  alliance,  eventual  and  defensive  was  signed  in 
Paris,  together  with  an  attached  secret  treaty. 58 


"  Stevens:   Facsimiles,  VIII,  No.  835. 

84  Ibid.  VIII,  No.  836. 

"  Ibid.  VIII,  No.  837. 

M  Clark:  Silas  Deane,  p.  58. 

"  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  pp.  57-79. 

M  Ibid,  II,  pp.  81-89. 


THE  CRUCIAL  PERIOD  77 

The  year  1778  brought  to  a  partial  close  the  long  series  of  in- 
trigues  and  misunderstandings  begun  in  1775.  Their  existence 
meant  imminent  disaster  to  the  American  cause.  The  constancy 
of  Franklin ;  the  confidence  of  the  French  ministry  in  him ;  the 
aid  of  the  French  agents  in  America  and  the  bungling  diplomacy 
of  the  English  ministry,  were  the  chief  factors  which  prevented 
the  loss  of  the  American  conflict.  The  committee  system  of 
conducting  diplomatic  affairs,  together  with  the  ridiculous 
"militia"  policy  of  the  Radicals,  were  the  opposing  factors.  The 
result  was  a  very  slender  margin  in  favor  of  success  for  the  Am 
erican  colonies.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  war  would  have  been 
appreciably  shortened  had  there  been  responsible  bodies  or  de 
partments  in  Congress  clothed  with  full  executive  powers  to 
rapidly  prosecute  the  war  and  hasten  the  growth  of  friendly 
relations  with  France  under  the  wise  guidance  of  men  of  the  type 
of  Franklin. 

SUMMARY. 

The  growing  prominence  of  the  Radical  elements  in  Con 
gress  gave  courage  to  the  Radical  envoys  abroad.  The  demands 
upon  France  were  constant  and  insistent.  Their  immediate  ac 
ceptance  would  have  assuredly  resulted  in  a  general  European 
conflagration. 

This  method  of  seeking  aid  from  foreign  powers  was  com 
bated  in  Congress,  but  the  Radicals  prevailed  through  their  con 
trol  of  committees.  An  attempt  to  block  this  control  by  the  Con- 
structionists  resulted  in  an  almost  total  lack  of  instructions  to 
the  Commissioners  abroad.  Deane,  consequently  assumed  powers 
which  he  was  never  authorized  to  use.  The  Beaumarchais  affair 
naturally  followed  with  its  suspicions  and  animosities.  In  this 
state  of  affairs,  Arthur  Lee  assumed  the  leadership  as  the  cham 
pion  of  a  real  "militia"  diplomacy.  Differences  among  the 


78      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

American  envoys  developed  on  this  issue.  Dissensions  followed 
and  individual  secret  negotiations  began.  This  gave  the  English 
ministry  an  opportunity  to  widen  these  differences  by  the  use 
of  threats,  bribes  and  slander.  The  result  was  the  recall  of 
Deane  and  the  censure  and  subsequent  recall  of  all  the  commis 
sioners  except  Franklin. 

This  envoy  was  next  attacked  by  the  English  ministry.  They 
attempted  to  discredit  him  in  France,  but  he  held  his  prestige 
by  moderation,  political  astuteness  and  skill.  He  was,  moreover, 
sadly  handicapped  by  party  struggles  in  Congress,  resulting  in 
the  practical  non-existence  of  a  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
This  weakness  invited  the  instigation  of  an  English  propaganda 
in  America  by  an  appeal  to  the  States  Rights  party.  Bribes  were 
next  extended  to  Franklin,  but  without  success.  A  treaty  of 
amity  and  commerce  was  signed  on  February  6,  1778,  through 
the  direct  work  of  Franklin  and  in  spite  of  the  inefficiency  at 
home  and  abroad,  directly  due  to  a  most  dangerous  attempt  to 
bring  about  a  complete  decentralization  of  power  under  the  con 
trol  of  an  unwieldy  committee  system. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  INFLUENCE  OF  FRANCE  IN  THE  CONDUCT  OF 
FOREIGN  AFFAIRS. 

The  French  ministry  early  saw  the  trend  of  affairs  in  Ameri 
ca  and  among  the  American  envoys  in  France.  While  implicit 
confidence  was  placed  in  Franklin's  universal  spirit  and  mature 
judgment,  nevertheless,  it  wisely  refrained  from  committing  it 
self  in  negotiations  with  men  who  could  not  act  in  unison  and 
who  could  not  secure  proper  instructions  from  Congress.  There 
fore,  as  early  as  1775,  at  the  time  of  Deane's  appointment  to  act 
as  agent  to  France,  the  French  ministry  sent  a  secret  committee 
to  America.  This  committee  wras  led  by  Bonvouloir  and  forward 
ed  information  to  France  concerning  conditions  arid  influenced, 
as  far  as  possible,  public  opinion  in  America. 

This  committee  strongly  advised  "that  great  care  be  used 
in  the  treatment  of  the  American  envoys,  especially  those  from 
New  England,  (Deane  and  Arthur  Lee)  for  this  part  of  the  coun 
try,  if  slighted,  will  capture  and  hold  all  French  possessions  un 
til  aid  by  France  is  given. ' '  * 

On  September  11,  1776.  Hopkins,  a  brigadier  general  in  the 
pay  of  the  French  army  and  a  member  of  the  committee,  wrote 
de  Sartine,  asking  that  the  Grand  Order  of  Military  Merit  be 
conferred  upon  him  so  that  he  might  prove  to  Americans  that 
the  Revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  would  not  affect  Protest 
ants  living  in  France  or  in  French  possessions. 2  The  basis  of 
this  request  was  obvious.  It  was  an  attempt  to  allay  fears  in 

1  Stevens:  Facsimiles,  XVI,  No.  1336. 
3  Ibid.  XII,  No.  1355. 


80      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

America  over  the  prospect  of  an  alliance  with  a  Catholic  country 
and  to  offset  the  attempts  of  the  English  to  stir  up  prejudice 
against  France  among  the  members  of  Congress. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  year  1778,  Gerard  de  Rayneval  was 
sent  by  France  as  minister  to  America.  He  lived,  on  account  of 
much  illness,  within  sixty  paces  of  the  door  of  Congress  and  was 
soon  constantly  consulted  by  the  members. 3  The  coming  of  Ger 
ard  to  America  served  two  purposes.  (1)  It  tended  to  increase 
the  friendship  between  the  two  countries  and  (2)  it  kept  France 
in  close  touch  with  the  vagaries  of  the  Radical  party  and  with 
its  "militia"  policy  as  reflected  in  France.  This  was  necessary 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  these  factors  might  compromise  France 
with  England  at  any  moment  without  her  being  properly  pre 
pared  to  meet  the  issues  involved. 

The  instructions  to  Gerard  were  direct  and  simple.  He  was 
to  guard  against  the  making  of  a  separate  peace  with  Britain  by 
Congress;  to  assure  Congress  that  the  French  king  would  make 
no  terms  with  England  short  of  independence ;  to  dissuade  Con 
gress  from  any  plan  of  peace  which  would  include  Florida  or 
Canada ;  to  refuse  to  extend  America  any  further  pecuniary  aid ; 
to  make  it  plain  to  Congress  that  the  king  would  not  prolong  the 
war  one  day  to  aid  America  to  make  or  keep  any  conquests  in 
the  West. 4  This  was  a  program  big  with  possibilities.  It  indi 
cated  that  France  clearly  realized  the  extent  of  the  inter-state 
jealousies  and  the  ramifications  of  the  States  Rights  ideas  as 
early  as  1778. 

Gerard  reported  to  Vergennes  as  early  as  July,  1778,  that 
strong  party  feeling  existed  in  Congress,  through  diversity  of 
principles  and  ambitions. 5  He  further  reported  '  *  that  a  selfish 


8  Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  Revolution,  p.  164. 

4  Doniol:    Participation    de    la    France    a'    retablishment    Etats-Unif 
d  'Amerique,  III,  p.  153. 

5  Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  Revolution,  pp.  165-166. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  81 

and  calculating  spirit  prevails  in  America.  Mercantile  cupid 
ity  exists,  especially  in  the  northern  people  and  it  will  undoubt 
edly  exercise  an  important  influence  on  the  future  destiny  of  the 
republic. " 6  He  still  further  reports  a  woeful  lack  of  efficiency 
in  Congress  through  the  placing  of  wrong  men  on  committees. 7 

Several  questions  soon  arose  which  the  French  minister  was 
obliged  to  consider  and  to  influence,  if  possible,  their  decision. 
Among  such  questions  were  the  following:  (1)  The  fisheries 
question  which  the  New  England  delegates  to  Congress  thought, 
the  most  important  of  all,  since  this  was  the  basis  of  New  Eng 
land's  prosperity.  In  fact,  it  was  one  of  the  most  important 
causes  of  the  war.  Other  states  thought  this  question  of  slight 
importance  and  nine  of  them  outside  of  the  New  England  group 
indicated  that  they  would  not  continue  the  war  for  this  advan 
tage  to  a  particular  section.  (2)  The  New  England  delegates 
laid  increasing  stress  upon  the  immediate  invasion  of  Canada, 
until  the  plan  was  emphatically  vetoed  by  Washington  on  the 
advice  of  Gerard.  (3)  Several  delegates  were  desirous  of  bring 
ing  Spain  into  the  war,  but  this  plan  meant  the  raising  of  com 
plicated  boundary  questions.  After  some  difficulty  it  was  silenced 
by  Gerard.  (4)  A  cabal  against  Washington  and  Franklin  was 
in  full  sway,  but  both  schemes  were  rendered  abortive  through 
the  diplomatic  skill  of  Gerard  and  Vergennes.  8  Gerard  was  also 
obliged  to  counteract  the  strong  representations  of  the  British 
ministry  in  an  attempt  to  win  over  certain  influential  parties  in 
Congress.  R.  H.  Lee  asserted  in  Congress  that  the  United  States 
had  a  right  to  deal  independently  with  England,  but  members  of 
Congress  instantly  assured  Gerard,  however,  that  Lee's  asser 
tion  was  received  with  contempt  and  indignation.  "All  the  dele 
gates  affirmed  to  me,"  said  Gerard,  "that  not  two  men  in  Con- 

8  Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  Revolution,  p.  176. 

7  Ibid.  pp.  174-175. 

8  Ibid.  pp.  194-196. 


82      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

gress  were  capable  of  listening  to  Temple's  (one  of  the  British 
commissioners)  proposals,  but  the  conduct  of  the  delegates  of 
Massachusetts  still  hampered  their  action. ' ' 9  The  implications 
concerning  Samuel  Adams  are  patent  and  Gerard  reported  that 
Congress  was  fast  becoming  weary  and  ashamed  of  the  ascend 
ency  enjoyed  by  the  party  headed  by  R.  H.  Lee  and  Samuel 
Adams. 10 

Five  members  of  Congress  drew  up  an  answer  to  a  question 
by  Gerard  concerning  Lee's  doctrines.  Four  members  sent  in 
a  secret  second  answer.  The  fifth  member,  Samuel  Adams,  re 
fused  to  agree  to  it,  and  tried  to  persuade  others  that  an  explicit 
answer  was  not  required.  Gerard  reported  that  he  was  fortify 
ing  his  colleagues  against  fallacious  arguments. 1J  The  use  of 
the  word  ' '  colleagues ' '  is  interesting  as  showing  how  intimate  the 
French  minister  had  become  with  the  political  conditions  in 
America  and  with  some  of  the  members  of  Congress. 

On  March  10,  1779,  Gerard  reported,  "Our  friends  in  Con- 
firess  began  to  attack  their  opponents  yesterday.  They  brought 
forward  the  principle  of  treating  with  France  in  perfect  confi 
dence.  The  Lee  faction  was  hard  pressed.  Samuel  Adams  said, 
'Why  must  our  interests  be  so  closely  united  with  those  of 
France?  Here  is  the  spot  where  our  independence  must  be  estab 
lished.'  "12 

This  conflict  in  Congress  culminated  in  the  appointment  of  a 
committee  of  thirteen  to  investigate  the  condition  of  foreign 
affairs  of  the  United  States  and  also  the  conduct  of  the  Commis 
sioners  in  France  and  report  thereon.  This  committee  brought 
in  a  report  in  March,  1779,  based  upon  evidence  furnished  by 
the  French  minister,  and  resulted  in  the  censure  of  all  and  the 

*  Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  Revolution,  p.  197. 

10  Ibid.  p.  196. 

11  Ibid.  p.  199. 
"  Ibid.  p.  200. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  CONDUCT  OP  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  83 

recall  of  most  of  them.  From  this  time  until  1781,  practically 
nothing  is  heard  of  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs.  There 
is  evidence  that  the  American  foreign  relations  were  largely  car 
ried  on  by  the  French  minister  working  through  friends  and 
committees  in  Congress. 

On  July  18,  1779,  the  Chevalier  de  la  Luzerne  assumed  his 
duties  as  minister  to  America.  He  at  once  came  into  contact 
with  a  scheme  of  the  Radicals  to  displace  Franklin  in  France. 
Arthur  Lee  and  Ralph  Izard  were  the  leaders  in  this  movement. 
"If,"  said  Lee,  "the  total  disorder  and  neglect  which  prevails 
in  the  public  affairs  committed  to  him  (Franklin)  will  not  satisfy 
gentlemen  that  the  continuation  of  him  in  office  is  incompatible 
with  the  public  honor  and  interest,  there  is  no  use  of  my  making 
further  charges. 13  Luzerne  reported  these  charges  to  Vergennes, 
who  replied,  "His  (Frankln's)  conduct  leaves  nothing  for  Con 
gress  to  desire.  It  is  as  zealous  and  patriotic  as  it  is  wise  and 
circumspect . . .  The  method  he  pursues  is  much  more  efficacious 
than  if  he  were  to  assume  a  tone  of  importunity  in  multiplying 
his  demands, — and  especially  if  these  were  enforced  by  threats 
to  which  we  would  attach  neuter  value  or  importance  and  which 
would  serve  to  render  him  personally  disagreeable. ' ' 14 

The  question  naturally  arises, — Who  saved  Franklin's  po 
litical  head  ?  It  is,  without  doubt,  safe  to  assume  that  it  was  Lu 
zerne 's  untiring  efforts  in  Franklin's  behalf,  coupled  with  the 
sympathy  and  work  of  the  level  headed  men  in  Congress,  which 
prevented  diplomatic  disaster. 

In  1779,  Vergennes  suggested  to  Congress  through  the 
French  minister  that  it  would  be  well  for  it  to  select  an  envoy 
empowered  to  treat  for  peace,  as  that  was  now  a  possibility.  The 
selection  was  at  once  made  the  basis  for  a  campaign  of  state  in 
trigue.  The  choice  lay  between  John  Adams  and  John  Jay. 

"  Wharton:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  IV,  p.  184. 

14  Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  Eevolution,  pp.  247-248. 


84      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

Franklin,  already  in  France  was  the  logical  candidate  and  the 
one  man  most  acceptable  to  Vergennes.  Jay  had  the  support  of 
New  York  and  practically  all  of  the  Southern  states,  because  of 
his  known  views  upon  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  river. 
Adams  was  supported  by  New  England  and  some  of  the  Middle 
states  because  of  his  views  on  the  fisheries.  Here  was  the  split 
in  the  old  alignment  noted  in  committee  control  in  Chapter  IV, 
and  which  began  to  assume  importance  about  1780.  The  Radi 
cals  won  in  the  selection  of  Adams  for  the  post  in  France,  while 
Jay  was  sent  to  Madrid. 15 

Next  came  the  instructions  to  these  men.  Luzerne  here  took 
active  part.  He  controlled  factions  and  made  it  plain  that  he 
desired  nothing  done  in  the  way  of  demands  outside  of  independ 
ence.  He  further  stipulated  that  Spain  must  be  considered. 
This  action  by  Luzerne  at  once  placed  France  in  a  position  of 
embarrassment  and  suspicion  and  the  Radicals  were  not  slow  in 
making  the  most  of  the  situation. 16  This  suspicion  was  increased 
by  evidence  that  Vergennes  did  not  care  to  see  America  emerge 
from  the  war  too  strong  and  he  was,  therefore,  inclined  to  use  his 
influence  in  securing  some  of  Spain's  demands,  relative  to 
Florida  and  the  Mississippi.  He  even  suggested  to  Congress  the 
value  of  placating  Spain  by  allowing  her  western  territory  and 
warned  Congress  that  France  would  not  prolong  the  war  a  single 
day  to  help  America  in  western  conquests. 17 

Suspicious  of  France,  John  Adams,  on  arriving  in  Paris, 
assumed  at  once,  an  attitude  of  antagonism.  He  disliked  all  par 
ties  and  men.  For  this  reason  he  fought  Franklin  and  reviled 
Vergennes.  He  informed  Vergennes  that  the  colonies  were  un 
der  no  distressing  burden  of  obligation  to  France,  for  without 


"  Doniol:  Participation  de  la  France,  etc.,  Ill,  p.  293. 
16  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  310. 

"  Ibid.  II,  pp.  244,  249;  Doniol:  Participation  de  la  France,  etc.,  Ill, 
p.  153. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  85 

America,  the  Bourbons  would  be  defeated  by  England. 18  Frank 
lin  at  once  wrote  the  President  of  Congress,  "I  think  an  expres 
sion  of  gratitude  is  not  only  our  duty,  but  our  interest Mr. 

Adams,  who  means  our  welfare  and  our  interest  as  much  as  I 
do  or  any  man  can  do,  seems  to  think  a  little  stoutness  and  a 
greater  use  of  independence  and  boldness  in  our  demands  will 
secure  us  ample  assistance.  It  is  for  the  Congress  to  judge  and 
regulate  their  affairs  accordingly."  19 

But  this  suspicious  attitude  to  France  began  to  permeate 
Congress.  That  body,  in  1780,  repudiated  paper  money  and  rec 
ommended  that  it  be  redeemed  at  40  to  1.  t  Adams  informed 
Vergennes  of  this  action  of  Congress,  which  much  incensed  him. 
"In  giving  this  information,"  said  Adams,  "I  flatter  myself, 
that  I  am  so  much  the  master  of  the  principles,  as  to  demonstrate 
that  the  plan  of  Congress  is  not  only  wise,  but  just. ' '  $  Vergennes 
at  once  wrote  to  Luzerne,  asking  him  to  have  Congress  modify 
the  resolutions  as  far  as  France  was  concerned,  since  it  spelled 
ruin  for  French  financial  interests. 

This  financial  muddle  came  at  the  most  critical  period  of  the 
whole  revolution.  On  August  7,  1780,  Vergennes  informed  Lu 
zerne  of  the  paper  money  conference  with  Adams  and  added,  '  *  I 
give  you  these  details  in  order  that  you  may  confidentially  con 
fer  with  the  President  and  principal  members  of  Congress  and 
thus  enable  them  to  judge  whether  if  Mr.  Adams  is  such  as  to 
qualify  him  for  the  important  task  confided  to  him  by  Congress. 
As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  foresee  that  the  Plenipotentiary  will 
do  nothing  but  raise  difficulties  and  cause  vexations  on  account  of 
a  stubborness,  a  pedantry,  a  self-sufficiency  and  a  self-conceit, 
which  render  him  incapable  of  handling  political  questions 


18  Durand:   Documents  of  American  Revolution,  p.   226. 

19  Wharton:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  IV,  p.  23. 
t  Journals  of  Congress,  XVI,  p.  264. 

t  John  Adams:  Works,  VII,  p.  193. 


86      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

if  really  attached  to  independence,  which  I  cannot  verify 

he  seems  to  be  feebly  attached  to  the  alliance,  so  that  it  would 
cost  him  nothing  to  take  steps  which  would  imply  the  ingratitude 
of  the  United  States,  whilst  the  opposite  sentiment  forms  the 
basis  of  his  instructions. ' ' 20  Meanwhile,  Vergennes  took  the  mat 
ter  to  Franklin, 21  who  agreed  to  lay  the  whole  matter  before 
Congress. 22  Luzerne  wrote  Vergennes  on  January  2,  1781,  stat 
ing  that  Adams's  letters  had  been  laid  before  Congress  and  that 
this  body  regarded  Adams's  views  of  his  instructions  and  mis 
sion  as  absurd. 23  On  January  28,  1781,  Luzerne  informed  Ver 
gennes  that  Congress  disapproved  generally  of  Adams 's  manage 
ment  of  his  mission  and  regretted  that  negotiations  for  peace 
should  be  in  the  hands  of  one  so  capable  of  being  mistaken  in  its 
real  object. 24. 

Adams,  however,  was  not  to  be  swerved  from  his  course  by 
the  opinions  of  Congress.  Writing  to  Vergennes  regarding  the 
instructions  to  Rochambeau,  he  implied  that  France  did  not  mean 
to  give  any  effective  aid  to  America.  He  further  added,  after 
criticizing  Vergennes,  "  I  am  determined  to  omit  no  opportunity 
of  communicating  my  sentiments  to  your  excellency  upon  every 
thing  that  appears  to  me  of  importance  to  the  common  cause,  in 
which  I  can  do  it  with  any  propriety. ' ' 25 

Vergennes  at  once  replied  that,  "his  Majesty  did  not  re 
quire  Mr.  Adams's  solicitations  in  order  to  interest  him  in  the 
welfare  of  the  United  States. ' ' 2G  Adams  had,  at  last,  become 
so  distasteful  to  Vergennes  that  he  wrote  to  Luzerne  on  Febru- 


20  Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  Kevolution,  pp.  233-234. 

21  Wharton:   Diplomatic  Correspondence,  III,  p.  827. 

22  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  844. 

23  Durand:   Documents  of  the  American  Revolution,  p.  233. 

24  Ibid.  p.  234. 

25  Doniol:   Participation  de  la  France,  etc.,  IV,  p.  422;   John  Adams: 
Works,  VII,  p.  241. 

28  Doniol:  Participation  de  la  France,  etc.,  IV,  p.  423. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  87 

ary  18,  1781,  and  indicated  that  he  hoped  that  Congress  would 
not  appoint  Adams  as  an  aid  to  Franklin  again,  but  he  directed 
Luzerne  to  refrain  from  trying  to  procure  his  recall,  but  rather 
to  get  Congress  to  give  him  instructions  which  will  keep  him  from 
doing  mischief. 27 

The  situation  was  now  the  more  delicate,  because  Franklin 
had  allowed  himself  to  be  used  by  Vergennes  as  a  channel  of 
communication  with  Congress  concerning  his  troubles  with 
Adams.  This  materially  injured  Franklin  and  created  a  large 
support  for  Adams. 28  Nevertheless,  through  Luzerne 's  sugges 
tions,  Congress  decided  to  strengthen  Adams  by  the  selection  of 
joint  commissioners  from  widely  scattered  states.  To  accomplish 
this  plan,  Luzerne  employed  means  which  cannot  be  count 
enanced,  though  it  seemed  justified  at  the  time  on  account  of  the 
rabid  opposition  of  the  Radicals  to  Franklin  and  his  work.  It 
was  found  possible  to  elect  Franklin  as  one  of  these  Commission 
ers,  by  the  manipulation  of  Sullivan  of  New  Hampshire.  Thomas 
Paine  was  also  bribed  to  aid  in  carrying  out  the  plan.  This  is 
proved  by  Luzerne 's  letter  to  Vergennes  in  which  he  says,  "He 
informed  me  that  he  would  accept  this  task  with  pleasure.  I 
promised  him  $1,000  a  year."29  The  same  kind  of  an  induce 
ment  was,  it  may  be  inferred,  extended  to  Sullivan,  for  Luzerne 
says  concerning  him,  "This  delegate  has  shown  in  this  affair 
equal  patriotism  and  attachment  to  the  alliance. ' ' 30  With  the 
aid  of  these  two  men  and  others,  instructions  suitable  to  Ver 
gennes  were  agreed  upon  and  John  Jay,  Franklin,  Henry  Lau- 
rens  and  Thomas  Jefferson  were  chosen  to  aid  John  Adams  in 
Europe. 31  Adams,  on  hearing  of  this  affair  was  furious,  ' '  Con 
gress,"  he  said,  "surrendered  their  own  sovereignty  into  the 

27  Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  ^Revolution,  pp.  235-237. 

28  Bancroft :  History  of  the  United  States,  X,  p.  443. 
2*  Doniol:  Participation  de  la  France,  etc.,  IV,  p.  60. 
80  Ibid.  IV,  p.  608. 

11  Bancroft:  History  of  the  United  States,  X,  p.  238. 


88      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

hands  of  the  French  minister.  Blush,  Blush,  ye  guilty  record — 
Blush  and  perish."32 

The  success  of  Luzerne  in  selecting  envoys  and  writing  in 
structions  for  them,  did  not  effectually  check  the  Kadical  oppo 
sition,  however.  It  actually  made  it  more  rabid.  The  Massa 
chusetts  delegates  held  their  seats  in  Congress  in  spite  of  a  reg 
ulation  of  Congress  that  no  delegate  should  hold  his  seat  for 
more  than  three  consecutive  years.  Samuel  Adams  was  returned 
to  Congress  year  after  year.  That  Luzerne  fought  against  the 
pernicious  influence  of  this  man  by  means  which  would  not  al 
ways  bear  the  light,  is  shown  by  a  report  to  Vergennes  in  which 
he  says  that  the  actions  of  the  Massachusetts  delegates  "has  led 
me  into  several  proceedings  of  which  I  have  not  complained,  be 
cause  I  have  prevented  their  effects  by  other  means. ' ' 33 

In  May,  1779,  Samuel  Adams  had  nominated  Arthur  Lee  for 
a  post  in  Europe  as  special  envoy  in  place  of  Franklin,  in  spite 
of  all  the  charges  against  him.  Luzerne  reported  that  Adams  did 
all  that  he  could  through  intrigue  and  friendship  to  accomplish 
this  selection,  but  Luzerne  put  a  stop  to  the  plan  by  refusing  to 
transact  business  through  him  (Lee),  if  he  were  selected.34 
Adams  then  attempted  to  nominate  General  Gates,  but  Washing 
ton  and  Luzerne  checked  this  plan  by  announcing  that  Gates 
could  not  enter  upon  diplomatic  duties  until  cleared  of  military 
charges. 35 

By  December,  1780,  Congress  was  filled  by  cabals  and 
schemes  to  discredit  both  Washington  and  Franklin.  The  num 
ber  of  special  committees  suddenly  increased.  Their  work  waf 
so  bungling  that  an  attempt  was  made  to  reduce  their  number 
and  size,  but  Samuel  Adams  blocked  every  move  of  this  kind.  So 


M  Doniol:  Participation  de  la  France,  etc.,  IV,  p.  608. 
88  Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  Revolution,  p.  249. 
84  Ibid.  p.  241. 
88  Ibid.  p.  242. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  89 

great  was  the  committee  evil,  that  Washington  was  obliged  to 
keep  his  plans  of  campaigns  secret  from  Congress.  D'Estaing 
and  Luzerne  were  the  only  two  men  in  America  to  whom  they 
could  be  entrusted.  Things  came  to  such  a  serious  state  by  the 
middle  of  1780,  that  Livingston  of  New  York  was  bent  upon 
forming  a  separate  confederation  with  New  England  left  out. 
But  Luzerne  counseled  delay  and  an  attempt  to  win  back  Penn 
sylvania  and  Delaware,  both  of  which  had  been  won  over  to  the 
New  England  side.  By  this  means  Luzerne  hoped  that  the  Mid 
dle  states  would  hold  the  balance  of  power.  Lafayette,  in  a  let 
ter  to  Vergennes  dated  May  20,  1780,  indicated  that  Luzerne  was 
convinced  that  Congress  could  never  act  with  discretion  and 
promptitude  on  any  diplomatic  matters  and  had  accordingly 
asked  Congress  to  name  a  committee  to  confer  with  him,  with 
power  to  set  in  motion  all  the  resources  of  America. 36  This  let 
ter  is  evidence  that  Luzerne  was  satisfied  that  disaster  could  only 
be  averted  by  clothing  Washington  with  extraordinary  powers 
and  allowing  Franklin  to  use  his  best  judgment  in  an  executive 
control  of  foreign  relations.  Consequently,  the  French  minister 
adopted  the  plan  of  bombarding  Congress  with  memorials  and 
securing  the  selection  of  the  committee  named  above. 

This  committee  was  selected  on  December  26,  1780.  It  con 
sisted  of  Witherspoon,  Sullivan,  Duane,  Madison  and  Mathews. 37 
Witherspoon  was  the  only  member  of  the  committee,  who  as  a 
confessed  Radical,  stood  out  for  New  England.  Madison  be 
lieved  in  the  concentration  of  powder  for  efficiency  up  to  a  certain 
limit  and  Mathews  was  much  interested  in  the  Mississippi  ques 
tion.  The  complexion  of  the  committee  gives  evidence  of  the 
influence  of  Luzerne  in  its  selection. 

The  Radicals  and  Constructionists  for  the  first  time  were 
able  to  agree  upon  a  new  plan  for  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs 

36  Stevens:  Facsimiles,  XVII,  No.  1625. 

37  Ibid.  XV,  No.  1193. 


90      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

about  the  middle  of  1780,  but  for  far  different  reasons.  The 
Radicals  saw  the  growing  control  of  diplomatic  relations  by  Lu 
zerne  and  wished  to  check  it;  the  Constructionists  hoped  that 
such  control  would  arouse  the  leaders  of  Congress  to  a  realization 
of  the  necessity  of  a  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  having  a 
definite  policy  of  action. 

On  May  15,  1780,  a  motion  was  made  to  select  a  committee 
of  three  to  consider  and  report  upon  proper  arrangements  for 
the  establishment  of  a  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs. 38  The 
members  of  this  committee  were  Lovell,  Houston  and  Duane,  two 
of  whom  were  followers  of  Samuel  Adams.  This,  alone,  assured 
the  defeat  of  the  plan.  It  was  felt  by  the  Radicals  that  this  com 
mittee  would  make  uncertain  the  plans  of  Luzerne  and  check  his 
control  of  diplomatic  affairs.  It  was  not  until  December  17,  1780, 
however,  that  Congress  was  privileged  to  consider  the  report  of 
this  committee. 39  Nothing  again  was  heard  of  the  plan  until 
January  10,  1781,  when  the  original  committee  reported  on  a 
plan  for  a  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs. 40 

On  May  29,  1781,  the  French  minister  conferred  with  a  com 
mittee  which  had  been  appointed  to  consider  two  memorials  sent 
by  him  to  Congress  concerning  the  conditions  of  affairs  in 
France. 41  During  1781,  Luzerne  still  continued  to  forward  me 
morials  to  Congress  upon  many  subjects,  the  majority  of  them 
having  a  direct  bearing  upon  the  appointment  and  control  of 
consuls ; 42  plans  of  conventions  for  discussion  of  peace ; 4S 
reports  on  treaties ;  44  and  communications  from  abroad.  45 


M  Journals  of  Congress,  XVI,  p.  428. 

89  Ibid.  XVII,  p.  505. 

40  Ibid.  XIX,  pp.  43-44. 

41  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  pp.  372-373. 

42  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  10. 
48  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  20. 
44  Ibid.  II,  p.  267. 
46  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  26. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  91 

On  August  11,  1781,  Luzerne  reported  to  Vergennes  that  he 
had  used  his  influence  to  procure  the  appointment  of  Living 
ston  as  Secretary  of  State,  but  that  his  opponents  declare  that 
the  endorsement  of  the  French  minister  is  a  guarantee  of  the 
defeat  of  any  candidate.  Luzerne  praised  Livingston,  but  ad 
mitted  him  to  be  somewhat  indolent  and  a  lover  of  quiet.  48 

Meanwhile,  the  committee  which  had  been  appointed  to  con 
fer  with  Luzerne,  was  enlarged  at  his  request,  because  it  could 
not  apparently  accomplish  the  work  outlined  for  it  to  do.  Ver 
gennes  informed  this  committee  through  Luzerne,  that  the  war 
could  not  be  further  prosecuted  by  France  unless  Congress  indi 
cated  greater  activity  at  once. 47  He  also  directed  Luzerne  to 
inform  Congress  that  it  would  be  necessary  for  that  body  to  draw 
a  line  of  conduct  for  John  Adams,  of  which  he  might  not  be  al 
lowed  to  lose  sight  and  accused  Adams  of  a  wrong  use  of  his 
powers  in  treating  with  England. 48 

Luzerne  at  once  made  a  strong  representation  to  Congress, 
asking  for  the  immediate  appointment  of  a  committee  with  which 
he  could  treat. 49  Luzerne  indicated  to  this  committee  the  dan 
gers  of  delay  'and  the  possibility  of  the  loss  of  the  war. 50 

Stirred  to  action  at  last,  this  committee  reported  out  letters 
which  were  forwarded  by  Congress  to  the  French  king  on  Octo 
ber  18,  1781,  assuring  him  of  redoubled  efforts  by  Congress  to 
bring  the  war  to  a  speedy  conclusion. 51  On  October  24,  1781, 
Washington  reported  to  Congress  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis 
and  this  event  was  ordered  communicated  to  the  French  min 
ister  through  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs. 52 


48  Durand:  Documents  of  the  American  Eevolution,  p.  238. 
4T  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  22. 

48  Journals  of  Congress,  XX,  p.  563. 

49  Ibid.  XX,  p.  561. 

60  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  pp.  36-37. 

61  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  40. 

62  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  47. 


92     CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

SUMMARY. 

As  early  as  1775,  the  French  ministry  sent  secret  envoys  to 
America  to  study  conditions  and  to  influence  public  opinion  in 
favor  of  France.  After  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  1778,  a  min 
ister  was  sent  to  America  to  further  influence  public  opinion 
and  to  control,  as  far  as  possible,  the  actions  of  Congress  in  the 
conduct  of  foreign  affairs. 

Gerard  early  realized  the  pernicious  influence  of  the  Radi 
cals  and  the  inefficiency  of  the  committee  system  of  Congressional 
control.  Under  these  conditions,  he  boldly  endeavored  to  control 
domestic  affairs  and  so  far  succeeded  as  to  be  directly  instru 
mental  in  effecting  the  recall  of  some  of  the  American  envoys 
to  France. 

Luzerne,  upon  his  arrival  in  America,  used  his  influence  in 
checking  the  inefficient  control  of  the  army  and  the  attempt  to 
replace  Franklin.  He  took  part  in  the  framing  of  instructions 
to  John  Adams  as  peace  envoy;  he  was  instrumental  in  procur 
ing  the  modification  of  the  paper  money  tangle;  he  induced 
Congress  to  bring  Adams  to  account  for  failure  to  follow  the 
letter  of  his  instructions ;  he  was  probably  concerned  in  the  word 
ing  of  new  instructions  to  Adams ;  he  secured  the  appointment  of 
other  Commissioners  to  aid  Adams ;  he  frustrated  an  attempt  by 
Samuel  Adams  to  secure  the  election  of  Arthur  Lee  again  to  a 
post  in  Europe;  he  prevented  an  attempt  of  the  Middle  and 
Southern  colonies  to  secede  from  New  England,  thus  maintaining 
a  balance  of  power. 

Finally  he  asked  Congress  to  appoint  a  committee  to  confer 
with  him  on  the  marshalling  of  America's  entire  resources;  he 
worked  through  this  committee  to  secure  the  clothing  of  Wash 
ington  with  dictatorial  and  Franklin  with  plenary  powers  in 
their  respective  fields  of  labor.  In  this  work,  he  largely  assumed 
the  functions  of  the  original  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  93 

He  suggested  the  establishment  of  a  Department  of  Foreign 
Affairs  and  probably  aided  in  drawing  up  the  report  of  the 
committee  on  the  Department.  He  used  his  influence  in  securing 
the  election  of  Livingston  as  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs.  He 
urged  Congress  to  redouble  its  efforts  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  and  discouraged  Congress  from  laying  claim  to  western 
territory.  He  constantly  kept  in  mind  the  best  interests  of 
France  as  well  as  those  of  America. 

Luzerne's  services  to  America  cannot  be  estimated.  He 
finally  succeeded  in  arousing  Congress  to  a  supreme  effort  in 
winning  the  war  and  events  conclusively  proved  that  his  influ 
ence  was  effective. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  CENTRALIZATION  OF  POWER  IN  THE 
CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS. 

The  recall  of  Arthur  Lee  and  John  Adams  as  special  envoys 
to  France  in  October,  1778,  and  the  election  of  Benjamin  Frank 
lin  as  minister  plenipotentiary  to  that  country  on  October  26, 
1778,  were  milestones  in  the  development  of  the  executive  powers 
of  government  in  the  United  States. 

The  work  of  the  Commission  in  France  had  been  almost 
fruitless,  if  we  except  the  treaty  of  1778,  owing  to  the  "animosi 
ties  and  disputes  detrimental  to  the  interests  and  honor  of  the 
United  States. ' '  Complete  disgust  at  the  chaotic  turn  of  events, 
had  forced  the  leaders  in  Congress  to  demand  the  censuring  of 
all  the  Commissioners ;  the  recall  of  two  of  them  and  the  confer 
ring  of  plenary  powers  upon  Franklin. 

On  December  28,  1776,  a  committee  was  appointed  in  Con 
gress  to  prepare  plans  for  obtaining  foreign  assistance.  It  re 
ported  and  its  plans  were  referred  to  a  committee  of  the  whole.  * 
On  December  30,  1776,  the  report  of  the  committee  was  read  and 
considered. 2  The  direct  result  of  this  report  was  the  sending 
of  Izard  to  Tuscany;  Dana  to  Russia;  Arthur  Lee  to  Prussia; 
William  Lee  to  Vienna  and  Laurens  to  the  Netherlands.  But  in 
every  instance,  they  were  either  never  received  or  allowed  to 
wander  harmlessly  about  without  recognition  or  accomplishment. 
This  was  a  typical  result  of  the  "militia"  policj^.  Furthermore, 
it  kept  six  ministers  in  Europe,  when  one  would  have  been  suffi- 

1  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  37. 
a  Ibid.  II,  pp.  38-39;  40,  41. 


THE  CENTRALIZATION  OF  POWER  95 

i 

cient.  It  harassed  the  work  of  Franklin ;  it  was  a  matter  of  great 
expense.  It  had  a  bad  effect  upon  the  French  negotiations.  It 
nearly  broke  up  the  work  of  the  Commissioners  during  1777  and 
1778. 

It  was  the  accumulated  results  of  all  these  embarrassing 
situations,  that  caused  Congress  to  accept  the  report  of  the  Com 
mittee  of  Secret  Correspondence  on  January  2,  1777,  in  the  form 
of  a  commission  for  Franklin.  3  But  this  report  was,  as  usual, 
referred  to  a  committee  of  three  (Chase,  Wilson,  Samuel  Adams). 
The  appearance  of  Adams  on  the  committee  was  a  guarantee 
that  Franklin  would  be  limited  in  his  powers.  The  report  of  the 
committee  was  adopted  by  Congress  and  gave  Franklin  new  pow 
ers  beyond  those  he  first  enjoyed  as  Commissioner  to  France. 
This  was,  without  doubt,  a  concession  to  Wilson,  who  was  a  Con- 
structionist  and  a  member  of  this  committee. 4 

Franklin's  instructions  were  grouped  under  eleven  heads. 
Most  of  the  items  appeared  to  be  compromises  between  the  oppos 
ing  parties  in  Congress.  The  last  item,  however,  definitely  stated 
that  he  was  to  make  no  engagements  without  the  consent  of  Con 
gress  having  previously  been  obtained. 5  This  was  the  one  point 
which  shows  the  power  of  the  advocates  of  the  decentralization 
of  power.  Yet  in  this  very  point,  there  was  a  great  advance  in 
the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs,  because  the  entire  work  was  placed 
in  the  hands  of  one  man.  This  would,  in  the  end,  work  out  for 
increased  executive  powers  of  foreign  ministers. 

Necessity  had  been  the  cause  of  many  of  the  executive  as 
sumptions  of  Franklin  during  all  the  years  from  1776  to  1782. 
This  assumption  of  power  had  been  a  gradual  growth  and  when 
in  1778,  he  was  given  special  powers,  he  was  not  at  a  loss 
as  to  how  they  should  be  used.  Lacking  instructions  from  Con 

8  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  42. 

4  Ibid.  II,  pp.  42,  43. 

*  Ibid.  II,  pp.  107-111;  Journals  of  Congress,  XII,  pp.  1038-1042. 


96      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

gress,  he  soon  found  himself  acting  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
in  negotiations  for  loans  and  in  the  disbursing  of  money. 6  He 
was  a  deputy  Secretary  of  War,  in  that  he  bought  and  forwarded 
military  supplies  and  in  part,  gave  suggestions  and  views  to  the 
Frencn  Court  on  the  conduct  of  campaigns  and  the  movement 
of  troops.  He  acted  as  deputy  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  fitting 
out  cruisers  and  planning  naval  campaigns. 7  He  acted  as  Sec 
retary  of  State  in  conducting  various  diplomatic  matters.  All 
these  functions  implied  the  delegation  of  power  by  Congress,  but 
such  power  it  did  not  delegate,  as  we  have  had  occasion  to  ob 
serve.  Such  powers  were  tacitly  assumed,  however,  with  the  en 
couragement  of  the  French  Court  and  the  Constructionists  at 
home.  Here  was  the  first  real  executive  work,  which  was  the 
antecedent  of  the  subsequent  development  of  power  of  an  execu 
tive  nature  in  the  American  scheme  of  government  after  1789. 
That  this  early  power  of  Franklin  was  not  abused  was  due  to 
his  stability  and  integrity.  In  the  hands  of  Arthur  Lee  or  John 
Adams  it  might  have  been  fatal. 

After  the  recall  of  the  envoys,  Franklin  was  free  to  use  his 
new  powers  in  the  most  efficient  way  and  with  a  wide  interpre 
tation.  But  his  respite  was  short.  The  enemies  of  Franklin  in 
Congress  attempted  to  replace  him  with  John  Adams.  Failing 
in  this,  they  were  able  to  secure  the  selection  of  Adams  as  peace 
envoy,  and  he  arrived  in  France  in  this  capacity  early  in  1780. 

Immediately,  Adams  began  his  old  tactics  of  berating  Frank 
lin  and  especially  the  French  ministry.  In  October,  1780,  Frank 
lin  advised  him  to  assume  a  different  attitude  to  Vergennes  but 
to  no  avail. 8  On  July  12,  1781,  Adams'  commission  as  an  envoy 
to  close  a  commercial  treaty  with  France  was  revoked  by  Con- 


6  Wharton:   Diplomatic  Correspondence,  I,  p.  291. 

7  Ibid.  II,  pp.  224-245. 
1  Ibid.  IV,  p.  87, 


THE  CENTRALIZATION  OP  POWER  97 

gress. 9  On  May  29,  1782,  Livingston,  then  Secretary  of  For 
eign  Affairs,  scored  Adams  for  not  replying  to  a  letter  from  the 
Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  warns  him  against  signing  a 
separate  peace. 10  On  October  31,  1782,  Adams  wrote  to  Living 
ston,  lamenting  that  he  is  bound  by  instructions. X1  On  November 
18,  1782,  he  wrote  again  to  Livingston  arguing  against  the  limita 
tions  placed  upon  him  by  his  instructions  and  adds,  "There  is 
nothing  that  humbles  and  depresses;  nothing  that  shackles  and 
confines;  in  short  nothing  that  renders  totally  useless  all  your 
ministers  in  Europe  so  much  as  these  positive  instructions  to  con 
sult  and  communicate  with  the  French  ministry  upon  all  occa 
sions  and  follow  their  advice. ' ' 12 

This  is  certainly  a  marked  change  in  the  attitude  of  this 
leader  of  Radicals  and  believer  in  the  utmost  decentralization  of 
power.  He  then  feared  the  use  of  power.  Now  it  was  a  far  dif 
ferent  matter.  Cold  reason  compelled  Adams  to  gradually  as 
sume  a  national  view,  though  it  was  diametrically  opposed  to  his 
state  interests  and  affections,  which  made  him  at  heart  provin 
cial.  In  this  mental  state,  Adams  was  not  of  great  value  to 
America  in  France.  The  French  ministry  turned  naturally  to 
Franklin  with  the  hope  that  he  could  assume  enough  power  to 
conclude  peace  with  satisfaction  to  all  concerned. 

Franklin's  executive  powers  rapidly  increased  from  this 
time.  Two  factors,  among  many,  seem  of  great  importance  in 
hastening  this  increase  of  powers.  (1)  The  committee  system  in 
Congress  completely  broke  down  about  1781.  In  spite  of  the 
appointment  of  261  committees  during  this  year,  nothing  of  im 
portance  was  accomplished.  The  direct  result  was  the  establish 
ment  of  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  with  Livingston,  a 


•  Journals  of  Congress,  XX,  p.  746. 

10  Wharton:    Diplomatic  Correspondence,  V,  pp.  226-227. 

11  Ibid.  VI,  pp.  53,  54. 

12  Ibid.  VI,  pp.  52-53. 


98      CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

staunch  friend  of  Franklin,  as  its  first  Secretary.  He  at  once 
placed  in  Franklin 's  hands  all  the  powers  he,  as  Secretary,  could 
give  him  and  kept,  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  the  Radical  element 
in  the  dark  concerning  Franklin's  plans. 

(2)  The  other  important  factor  was  the  surrender  by  the 
Southern  states  of  their  claims  to  the  Floridas  and  the  instruct 
ing  of  Jay  to  agree  to  give  up  the  free  navigation  of  the  Missis 
sippi  below  the  31st  parallel  of  latitude. 13  But  Jay  never  re 
vealed  these  instructions  as  Spain  did  not  enter  the  French  and 
American  alliance  and  as  a  result,  the  French- American  treaty 
was  modified  to  the  advantage  of  the  United  States. 

Here  was  a  clear  case  of  the  assumption  of  executive  power. 
It  was  good  evidence  that  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  was  not 
in  the  hands  of  Congress  or  even  in  the  hands  of  the  Secretary 
of  Foreign  Affairs. 

In  1782,  Franklin  called  Jay  to  France  from  Spain  with 
this  comment,  "Spain  has  taken  four  years  to  consider  whether 
she  would  treat  with  us  or  not.  Give  her  forty  years  and  let  us 
mind  our  own  business. ' ' 14  With  Jay  in  France,  negotiations  for 
peace  began  between  Oswald,  the  English  representative,  and 
Franklin  in  the  spring  of  1782.  Jay,  as  a  commissioner,  refused 
to  treat  with  Oswald  whatsoever,  on  the  basis  of  the  ' '  American 
colonies  and  plantations, ' '  but  only  upon  the  basis  of  a  sovereign 
power  entitled  the  United  States  of  America. 

Franklin  and  Vergennes  both  urged  Jay  to  assume  a  con 
ciliatory  attitude.  This  aroused  Jay 's  suspicions. 15  They  were 
increased  by  a  letter  of  Marbois  to  Vergennes  in  which  reference 
was  made  to  the  United  States  in  such  a  way  as  to  cause  Jay  to 
think  that  the  French  ministry  was  distinctly  unfriendly.  Jay 
was  convinced  that  France  would  oppose  the  extension  of  Ameri- 

18  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  99. 

14  Jay:  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  II,  p.  193. 

15  Ibid.  II,  p.  372. 


THE  CENTRALIZATION  OF  POWER  99 

ca  to  the  west,  limit  the  Newfoundland  fisheries,  aid  Spain  in 
securing  her  claims  to  the  Mississippi  and  support  the  English 
claim  to  all  the  territory  above  the  31st  degree  latitude. 16 

He  was  determined  that  France  should  not  sacrifice  the  in 
terests  of  the  United  States  to  satisfy  Spain  and  the  Family 
Compact.  He,  therefore,  determined  to  act  without  instructions, 
even  without  the  sanction  of  Franklin.  He  urged,  without  in 
forming  the  French  ministry,  (which  according  to  his  instruc 
tions  he  was  bound  to  do)  the  dispatch  of  an  envoy  to  England 
to  show  the  English  ministry  the  immediate  necessity  of  cutting 
the  cords  binding  France  to  America. 17 

Jay  was  partly  right  and  partly  wrong  in  his  suspicions. 
France  was  well  within  her  rights  in  demanding  knowledge  and 
aid  from  America  in  negotiating  terms  of  peace.  On  the  other 
hand,  had  France  and  Spain  known  all  the  details  of  the  nego 
tiations  between  America  and  England,  the  treaty  of  peace, 
which  was  ultimately  signed,  would  not,  in  all  probability,  have 
been  as  advantageous  to  the  United  States.  This  action  by  Jay 
was  a  clear  case  of  the  assumption  of  executive  powers  in  such  a 
way  as  to  save  a  most  vital  and  delicate  situation. 

Jay's  stand  all  through  the  negotiations  was  opposed  to 
that  of  Franklin.  It  is  true  that  Franklin  was  a  Construetionist 
as  well  as  Jay,  but  he  was  an  opportunist  Constructionist.  Jay's 
stand  in  the  whole  matter  was  extremely  technical,  but  extremely 
useful.  He,  no  doubt,  suspected  and  feared  too  much,  but  these 
fears  and  suspicions  were  of  immense  value  to  the  United  States. 
He  knew  before  he  left  America,  that  France  did  not  believe  that 
the  United  States  would  make  the  possession  of  the  fisheries  the 
absolute  and  irreducible  basis  of  peace. 18  The  persistence  of 
Adams  on  this  point,  however,  came  very  near  wrecking  the 

16  Jay:  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  II,  p.  398. 

17  Ibid.  II,  pp.  405-407. 

18  Wharton:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  V,  p.  241. 


100    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

whole  negotiations.  For  this  reason  the  conferences  dragged  on 
until  the  latter  part  of  1782.  But  Adams  and  Jay,  together, 
finally  gained  all  the  disputed  points,  pleasing  both  Northern  and 
Southern  states.  The  boundary  question,  the  fishery  question, 
the  treatment  of  the  Loyalists  and  the  settlement  of  the  Ameri 
can  debts  were  all  settled  and  the  articles  of  the  provisional 
treaty  signed  on  November  30,  1782. 

Thus  the  transfer  of  the  executive  functions  of  government 
to  France  and  their  assumption  by  three  American  envoys,  made 
possible  the  advantageous  provisions  of  the  articles  of  peace. 
What  advantages,  if  any,  would  have  been  attained,  had  the 
American  Congress  controlled  foreign  affairs  to  the  end,  can 
never  be  known.  That  the  war  would  never  have  ended  success 
fully  with  it  in  power,  working  through  its  inefficient  committee 
system,  is  probable.  That  the  terms  of  peace  would  not  have 
been  satisfactorily  completed  and  with  advantage  to  America 
under  a  true  Congressional  regime  is  almost  certain. 

SUMMARY. 

New  England  demanded  that  the  fisheries  question  should 
be  settled  in  her  favor  at  the  outcome  of  the  war,  regardless  ol 
its  effect  upon  the  rest  of  the  country.  This  was  always  the 
spirit  of  the  ''militia"  policy.  This  kind  of  diplomacy  was 
sectional.  Franklin's  policy  was  national. 

Since  the  Radicals  could  not  remove  Franklin,  they  sought 
to  limit  his  powers.  His  instructions  were  made  very  definite. 
But  the  fact  that  the  work  in  France  was  placed  in  the  hands 
of  one  man  was  a  great  step  in  advance  in  the  use  of  executive 
power.  The  committee  system  had  miserably  failed  and  the 
Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs  was  inactive.  The  only  solution 
of  the  problem  was  the  one  attempted — the  virtual  transfer  of 
the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  to  Europe. 


THE  CENTRALIZATION  OP  POWER  101 

Franklin,  in  France,  assumed  varied  executive  powers.  He 
was  driven  to  do  this  by  the  necessities  of  the  case.  This  was. 
the  first  real  development  of  executive  power  in  connection  with 
the  American  government.  That  it  was  wisely  used  was  due 
to  the  man  using  it.  He  was  most  acceptable  to  the  French 
Court.  This  very  position  of  confidence  stirred  up  suspicions 
against  him.  When  Jay  arrived  in  France,  he  was  soon  able  to 
follow  Franklin's  lead.  With  the  consent  of  Franklin,  he  broke 
his  instructions  in  1782  and  the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  with 
England  without  the  knowledge  of  France  and  contrary  to  the 
instructions  of  Congress. 

This  action  of  the  American  envoys  was  hastened  by  party 
strife  in  Congress.  The  assumption  of  executive  power  could 
alone  save  the  situation.  Its  results  were  acceptable.  The  end 
seemed  to  justify  the  means.  This  was  all  accomplished  by  the 
concentration  of  executive  power  in  the  hands  of  men  able  to 
properly  use  it.  That  it  was  assumed  is  evidence  that  Congress 
did  not  have  the  power  to  give  it,  or  possessing  it,  would  not  dele 
gate  it  to  the  envoys  abroad.  Their  successful  work  in  France 
was  the  beginning  of  the  rapid  growth  of  the  executive  functions 
of  government. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OP  A  DEFINITE  POLICY  IN  THE 
CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS. 

The  actions  of  the  peace  envoys  in  France  is  proof  that  the 
executive  power  of  the  government,  through  its  representatives, 
developed  more  rapidly  than  it  was  delegated  by  Congress. 

It  is  interesting  to  note,  however,  that  the  growth  of  execu 
tive  power  began  early  in  the  life  of  Congress.  As  early  as  Jan- 
/  uary  24,  1776,  a  committee  was  appointed  to  consider  the  estab 
lishment  of  a  War  Office. a  After  June  25,  1776,  many  questions 
which  had  formerly  been  referred  to  special  committees  for  ac 
tion,  were  now  turned  over  to  this  Board. 2  During  1776,  a  com 
mittee  was  appointed  to  consider  the  establishment  of  a  Post 
Office. 3  On  April  17,  1777,  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspond 
ence  was  changed  to  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs.  4  Dur 
ing  this  year,  Samuel  Adams  was  elected  a  member  of  the  Board 
of  War. 5  It  is  at  once  noticeable  that  fewer  special  committees 
were  appointed  to  consider  letters  from  Washington,  since  most 
of  them  were  referred  to  this  Board. 

The  first  marked  delegation  of  power  appears  on  May  16, 
1778,  when  it  was  resolved  that  such  alterations  in  or  additions 
to  the  instructions  given  to  the  Commissioners  at  the  Courts  of 
Berlin,  Vienna  and  Tuscany  may  be  made  by  the  Committee  for 
Foreign  Affairs  as  they  may  think  expedient.  6 

1  Journals  of  Congress,  IV,  p.  85. 

2  Journals  of  Congress,  IV,  p.  85ff. 

3  Ibid.  IV,  p.  107. 

4  Ibid.  VII,  p.  274. 
6  Ibid.  VII,  p.  32. 

6  Journals  of  Congress,  XI,  p.  505. 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  A  DEFINITE  POLICY  103 


On  May  15,  1780,  a  committee  of  three  was  appointed  to 


consider  a  plan  for  the  establishment  of  a  Department  of  ^ 

eign  Affairs.  7  Six  months  later,  on  December  17,  1780,  this 
special  committee  brought  in  its  plan.  8  Here  was  good  evidence 
of  the  inability  of  Congress  to  do  efficient  work.  On  Jan.  10, 
1781,  the  report  of  the  committee  was  seriously  considered  by 
Congress.  9 

Meanwhile  a  concentration  of  executive  power  had  begun 
in  other  lines  of  governmental  work.  On  January  10,  1780,  a 
committee  of  four  had  been  appointed  to  consider  the  establish 
ment  of  a  Court  of  Appeals.  10  On  August  21,  1780,  a  committee 
had  been  appointed  to  consider  a  plan  for  an  executive  depart 
ment.  During  this  period  much  work  was  being  assigned  to  the 
Boards  of  War,  Marine,  Commerce  and  Treasury,  but  very  little 
to  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs,  as  we  have  observed. 

On  January  10,  1781,  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 
was  established,  with  recommendations  for  the  selection  of  a 
Secretary.  ^  On  January  17,  1781,  Arthur  Lee  and  Livingston 
were  placed  in  nomination  by  the  Radicals  and  Constructionists 
respectively,  but  no  action  was  then  taken.  12  It  was  voted  that 
the  ballots  be  cast  on  these  names  on  February  9,  1781.  13  No 
action  was  taken,  however,  until  June  13,  1781,  and  it  was  then 
voted  to  postpone  action  until  the  following  week.  14  There 
seems  to  be  no  record  as  to  the  exact  date  when  the  Secretary 
was  elected,  but  it  may  be  assumed  from  the  records  of  events 
that  Livingston  was  elected  as  Secretary  sometime  in  August, 


7  Journals  of  Congress,  XVI,  p.  428. 

8  Ibid.  XVII,  p.  1156. 

9  Ibid.  XIX,  p.  42. 

10  Ibid.  XVI,  p.  32. 

11  Ibid.  XIX,  p.  42. 
"  Ibid.  XIX,  p.  65. 
18  Ibid.  XIX,  p.  133. 
14  Ibid.  XXI,  p.  637. 


104    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

1781. 15  On  January  16,  1781,  the  salary  had  been  fixed  at 
$4,000  per  year. 16 

The  duties  of  the  new  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  were  in 
substance  as  follows:  (1)  To  hold  office  during  the  pleasure  of 
Congress;  (2)  To  have  custody  of  all  books,  papers,  etc.,  belong 
ing  to  the  Department;  (3)  To  conduct  all  correspondence; 
(4)  To  correspond  with  governors;  (5)  To  receive  the  applica 
tions  of  foreigners;  (6)  To  secure  the  redress  of  private  in 
juries  in  foreign  lands;  (7)  To  attend  Congress  and  report  on 
all  cases  referred  to  him  by  Congress;  (8)  To  give  Congress  in 
formation  concerning  his  department;  (9)  To  have  access  to  all 
state  papers;  (10)  To  control  foreign  ambassadors. 17 

It  had  taken  a  long  time  to  come  to  this  position  in  the  con 
trol  of  foreign  affairs  and  it  is  evidence  that  the  leaven  of  execu 
tive  control  had  begun  to  work  in  Congress.  Yet  it  is  surprising 
how  much  Congress  hampered  the  new  Secretary  in  the  conduct 
of  his  department.  Able  man  as  Livingston  was,  he  was  never 
allowed  to  initiate  any  diplomatic  activities  of  any  consequence. 
That  he  had  a  definite  foreign  policy  which  he  desired  to  carry 
out  was  early  manifest,  but  he  was  handicapped  by  constitu 
tional  limitations. 18  Furthermore,  Congress  continually  in 
fringed  upon  his  delegated  powers  as  Secretary. 

On  November  23,  1781,  Congress  ordered  the  Secretary  to 
inform  its  Ministers  in  France  to  confer  with  Lafayette  and  to 
employ  him  in  accelerating  supplies  and  fulfilling  plans  for  the 
assistance  of  America. 19  On  January  2,  1782,  the  Secretary  was 
ordered  to  lay  before  Congress  an  estimate  of  the  expenses  to  be 
incurred  by  the  Ministers  abroad. 20  On  May  1,  1782,  the  Secre- 

"  Journals  of  Congress,  XXI,  p.  855. 

16  Ibid.  XIX,  p.  64. 

17  Wharton:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  V,  pp.  199-201. 

18  Ibid.  I,  pp.  663-664-665. 

19  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  49. 

20  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  52. 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  A  DEFINITE  POLICY  105 

tary  lays  before  Congress  a  letter  from  the  French  minister. 21 
On  May  14,  1782,  he  is  directed  to  state  the  condition  of  com 
merce  and  outline  plans  for  its  protection. 22  Committees  be 
gan  to  be  appointed  to  do  the  work  originally  assigned  to  the  Sec 
retary.  One  committee  was  selected  to  revise  the  instructions  to 
Adams. 23  Another  committee  was  appointed  to  draft  a  com 
mission  and  instructions  for  a  minister  to  Sweden. 24  A  third 
was  elected  to  receive  communications  from  the  French  minis 
ter.  25  On  September  24,  1782,  a  committee  of  three  was  elected 
to  confer  with  the  French  minister  relative  to  England's  at 
titude  to  peace. 26  On  October  4,  1782,  the  same  committee  re 
ported  on  dispatches  from  Jay  and  Lafayette. 27  On  October 
22,  1782,  a  committee  of  three  reported  on  a  letter  from  Jay  and 
recommended  that  he  be  ordered  to  at  once  conclude  a  treaty 
with  the  United  Provinces. 28  On  November  25,  1782,  on  re 
ceiving  the  report  of  a  committee  of  three,  Congress  ordered  the 
Secretary  to  send  all  information  possible  to  Congress  and  to 
Ministers  to  European  Courts,  except  secret  materials. 29  On 
December  3,  1782,  Livingston  resigned  as  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 30  On  December  25,  1782,  Livingston,  on  the  request  of 
Congress  to  remain  in  office  until  spring,  consented  to  perform 
the  duties  of  the  office  until  that  time,  but  this  consent  was  given 
with  great  reluctance. 31 

It  was  natural  that  Livingston  should  have  resigned.     At 
first,  Congress  saw  to  it  that  he  was  kept  strictly  within  his 

21  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  pp.  93-100. 

22  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  109. 

23  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  142. 
34  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  215. 

25  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  217. 

26  Ibid.  Ill,  pp.  218-226. 

27  Ibid.  Ill,  pp.  248-250. 

28  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  251. 

29  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  254. 

30  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  255. 
81  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  265. 


106    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

duties  as  outlined  in  the  original  plan.  The  Radicals  were, 
moreover,  particular  that  a  very  strict  construction  should  be 
placed  upon  his  powers.  A  little  later,  the  Radicals  took  up 
their  old  plan  of  securing  the  appointment  of  special  committees 
to  control  the  work  and  functions  of  the  Secretary.  He  became 
a  mere  " rubber  stamp."  Self  respect  required  him  to  resign. 
That  Livingston  had  a  real  policy  and  planned  to  use  it,  had  he 
been  allowed  to  do  so,  is  shown  by  several  instances. 

After  a  report  by  the  Secretary  with  recommendations,  on 
February  5,  1782,  it  was  voted  by  Congress,  "that  Franklin  be 
authorized  to  enter  into  such  engagements  in  France  or  with 
any  state  or  province  or  with  any  man  or  body  of  men  whatso 
ever,  when  necessary,  for  binding  the  United  States  to  discharge 
said  loans  with  interest  and  the  United  States  pledges  their  faith 
to  conform  to  what  he  executes. ' ' 32 

The  above  stands  out,  however,  as  the  only  clear  case  where 
the  recommendations  of  the  Secretary  resulted  in  any  clearly 
denned  action  on  the  part  of  Congress  relative  to  the  enlarge 
ment  of  the  powers  of  the  Ministers  abroad. 

There  were  several  other  reasons  why  Livingston  was  com 
pelled  to  resign.  (1)  The  work  of  the  Department  was  very  ar 
duous  owing  to  the  large  amount  of  correspondence.  (2)  He 
found  that  as  soon  as  he  had  incorporated  the  sentiments  of  Con 
gress  in  communications  to  his  Ministers,  the  sentiments  of  Con 
gress  had  again  changed,  so  that  his  instructions  meant  nothing. 
(3)  He  desired  to  give  instructions  to  his  ministers  of  a  secret 
nature,  in  many  instances,  but  he  dared  not  send  them  without 
the  advice  and  consent  of  Congress.  (4)  He  was  seldom  able  to 
gain  information  of  value  to  him  in  his  work  by  listening  to  the 
debates  in  Congress  and  he  was  never  encouraged  to  ask  ques 
tions. 


82  Journals  of  Congress,  XXII,  p.  66. 
88  Ibid.  XXII,  p.  370. 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  A  DEFINITE  POLICY  107 

That  Livingston  faithfully  fulfilled  the  duties  of  the  office 
during  his  term  as  Secretary  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  on  July 
2,  1782,  a  committee  of  five,  most  of  whom  were  Radicals,  be 
gan  an  investigation  of  the  Department. 33  On  September  18, 
1782,  the  committee  reported  on  the  number  and  nature  of  the 
books,  papers,  etc.,  in  the  archives  of  the  Department.  It  re 
ported  that  the  Secretary  had  shown  much  industry,  attention 
and  ability  in  his  work;  that  whatever  errors  were  discovered 
were  too  trivial  to  be  reported  to  Congress,  and  that  some  sug 
gestions  were  made  to  the  Secretary,  which  no  doubt  would  be 
acted  upon. 34 

It  would  seem  that  Livingston's  incumbency  as  Secretary 
of  Foreign  Affairs  was  a  distinct  period  of  transition  from 
utter  chaos  to  the  beginning  of  executive  control  and  he  was 
the  particular  victim  of  a  natural  reaction  against  such  change. 
Had  he  remained  a  year  longer  as  Secretary,  he  would,  without 
doubt,  have  begun  to  reap  the  good  results  of  the  transition. 

Two  factors  changed  conditions  very  materially  during 
1782,  so  that  by  1783  and  1784,  the  Department  of  Foreign  Af 
fairs  really  began  to  function  as  such.  (1)  The  Committee 
system  completely  broke  down  during  1781  and  1782  as  a  means 
of  control  of  Congressional  action.  Whereas,  in  the  early  part 
of  1781,  many  special  committees  were  elected  to  consider  mat 
ters  which  most  certainly  belonged  to  the  several  Departments; 
by  1782,  most  of  the  committees  elected  had  as  their  function 
the  consideration  of  matters  presented  to  Congress  by  these  De 
partments.  The  positions  of  Congress  and  Departments,  as  far 
as  functions  and  actions  were  concerned,  were  now  exactly  re 
versed.  The  result  was  a  most  remarkable  growth  of  execu 
tive  power  in  the  several  Departments  of  government.  (2)  On 
November  21,  1782,  James  Madison  offered  a  resolution  in  Con- 

34  Journals  of  Congress,  XXIII,  pp.  586-589. 


108    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

gress  to  the  effect  that  the  powers  of  the  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs  be  enlarged. 35  Previous  to  this,  his  powers  had  been 
somewhat  enlarged,  but  now  a  committee  of  five  was  appointed 
to  consider  the  matter  of  further  enlarging  them.  Their  report 
was  wordy  and  grandiloquent,  but  when  reduced  to  its  lowest 
terms  was  not  much  of  an  improvement.  The  appointment  of 
the  committee  was  no  doubt  a  concession  to  the  Construction- 
ists,  especially  Madison,  but  the  Radicals  saw  to  it  that  the 
teeth  of  the  measure  should  be  effectually  drawn.  The  work 
of  the  Department,  as  outlined  by  this  committee,  ended  with 
the  provision  that  all  letters  to  United  States  Ministers  or  for 
eign  powers  must  receive  the  approval  of  Congress  before  sent. 
The  suggestion  that  the  Secretary  be  given  a  seat  in  Congress 
was  struck  out.  He  was  to  reduce  all  communications  to  proper 
form  in  his  office,  which  were  to  be  resubmitted  to  Congress, 
then  countersigned  by  the  Secretary  and  then  delivered  to  the 
proper  destination. 86 

This  plan  gave  the  Secretary  more  work  than  before,  but 
no  more  real  power.  The  new  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 
was  accepted  with  the  repeal  of  the  law  establishing  the  first 
one. 37  But  the  new  Department  did  not  then  receive  any  more 
work  of  importance  to  do.  Some  committees  were  still  elected 
to  do  this  work.  On  February  14,  1783,  a  committee  reported 
on  a  letter  from  Jefferson  and  Congress  at  once  acted  on  his 
proposed  mission  as  a  special  envoy  to  Europe. 38  On  April  1, 
1783,  a  committee  of  five  reported  that  Laurens  be  allowed  to 
return  home. 39  On  June  4,  1783,  Livingston  flatly  refused  to 
serve  longer  as  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  it  was  ordered 
that  the  Secretary  of  Congress  receive  the  papers  of  the  De- 

30  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  254. 

38  Journals  of  Congress,  XXII,  p.  87. 

3T  Ibid.  XXII,  p.  92. 

88  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  318. 

»  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  320. 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF   A  DEFINITE  POLICY  109 

partment  of  Foreign  Affairs  until  a  successor  was  elected. 40 
Congress  at  this  time  accepted  Livingston's  resignation  with  re 
luctance,  extended  to  him  its  thanks  and  praised  his  zeal,  fidel 
ity  and  ability  in  the  work  of  the  Department. 41  Without  a 
Secretary,  the  work  of  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  was 
again  conducted  by  special  committees.  This  plan  had  been  the 
customary  one  up  to  1780,  as  we  have  seen.  Yet  its  shortcom 
ings  were  at  once  manifest.  The  leaders  in  Congress  saw  at 
once  that  the  government  had  outgrown  the  old  ways  of  con 
ducting  Congressional  business  and  demanded  a  responsible 
Secretary  for  the  conduct  of  diplomatic  relations.  After  a  short 
delay  and  with  no  postponement,  John  Jay  was  elected  Secre 
tary  of  the  United  States  of  America  for  Foreign  Affairs  on 
May  7,  1784,  at  a  salary  of  $3,000  per  year. 42  The  Department 
now  advanced  to  a  new  position  of  importance  and  usefulness. 

SUMMARY. 

From  the  year  1776,  there  were  scattered  attempts  to 
place  executive  power  in  the  hands  of  standing  committees. 
Some  executive  work  of  a  domestic  nature  was  beginning  to  be 
referred  to  various  Boards,  but  no  serious  attempt  had  been 
made  to  establish  an  executive  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
On  January  10,  1781,  such  a  Department  was,  however,  estab 
lished,  but  it  required  seven  months  more  to  select  a  Secretary. 

New  powers  were  granted  the  Secretary,  yet  he  was  not 
allowed  to  initiate  any  important  measures  or  follow  a  well 
defined  policy.  He  was  strictly  limited  in  his  powers.  Em 
barrassments  and  slights  followed  and  the  office  of  Secretary 
fell  into  disrepute.  Livingston,  the  Secretary,  unable  longer 
to  withstand  the  existing  conditions,  resigned. 

40  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  363. 

41  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  363. 


110    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

Livingston  was  a  victim  of  a  period  of  transmission.  The 
committee  system  was  collapsing  and  Franklin  was  assuming 
enlarged  powers  abroad.  The  committee  system  again  took 
charge  of  the  Department,  but  it  was  soon  found  inadequate. 
In  1783  more  powers  were  given  to  the  Secretary,  but  this  did 
not  suffice.  Finally  in  1784,  Jay  was  elected  as  Secretary  for 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Department  assumed  new 
life. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE   ELECTION   OF   A    SECRETARY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   OF 

AMERICA  FOR  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  AND 

THE  FORMATION  OF  A  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE. 

1. 

The  election  of  John  Jay  as  Secretary  of  the  United  States 
of  America  for  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  marked  an 
epoch  in  the  history  of  the  control  of  foreign  relations.  In  Jay, 
the  Department  possessed  a  far  different  type  of  man  from  Liv 
ingston.  Experienced  in  the  conduct  of  peace  negotiations  with 
England  while  in  France,  he  brought  to  the  new  office  the  same 
aggressiveness  which  he  had  shown  abroad.  Jay  also  possessed 
initiative  and  the  will  power  to  persevere  until  his  policies  were 
wrought  out.  His  one  supreme  purpose  was  to  make  the  power 
of  the  United  States  felt  abroad,  but  he  knew  that  this  could  not 
be  accomplished  until  there  was  a  far  stronger  government  at 
home.  His  experiences  in  France  and  Spain  had  given  him  con 
clusive  proof  of  its  weakness.  It  was  because  of  this  weakness, 
that  he  felt  justified  in  assuming  unauthorized  powers  as  a  spe 
cial  envoy. 

Jay  met  strong  obstacles  in  carrying  out  his  plans,  however. 
The  enemies  of  strong  government  fought  him  at  every  point. 
In  a  letter  to  Washington  on  June  27,  1786,  two  years  after  he 
became  Secretary,  he  complained  of  the  dire  condition  of  affairs 
and  outlines  the  absolute  necessity  of  a  strong  government  ably 
administered. *  On  August  18,  1786,  he  wrote  to  Jefferson  and 

1  John  Jay:  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  III,  p.  203. 


112    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

deplored  the  lack  of  energy  in  the  state  and  federal  govern 
ments.  2  In  a  second  letter  to  Jefferson,  dated  October  27,  1786, 
he  indicated  that  the  inefficiency  of  the  government  became  daily 
more  apparent. 3  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Carmichael,  January  4, 
1787,  he  indicated  that  business  of  importance  had  not  been  done 
since  November  3,  1786,  owing  to  the  lack  of  a  quorum  in  Con 
gress.  4  On  February  9,  1787,  he  wrote  Jefferson,  indicating  that 
the  executive,  judicial  and  legislative  work  of  the  government 
must  be  arranged  in  separate  departments. 5 

Jay  was  not  alone  in  this  opinion.  Both  Jefferson  and  Mad 
ison  stood  with  him.  Jefferson  as  a  revolutionist,  possessed  keen 
constructive  powers  and  a  clear  appreciation  of  the  need  of  the 
adaptation  of  the  government  to  the  needs  of  the  people.  6  As 
chairman  of  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs,  he  drafted  in 
structions  for  the  concluding  of  commercial  treaties  on  the  basis 
of  reciprocity.  In  this  he  was  in  full  accord  with  Franklin.  He 
supported  the  establishment  of  a  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 
against  the  Radicals.  He  supported  Madison  against  R.  H.  Lee 
in  sustaining  measures  in  the  Virginia  legislature  giving  power 
to  Congress  to  impose  impost  duties. 7 

As  early  as  March,  1785,  Madison  wrote  concerning  the  De 
partment  of  Foreign  Affairs,  ' '  If  the  office  of  Foreign  Affairs  be 
a  proper  one  and  properly  filled,  a  reference  to  it  of  all  foreign 
dispatches  is  so  obvious  a  course,  that  any  other  disposition  of 
them  by  Congress  condemns  their  own  establishment  and  affronts 
the  minister  in  office  and  puts  on  him  a  label  of  caution  and 
against  respect  and  confidence  of  the  ministers  of  foreign  powers, 


2  John  Jay:  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  III,  p.  210. 

8  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  212. 

4  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  225. 

8  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  231. 

8  Wharton:  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  I,  p.  257. 

T  Ibid.  I,  p.  258. 


THE  FORMATION  OF  A  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  113 

essential  to  his  usefulness. ' ' 8  He  added  that  while  Congress 
might  reject  the  opinions  of  the  Secretary,  it  should  not  renounce 
the  opportunity  of  using  them.  In  the  light  of  the  citations  above, 
it  is  interesting  to  note  the  gradual  development  of  power  on  the 
part  of  Jay  as  Secretary. 

On  June  23,  1784,  Jay  took  office.  On  May  5,  1784,  the  Rad 
icals  made  their  last  attempt  to  carry  out  the  States  Rights  policy 
in  connection  with  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  It  was  re 
solved  that  two  Commissioners  be  appointed  in  addition  to  Mr. 
Adams,  Mr.  Franklin  and  Mr.  Jay  (then  in  Europe)  to  be  chosen 
in  such  manner  that  the  commercial  interests  of  the  different 
parts  of  the  country  might  be  equally  attended  to. 9  This  motion 
was  lost,  after  a  prolonged  debate,  on  the  ground  that  the  inter 
ests  of  the  United  States  did  not  require  more  than  three  min 
isters  plenipotentiary  in  Europe  at  the  same  time.  There  was 
little  doubt  that  the  ''strong  government"  advocates  defeated 
this  plan,  since  they  had  observed  in  so  many  instances  how  the 
multiplication  of  envoys  in  Europe  had  disrupted  the  policies  of 
the  best  statesmen  in  America. 

To  counteract  this  abortive  attempt  of  the  Radicals,  on  May 
10,  1784,  a  motion  was  made  to  give  Adams,  Franklin  and  Jef 
ferson  (who  had  been  elected  to  take  Jay's  place)  power  to  make 
and  receive  propositions  for  a  treaty  of  commerce  and  amity  and 
to  negotiate  -and  sign  the  same,  transmitting  it  to  Congress  for 
its  final  ratification. 10 

The  Southern  states  now  made  their  demands  known  by  caus 
ing  it  to  be  resolved  on  June  3,  1784,  that  the  Ministers  should 
not  enter  into  any  compact  with  Spain  by  which  any  rights  of 
the  citizens  of  the  United  States  to  a  free  navigation  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  river  from  its  source  to  the  ocean  should  be  given  up. " 

8  Madison:  Writings,  I,  p.  141. 

9  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  469. 

10  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  489. 
u  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  511. 


114    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

The  boundary  and  navigation  questions  were  fast  becoming 
national  issues.  In  such  an  approaching  crisis,  it  was  seen  that 
divided  responsibility  would  be  ruinous  to  the  Spanish-American 
controversy.  Accordingly,  on  February  11,  1785,  it  was  resolved, 
on  the  basis  of  the  report  of  a  committee  of  five,  to  whom  had 
been  referred  letters  from  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  that 
all  communications,  as  well  to  'as  from  the  United  States  in  Con 
gress  assembled,  on  the  subject  of  foreign  affairs,  be  made 
through  the  Secretary  for  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 
and  that  all  letters,  memorials  or  other  papers  on  the  subject  of 
foreign  affairs,  be  addressed  to  him.  Also,  it  was  further  re 
solved  that  all  papers  written  in  a  foreign  language,  which  in 
future  shall  be  sent  to  Congress  from  the  Secretary  of  the  De 
partment  of  Foreign  Affairs,  be  accompanied  with  a  translation 
in  English  and  that  a  proper  interpreter  be  engaged  to  do  this 
work. 12 

On  May  14,  1785,  the  Secretary  reported  out  the  form  of  a 
commission  for  John  Adams  as  minister  to  England. 13  This  was 
the  first  instance  where  the  Secretary  had  been  allowed  to  do  this 
important  work,  though  it  had  always  been  one  of  his  functions. 
On  the  next  day  the  Secretary  was  ordered  to  make  out  a  letter 
of  credence  to  Adams,  taking  care  not  to  make  any  reference  to 
former  disputes. 14 

A  marked  change  had  now  taken  place  in  the  conduct  of 
foreign  affairs,  yet  the  committee  system  of  control  had  not  en 
tirely  disappeared,  even  at  this  date.  A  committee  was,  for  in 
stance,  appointed  to  take  into  consideration  letters  from  the  min 
isters  of  the  United  States  at  foreign  Courts. 15  But  the  system 
as  such,  was  practically  dead.  The  "militia"  idea  of  diplomacy 


12  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  527. 

13  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  546. 

14  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  547. 

15  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  550. 


THE  FORMATION  OF  A  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  115 

was  still  active,  however.  Adams  was  elected  as  Minister  on 
February  24,  1785. 16  He  at  once  left  for  England.  Blunt  and 
proud  of  his  country,  he  demanded,  on  his  arrival,  rewards  for 
America,  In  this  spirit,  he  worked  for  three  years  and  returned 
empty  handed.  This  failure  was  due  primarily  to  the  attitude 
of  Adams,  but  a  second  large  factor  was  the  fact  that  England 
could  not  ascertain  with  whom  to  conclude  a  treaty,  because  she 
did  not  know  whether  Congress  or  the  individual  states  held 
the  sovereign  power  of  the  United  States.  It  was  for  this  reason 
that  no  Minister  was  sent  to  America  by  England  until  1791. 17 

On  July  2,  1785,  the  Secretary  introduced  the  Spanish  min 
ister,  don  Diego  Gardoqui  to  Congress.  Here  was  assumed  an 
other  function  formerly  always  delegated  to  special  committees 
of  selected  membership.  Gardoqui  announced  that  he  was  em 
powered  to  treat  on  adjustment  of  points  of  difference  between 
Spain  and  America. 18  On  July  20,  1785,  it  was  resolved  "that 
the  Honorable  John  Jay,  Secretary  to  the  United  States  of  Am 
erica  for  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  be  and  he  hereby  is 
invested  with  full  powers  in  behalf  of  the  United  States  of  Amer 
ica  to  treat,  adjust,  conclude  and  sign  with  don  Diego  de  Gar 
doqui  whatever  articles,  compacts  and  conventions  may  be  neces 
sary  for  establishing  and  fixing  the  boundaries  between  the  ter 
ritories  of  the  said  United  States  and  those  of  His  Catholic  Maj 
esty,  etc. ' ' 19  Congress  added,  however,  that  the  general  plan  of 
each  article  be  submitted  to  Congress  previous  to  making  it  a 
proposition  to  the  Spanish  Minister. 

Here  is  seen  for  the  first  time,  the  power  to  conclude 
treaties  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  Secretary  to  the  United 
States. 


18  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  533. 

17  Wharton :  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  I,  p.  574. 

18  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  pp.  562-566. 

19  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  568. 


116    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

The  seat  of  the  control  of  affairs  of  a  diplomatic  nature 
was  now  being  brought  back  from  Europe  and  placed  in  the 
hands  of  the  Secretary  to  the  United  States,  where  it  had  always 
legally  belonged,  but  owing  to  party  struggles  and  the  inefficien 
cy  of  the  committee  system,  had  never  been  allowed  to  remain. 

The  first  reference  to  Jay  as  the  Secretary  to  the  United 
States  of  America  for  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  was 
made  in  the  Journals  of  Congress  on  July  13,  1785,  over  a  year 
after  he  had  been  elected  to  that  office. 20  While  plainly  be 
lated,  it  was  proof  that  Congress  had  begun  to  regard  Jay  and 
his  office  seriously.  On  July  20,  1785,  the  same  day  that  Jay  re 
ceived  his  new  powers  as  'a  negotiator  of  treaties,  we  find  the  first 
instance  of  a  special  committee  having  been  elected  to  receive 
communications  from  the  Secretary.  This  committee  was  in 
structed  to  report  back  to  Congress  on  a  suggested  method  of 
procedure  with  regards  all  such  communications. 21 

Here,  for  the  first  time,  the  positions  of  the  Secretary  and  a 
special  committee,  are  exactly  reversed  as  compared  to  their  posi 
tions  in  1780  and  1781.  At  that  time,  the  committees  were  ap 
pointed  to  conduct  the  work  of  the  Department  of  Foreign  Af 
fairs  and  the  Secretary  was  either  ignored  or  directly  ordered  to 
carry  out  the  wishes  of  the  committees. 

On  July  21,  1785,  -a  special  commission  was  issued  to  Jay, 
closing  as  follows :  * '  and  we  hereby  promise  in  good  faith  to  ap 
prove,  ratify  and  fulfill  and  cause  to  be  observed  and  fulfilled 
whatsoever  shall  by  him,  our  plenipotentiary,  be  stipu 
lated  and  signed,  etc. ' ' 22 

On  August  25,  1785,  however,  the  clause,  requiring  him 
(Jay)  to  refer  all  plans  of  propositions  to  Congress  before  ac 
tion  upon  them,  was  repealed.  He  was  ordered  to  stipulate  the 


20  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  566. 

21  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  568. 
23  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  571. 


THE  FORMATION  OF  A  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  117 

rights  of  the  United  States  as  to  their  territorial  boundaries  and 
the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  river  from  its  source  to  the 
ocean,  as  established  in  the  treaty  with  Great  Britain  and  he  was 
not  to  conclude  any  treaty  until  he  had  submitted  it  to  Con 
gress.  23 

The  truth  of  the  matter  was  that  the  Spanish  minister  knew 
the  proverbial  weakness  of  Congress.  He  was  playing  a  deep 
game.  Congress  became  suspicious  of  this  and  changed  front 
to  meet  the  issue.  The  remarkable  fact  concerning  this  action 
is  that  Congress  had  become  so  solidified  in  aims  and  purposes 
that  it  could  'adopt  at  once  a  certain  line  of  action  and  follow  it. 
This  shows  a  great  advance  in  united  action  and  centralization  of 
power. 

On  May  31,  1786,  Jay,  having  been  actually  threatened  by 
the  Spanish  minister,  asked  Congress  to  appoint  a  committee  to 
instruct  and  direct  him  on  every  point  and  subject  relative  to 
the  proposed  treaty  with  Spain.  He  also  recommended  that  such 
committee  be  a  secret  one. 24  This  seems  to  be  proof  that  enough 
power  had  been  given  to  the  Secretary  by  Congress,  that  he  now 
found  it  undesirable  to  assume  the  full  responsibility  in  the  use 
of  that  power.  Called  before  Congress  relative  to  his  request, 
he  informed  Congress  on  August  3rd,  that  he  considered  a  treaty 
with  Spain  of  the  greatest  importance.  He  stated  that  France 
would  not  remain  neutral  in  a  struggle  with  Spain ;  that  the  two 
great  obstacles  in  the  negotiations  were  the  boundaries  and  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  that  the  Spanish  minister  had 
informed  him  that  the  Spanish  king  would  never  compromise  on 
these  points.  Jay  suggested  a  compromies  by  negotiating  a 
treaty  for  twenty-five  years  and  no  use  of  the  river  below  the 
southern  boundary  of  the  United  States. *5 

28  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  III,  p.  586. 
24  Ibid.  IV,  p.  43. 
28  Ibid.  IV,  p.  44ff. 


118    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

This  suggestion  at  once  stirred  up  a  heated  debate  in  Con 
gress.  States  Rights  statesmen  came  at  once  to  the  front.  The 
Southern  states  stood  solid  against  Jay's  plan.  The  Northern 
states  wanted  Jay  relieved  from  directions  demanding  the  nav 
igation  of  the  Mississippi.  Patrick  Henry  said  that  he  would 
rather  part  with  the  confederation  than  relinquish  the  naviga 
tion  of  that  river. a6 

On  August  10,  1786,  Jay  was  asked  by  Congress  to  lay  be 
fore  it  all  information  which  he  possessed  concerning  the  atti 
tude  of  France  to  the  Mississippi  river  question. 27  Jay  re 
ported  to  Congress  on  the  matter  the  same  day,  and  informed 
that  body  that  the  Court  of  France  in  his  opinion,  would  not 
admit  the  claims  of  America. 28  He  indicated  that  Gerard  and 
Luzerne  both  talked  against  the  American  position,  while  repre 
senting  France  in  America. 

After  deliberating  upon  the  matter  for  two  weeks,  Congress, 
on  August  28,  1786,  repealed  the  act  of  August  25,  1785,  and  re 
solved  to  give  Jay  very  definite  instructions  upon  the  boundary 
and  navigation  questions,  particularly  as  to  the  relinquishing  of 
rights  below  the  southern  boundaries. 29  Congress  was  evidently 
apprehensive  that  Jay  might  decide  to  disobey  instructions  again 
as  he  had  done  in  France,  and  it  was  determined  to  take  no 
chances.  On  the  same  day,  therefore,  Jay's  commission  was  re 
pealed.  30  Congress  then  revised  the  whole  plan  of  negotiations. 
In  a  conference  with  the  Secretary,  it  was  indicated  that  the  ne 
gotiations  must  proceed  in  accordance  with  his  views  (a  tacit 
admission  of  his  increased  powers)  or  through  a  conviction  of 
their  impropriety,  Congress  must  adopt  some  other  plan.  To 


!a  Lee:  Arthur  Lee,  II,  p.  321. 

27  Secret  Jornals  of  Congress,  IV,  p.  63. 

28  Ibid.  IV,  pp.  63-71. 

29  Ibid.  IV,  p.  81. 
80  Ibid.  IV,  p.  85. 


THE  FORMATION  OF  A  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  119 

accept  Jay's  plan  confused  the  treaty  of  commerce  and  amity 
and  also  the  boundary  question. 31 

On  August  30,  1786,  the  Secretary  was  instructed  not  to 
conclude  any  treaty  of  commerce  with  Spain  unless  and  until 
the  boundary  question  was  settled  satisfactorily. 32 

Nothing  of  importance  was  heard  of  the  Spanish- American 
question  during  the  remainder  of  1786.  Beginning  with  the  year 
1787,  the  Secretary  generally  formally  reported  to  Congress  in 
writing  on  all  letters  and  communications  sent  to  him.  He  al 
most  invariably  accompanied  these  communications  with  recom 
mendations  as  to  what  Congress  should  do.  Sixteen  different  sets 
of  such  communications  were  noted  in  the  Secret  Journals  of 
Congress  from  February  3,  1787  to  July  28,  1788. 33 

On  April  4,  1787,  the  Secretary  was  asked  by  Congress  to 
report  on  the  state  of  the  negotiations  with  the  Spanish  minis 
ter.  34  On  April  13,  1787,  Jay  gave  the  complete  correspondence 
in  the  matter  to  Congress.  He  indicated  that  much  had  been 
done  by  indirection,  but  little  could  be  forced  upon  the  Spanish 
minister.  He  showed  that  it  had  been  partially  agreed  that  both 
Spain  and  the  United  States  were  to  use  the  Mississippi  down 
to  the  United  States  southern  boundary.  He  strongly  advised 
that  the  United  States  adopt  some  fixed  and  stable  plan  or  policy 
towards  Spain. 35  On  April  20,  1787,  Jay  was  asked  to  prepare 
a  commission  to  a  special  envoy  to  Spain  to  conclude  the  whole 
matter.  Jay  strenuously  opposed  this  action,  but  added,  that  if 
Congress  insisted,  he  should  propose  Jefferson  as  the  envoy. 36 

On  September  24,  1787,  the  Secretary,  fully  cognizant  of  the 
fruitlessness  of  Adams's  mission  to  England  as  Minister,  still 

31  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  IV,  p.  91ff. 

32  Ibid.  IV,  p.  92ff. 

33  Ibid.  IV,  pp.  285-438. 
84  Ibid.  IV,  p.  297. 

35  Ibid.  IV,  pp.  299-300. 
38  Ibid.  IV,  pp.  339-341. 


120   CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

deplored  the  fact  that  England  had  not  sent  a  Minister  to  the 
United  States.  He  indicated  a  desire  to  retaliate,  but  recom 
mended  caution  until  "affairs  justify  a  more  nervous  style  of 
conduct  and  language this  neglect  will  cease  the  mo 
ment  the  American  government  and  the  administration  of  it 
shall  be  such  as  to  impress  other  nations  with  a  degree  of  respect 

which  deny  Congress  the  means  of  inspiring  at 

present. ' ' 37 

On  October  5,  1787,  Jay  recommended  the  appointment  of 
a  Minister  to  succeed  Adams,  who  was  coming  home  at  his  own 
request. 38  On  October  13,  1787,  the  Secretary  recommended  the 
repeal  of  state  laws  favoring  certain  nations  through  treaties  of 
the  states. 39  The  frequency  of  these  recommendations  indi 
cates  plainly  that  a  new  era  had  begun  in  the  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs.  The  Secretary,  through  his  personality,  had 
developed  new  powers  relative  to  the  initiation  of  policies  and 
the  bringing  of  them  to  a  successful  conclusion. 

On  September  16,  1787,  Congress,  fearful  that  a  report  that 
they  were  disposed  to  surrender  to  Spain  in  the  matter  of  claims 
to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  river,  would  nullify  all  ef 
forts  in  coming  to  an  understanding  with  that  country,  resolved, 
"that  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  river  is  a  clear  and 
essential  right  of  the  United  States  and  that  the  same  ought  to  be 
considered  and  reported  as  such.  " 40  It  was  at  the  same  time 
resolved,  ' '  that  no  further  progress  be  made  in  the  negotiations 
with  Spain  by  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  but  that  the 
subject  be  reopened  by  the  federal  government  which  is  to  as 
semble  in  March  next. ' ' 41 

It  is  evident  that  Congress  had  taken  into  serious  consider- 

87  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  IV,  pp.  388-389. 

88  Ibid.  IV,  p.  401. 

89  Ibid.  IV,  pp.  411-413. 

40  Ibid.  IV,  p.  453. 

41  Ibid.  IV,  p.  454. 


THE  FORMATION  OF  A  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  121 

ation  the  recommendation  of  the  Secretary  that  a  more  stable 
government  be  organized  in  order  that  an  impression  might  be 
made  upon  the  powers  of  Europe  in  the  matter  of  diplomatic 
negotiations. 

This  was  the  last  action  on  matters  pertaining  to  the  De 
partment  of  Foreign  Affairs  under  the  Confederation. 

2. 

The  steps  in  the  development  of  a  definite  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs  had  been  gradual  from  1776  to  1788.  First  came 
the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  which  soon  functioned 
as  a  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Then  followed  a  long  contest 
over  the  establishment  of  a  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
With  the  formation  of  this  Department,  we  saw  how  the  Radi 
cals  attempted  to  keep  real  power  away  from  it,  but,  in  spite  of 
this  movement,  necessity  gave  the  Department  power  and  under 
Livingston  and  Jay,  it  became  a  real  power  in  the  control  of 
diplomatic  relations.  The  decided  work  of  Jay  made  the  forma 
tion  of  a  Department  of  State  relatively  easy. 

The  Constitution,  when  adopted  in  1789,  did  not  provide,  in 
so  many  words,  for  the  creation  of  executive  departments  of 
government.  It  referred  to  them,  however,  as  things  which 
would,  as  a  matter  of  course  be  adopted  or  established.  Article 
II,  Section  2,  in  treating  of  the  powers  of  the  President,  said, 
"He  may  require  the  Opinion,  in  writing,  of  the  principal  Of 
ficer  in  each  of  the  executive  departments,  upon  any  subject  re 
lating  to  the  duties  of  their  respective  offices but  the  Con 
gress  may  by  law  vest  the  appointment  of  such  inferior  officers, 
as  they  think  proper,  in  the  President  alone,  or  in  the  courts  of 
law,  or  in  the  heads  of  departments." 

Under  the  Confederation,  there  were  Departments  of  Fi 
nance,  War,  Marine,  Post  Office  and  Foreign  Affairs,  but,  of 


122    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

course,  no  Department  of  State.  Laws,  Ordinances,  proclama 
tions,  etc.,  were  promulgated  from  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of 
Congress,  signed  by  the  President  and  countersigned  by  the  Sec 
retary,  who  kept  the  great  seal  after  1782. 

Alexander  Hamilton  at  once  proposed  a  plan  of  government 
which  contemplated  a  supreme  executive,  "to  have  sole  appoint 
ment  of  the  heads  or  chief  officers  of  the  Departments  of  Finance, 
War  and  Foreign  Affairs. ' ' 42  An  executive  council  was  also 
proposed,  composed  of  the  President  of  the  Senate,  the  Chief 
Justice  and  Ministers  who  might  be  appointed  for  the  Depart 
ments  of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Affairs,  War,  Finance,  Marine, 
etc.,  who  shall  advise,  but  not  conclude  the  President. 43 

Pinckney  proposed  a  second  plan  including  the  following: 
A  Council  of  State,  composed  of  the  following  officers, — Chief 
Justice,  Secretary  of  Domestic  Affairs,  Secretary  of  Commerce, 
Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Secretary  of  War,  and  Secretary  of 
Marine,  who  shall  be  appointed  by  the  President  during  his 
pleasure.  The  duties  of  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  shall 
be  to  correspond  with  all  foreign  Ministers,  prepare  plans  of 
treaties  and  consider  such  as  may  be  transmitted  from  abroad 
and  generally  to  attend  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States  in 
their  connection  with  foreign  powers. 44 

The  three  outstanding  facts  concerning  these  proposed 
plans  of  government  were:  (1)  The  placing  of  the  supreme  au 
thority  in  the  hands  of  a  strong  central  executive  power  vested 
in  one  person — the  President.  (2)  The  separation  of  the  func 
tions  of  government  into  an  executive,  judicial  and  legislative 
tripartite  form.  (3)  The  more  definite  placing  of  executive 
functions  in  the  control  of  Departments  as  aids  to  the  President. 
But  it  is  a  fact  to  be  noted  that  all  three  of  these  features  were 


42  Madison:  Writings  (Hunt),  III,  p.  195. 
48  Ibid.  IV,  p.  234. 
«  Ibid.  IV,  p.  242. 


THE  FORMATION  OP  A  DEPARTMENT  OP  STATE  123 

built  upon  the  lines  already  developed  in  a  limited  way  from 
1776  to  1788,  omitting  in  a  large  measure  the  weaknesses  and 
adopting  the  good  points  they  possessed. 

A  marked  innovation,  however,  was  the  suggestion  that  the 
President  shall  appoint  a  Secretary  of  State  to  hold  office  during 
his  pleasure,  who  shall  be  a  Secretary  to  the  Council  of  State  and 
also  the  public  Secretary  of  the  President.  It  was  to  be  his  duty 
to  prepare  Public  dispatches  from  the  President,  which  he  shall 
countersign. 45 

The  scheme  for  the  Council  of  State,  after  due  consideration 
was  rejected,  but  its  importance  was  recognized  in  Section  2  of 
Article  II  of  the  Constitution.  It  pointed  unmistakably  towards 
executive  Departments  of  government.  After  the  fiasco  of  the 
preceding  twelve  years  in  the  conduct  of  governmental  functions, 
it  is  little  wonder  that  the  "strong  government"  advocates  in 
sisted  that  something  better  should  now  be  attempted. 

Congress  met  April  6,  1789.  Washington  was  inaugurated 
as  President  of  the  United  States  of  America  on  April  30,  1789, 
but  not  until  the  19th  of  May  was  the  establishment  of  executive 
Departments  taken  up  in  earnest.  After  much  discussion  on  this 
matter,  James  Madison  offered  a  substitute  for  all  the  former 
propositions  as  follows:  "That  there  should  be  established  an 
Executive  Department  to  be  denominated  the  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs  at  the  head  of  which  there  shall  be  an  officer,  to 
be  called  the  Secretary  to  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
appointed  by  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate  and  such  person  to  be  removable  by  the  Presi 
dent."46  The  idea  at  once  gained  credence  that  Madison's  mo 
tion  assumed  that  this  Department  would  be  at  the  head  of  all 
the  other  Departments  and  for  this  reason,  the  plan  was  strenu 
ously  opposed.  Yet,  in  the  end,  Madison's  idea  prevailed.  The 

46  Hunt:  Department  of  State,  p.  55. 
«  Ibid.  p.  59. 


124   CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

"strong  government"  leaders  insisted  that  had  the  Confeder 
ation  possessed  a  strong  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  during 
the  war  period,  much  trouble  would  have  been  avoided  and  the 
war  probably  appreciably  shortened. 

Finally  on  June  2,  1789,  a  committee  reported  to  Congress 
two  bills,  each  purporting  to  establish  a  Department: — (1)  A 
Department  of  War  and  (2)  a  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
There  had  been  much  heated  discussion  concerning  the  power  of 
the  President  to  remove  the  head  of  Departments,  so  the  bills 
were  amended  so  as  to  give  the  President  an  implied  power  of 
removal.  In  this  form  the  bills  were  passed  by  the  House  on 
June  24,  1789,  by  a  vote  of  29  to  22. 47  The  vote  indicated  that 
the  "strong  government"  men  did  not  completely  control  the 
situation,  but  this  condition  was  natural.  There  was  still  fear 
of  delegating  too  much  power  to  one  man  or  Department.  The 
bills  passed  the  Senate,  however,  on  July  18,  1789,  and  were 
signed  by  the  President  on  July  27,  1789. 48  The  act  provided  in 
Section  1,  that  (1)  There  shall  be  an  Executive  Department  to  be 
denominated  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs;  (2)  That  this 
Department  shall  be  headed  by  a  principal  officer  to  be  called 
the  Secretary  for  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs;  (3)  That 
the  duties  entrusted  to  him  by  the  President  shall  be  relative  to 
correspondence,  commissions,  instructions,  etc.,  to  or  with  public 
Ministers  from  foreign  states  or  princes,  or  to  memorials  or  other 
applications  from  foreign  public  Ministers  or  other  foreigners  or 
such  other  matters  as  the  President  shall  assign. 

Here  is  seen  the  establishing  of  a  new  Department  with  the 
usual  duties  and  asignments  of  the  old  and  preceding  one.  In 
Section  2,  it  is  provided  that  there  shall  be  an  inferior  officer 
called  a  chief  clerk  who  will  take  the  place  of  the  principal  (Sec 
retary)  when  said  principal  shall  for  any  cause,  be  removed  by 

41  Hunt:  Department  of  State,  p.  66. 
48  Annals  of  Congress,  I,  p.  659. 


THE  FORMATION  OF  A  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  125 

the  President,  or  in  any  other  case  of  vacancy,  he  shall  have 
charge  of  all  records,  books,  papers,  etc. 

In  Section  3,  each  of  the  officers  of  the  Department  is  re 
quired  to  take  an  oath  to  fulfill  with  fidelity  the  duties  of  their 
respective  offices.  Here  again  was  an  old  idea  applied  to  new 
conditions. 

In  Section  4,  it  is  provided  that  the  Secretary  shall  have 
charge  of  all  records,  books,  papers,  etc.,  in  the  office  of  the  Secre 
tary  for  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  heretofore  estab 
lished  by  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled. 49  This  plan 
had  been  adopted  back  in  1781. 

A  Home  Department  was  proposed  on  July  23,  1789,  to  bs 
headed  by  a  Secretary  of  the  United  States,  who  was  to  corre 
spond  with  the  states,  keep  the  great  seal  and  file  copies  of  public 
proceedings,  etc.  This  plan  met  with  little  favor,  it  being  urged 
that  too  much  correspondence  had  already  been  carried  011  with 
the  states. 60 

On  August  27,  1789,  a  bill  was  passed  by  the  House  and  on 
September  7,  1789,  the  Senate  concurred.  It  was  signed  by  the 
President  on  September  16,  1789.  This  act  provided  that  the 
Executive  Department  denominated  the  Department  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  hereafter  be  called  the  Department  of  State  and  that 
the  principal  officer  shall  be  called  the  Secretary  of  State.  His 
duties  shall  be  to  review  and  print  bills,  orders,  resolutions  or 
votes  of  the  Senate  and  House.  The  Secretary  shall  also  keep  the 
great  seal  and  shall  have  the  custody  of  all  books,  papers,  etc.,  as 
before.  Here  is  seen  the  simple  combining  of  the  duties  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  that  of  the 
Secretary  of  Congress.  Both  sets  of  duties  had  been  fully  de 
veloped  years  before. 

For  some  time  John  Jay  continued  to  act  as  Secretary  for 

*  Heney:  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  28. 
*°  Annals  of  Congress,  I,  p.  666. 


126    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

Foreign  Affairs,  even  though  the  Department  had  been  greatly 
changed.  He  even  acted  as  the  new  Secretary  of  State  for  fifty 
days.  On  September  26,  1789,  however,  Thomas  Jefferson  was 
commissioned  as  the  regular  Secretary  of  State  and  in  February, 
1790,  he  took  up  his  duties  in  that  office  as  provided  by  the  bill 
passed  on  September  15,  of  the  previous  year. 51 

SUMMARY. 

The  election  of  John  Jay  as  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs 
marked  a  second  great  epoch  in  the  development  of  the  control  of 
diplomatic  relations  by  Departments.  Jay  had  a  policy  of  aggres 
siveness  which  he  proposed  to  follow.  In  this  he  was  seconded  by 
the  ablest  leaders  in  Congress,  though  the  Radicals  unsuccessfully 
tried  to  limit  his  powers  and  those  of  his  Ministers  abroad.  By 
the  passing  of  resolutions  on  February  11,  1785,  it  was  decided 
that  all  communications,  which  had  to  do  in  any  way  with  the 
conduct  of  foreign  affairs,  must  pass  through  the  hands  of  the 
Secretary. 

This  put  an  effectual  stop  to  the  special  committee  control 
of  the  Secretary,  who  began  at  once  to  issue  commissions  and 
recommendations.  The  "militia"  idea  of  diplomacy  still  per 
sisted,  however.  This  is  well  shown  by  Adams's  actions  in  Eng 
land  and  the  uselessness  of  his  work.  His  failure  was  due  partly 
to  his  methods  of  working  and  largely  to  the  inefficiency  of  Con 
gress.  No  foreign  power  knew  whether  the  United  States  was 
one  nation  or  thirteen. 

On  July  20,  1785,  Jay  was  given  full  power  to  treat  with 
Spain  upon  the  boundary  and  navigation  questions.  Here  was 
the  first  instance  of  power  being  given  to  a  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs  to  conclude  a  treaty.  Jay's  strong  stand  upon  the  duties 
of  his  Department,  caused  Congress  to  attempt  to  limit  him, 

81  Jay:  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  III,  p.  381. 


THE  FORMATION  OF  A  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  127 

however,  in  his  conduct  of  the  negotiations.    This  showed  plainly 
the  increased  power  of  the  Secretary  and  his  Department. 

The  increase  in  the  dissensions  between  the  States  Rights 
and  National  parties  now  threatened  the  welfare  of  the  country. 
Jay  was  early  aware  of  this  and  pleaded  for  a  stronger  govern 
ment.  He  opposed  the  sending  of  a  special  envoy  to  Spain  to 
conclude  the  treaty,  claiming  that  this  action  would  show  weak 
ness  on  the  part  of  America.  He  opposed  the  sending  of  more 
Ministers  to  Europe,  claiming  that  a  few  would  do  far  better 
work  than  many.  During  1786  and  1787,  Jay  sent  many  recom 
mendations  to  Congress,  many  of  which  were  favorably  received. 

The  increased  weakness  of  the  foreign  relations  position  of 
Congress,  owing  to  its  indefinite  federal  policy,  brought  the 
majority  of  the  leaders  to  see  the  absolute  need  of  a  strong  cen 
tralized  government.  Even  John  and  Samuel  Adams  were 
finally  convinced  of  this.  After  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution, 
Madison  and  Hamilton  made  proposals  for  the  establishment  of 
strong  executive  departments.  All  these  proposals  were  based 
upon  previous  workable  schemes.  They  were  the  results  of  an 
evolutionary  force,  gradually  adapting  itself  to  new  conditions. 
Along  with  this  adaptation,  however,  there  was  seen  the  neces 
sity  of  much  greater  powers  of  government.  This  was  in  the 
minds  of  the  promoters  of  the  founding  of  Departments. 

A  Secretary  of  State  was  consequently  proposed,  but  with 
no  ready  response.  A  strong  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 
was  then  established  in  July,  1789.  A  Home  Department  was 
proposed  on  July  23,  1789,  but  rejected.  On  August  27,  1789,  a 
compromise  plan  was  proposed,  namely, — that  the  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs  be  called  the  Department  of  State  and  that  the 
principal  officer  be  called  the  Secretary  of  State,  whose  duties 
should  include  those  of  the  Secretary  of  the  proposed  Home  De 
partment.  This  was  finally  passed  and  Jefferson  became  the  first 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  of  America  on  Septem- 


128    CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OP  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

ber  26,  1789,  with  greatly  increased  powers  of  a  distinctively 
executive  nature. 

GENERAL  SUMMARY. 

This  thesis  has  attempted  to  show  that  hereditary  qualities 
and  environment  and  the  development  of  special  organizations 
as  a  result  of  these  influences,  had  a  marked  effect  upon  the  be 
liefs  and  convictions  of  the  several  delegates  (especially  those 
from  Massachusetts)  to  the  First  Continental  Congress  and  that 
this  resulted  in  the  rapid  development  of  controlling  factors 
which  first  began  to  be  important  and  to  struggle  for  supremacy 
in  the  Second  Continental  Congress.  (Chapters  I  and  II). 

This  difference  in  beliefs  'among  the  delegates  caused  the 
formation  of  parties  and  the  division  of  the  whole  country  into 
two  or  three  fairly  well  defined  areas  or  sections.  The  work  of 
the  Congress  was  at  first  naturally  carried  on  largely  by  com 
mittees,  but  when  party  lines  began  to  be  drawn,  the  committee 
system  began  to  be  used  as  a  means  of  controlling  the  political 
situation  in  Congress.  Both  Liberative  and  Constructionist  ele 
ments  struggled  for  the  mastery  of  this  democratic,  but  markedly 
inefficient  system.  (Chapter  III). 

During  the  years  1776/1777,  1778  and  1779,  the  committee 
system  prevailed.  All  executive  power  was  expressed  through 
the  passing  of  resolutions  and  carried  out  through  the  hands  of 
special  committees.  This  procedure  resulted  in  the  marked  de 
centralization  of  power  and  the  effectual  defeat  of  all  measures 
aiming  to  conduct  the  affairs  of  government  in  an  efficient  and 
successful  manner.  The  most  marked  effect  of  this  weakness  in 
governmental  action  was  the  inability  of  Congress  to  conduct 
foreign  relations  in  a  proper  way.  The  results  were  most  dis 
astrous  both  at  home  and  abroad.  Little  or  nothing  was  done  in 
a  diplomatic  way  until  the  year  1778.  Imminent  disaster  caused 
the  rapid  growth  of  the  Constructionist  party,  which  desired  a 


THE  FORMATION  OF  A  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  129 

strong  government  with  the  centralization  of  power  in  the  hands 
of  executive  departments.  (Chapter  IV). 

The  growing  of  this  party  was  shown  in  its  demand  for  the 
control  of  the  envoys  to  Prance  and  their  final  recall,  and  the 
placing  of  larger  powers  in  the  hands  of  Franklin  in  France. 
This  struggle  between  parties  over  governmental  powers,  with 
out  doubt,  prolonged  the  war.  During  this  period  of  chaos,  the 
negotiations  with  France  were  periodically  in  danger  of  breaking 
down  and  it  was  only  through  giving  a  free  hand  to  Franklin 
that  French  aid  was  finally  secured.  (Chapter  V). 

During  this  period  of  chaos  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  in 
America  was  practically  in  the  hands  of  the  French  minister  to 
the  United  States.  It  was  largely  through  the  policies  of  the 
French  Minister  that  dictatorial  powers  were  lodged  in  the  hands 
of  Washington,  the  cabals  against  Franklin  and  Washington 
largely  defeated  and  the  negotiations  with  France  prevented 
from  reaching  the  breaking  point.  (Chapter  VI). 

The  assumption  or  granting  of  these  powers  was  the  begin 
ning  of  the  executive  functioning  of  government  through  the 
work  of  individuals,  both  at  home  and  abroad.  Through  this 
policy  the  treaty  of  1778  with  France  was  signed ;  it  was  by  the 
disobeying  of  instructions  that  the  peace  with  England  was  con 
summated.  Meantime,  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  was 
established  in  Congress.  The  process  was  necessarily  slow,  be 
cause  it  was  continually  fought  by  the  Radicals.  But  the  com 
mittee  system  was  now  breaking  down  and  by  1783,  its  control 
ling  power  was  destroyed.  (Chapter  VII). 

The  executive  impetus  could  now  never  be  destroyed.  It 
had  been  shown  to  have  been  successful.  The  centralization  of 
power  in  departments  began  in  earnest.  The  prolonged  nego 
tiations  with  Spain  over  the  boundary  and  navigation  questions 
proved  beyond  a  doubt,  the  absolute  necessity  of  a  stronger  and 
more  efficient  government  than  had  hitherto  existed. 


130   CONGRESSIONAL  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONS,  1774-1789 

The  Constitution  was  accordingly  adopted  in  1789  and  pro 
vided  for  the  immediate  establishment  of  strong  executive  de 
partments.  The  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  with  a  Secre 
tary  was  formed  with  greatly  enlarged  powers.  But  this  De 
partment  almost  immediately  resolved  itself  into  a  Department 
of  State  with  a  Secretary  of  State.  (Chapters  VIII  and  IX). 

The  whole  process  of  development  had  been  slow  and  irreg 
ular.  But  its  outcome  was  sure,  since  the  very  existence  of  the 
United  States  of  America  depended  upon  it,  and  because  there 
were  enough  wise  leaders  in  America  who  could  see  the  meaning 
of  the  problem  and  possessed  the  sagacity  and  courage  to  fight 
it  through  to  a  successful  issue. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX 

No  attempt  has  been  made  to  list  all  the  material  consulted  in  the 
preparation  of  this  thesis.  The  works  given  below  include,  therefore,  only 
those  found  most  valuable  and  to  which  reference  has  been  made  in  foot 
notes  throughout  the  body  of  the  work. 

Adams,  C.  F. :  Life  of  John  Adams. 

Adams,  John :  Familiar  Letters  to  His  Wife. 

Adams,  John :  Works. 

Adams,  Samuel :  Writings. 

American  Historical  Association  Reports,  1901,  etc. 

Annals  of  Congress. 

Bancroft:  History  of  the  United  States. 

Bradford,  Alden:  History  of  Massachusetts  (1620-1820). 

Bradford,  William :  History  of  Plymouth  Plantation. 

Candler :  Revolutionary  Records  of  Georgia. 

Chamberlain :  John  Adams  and  the  Revolution. 

Clark :  Silas  Deane. 

Collins :  Composition  of  Committees  of  the  American  Revolution 

Deane:  Papers. 

Doniol:  Participation  de  la  France  a'  T  etablishment  Etats- 

Unis  d'Amerique. 

Durand :  Documents  of  the  American  Revolution. 
Foster :  A  Century  of  American  Diplomacy. 
Franklin:  Works. 

Freeman:  Growth  of  the  English  Constitution. 
Galloway,  Joseph :  Historical  and  Political  Reflections. 
Hale:  Franklin  in  France. 
Heney :  Statutes  at  Large. 
Hosmer :  Samuel  Adams. 


132  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  INDEX 

Hunt :  The  Department  of  State. 

Hutchinson  :  History  of  Massachusetts  Bay. 

Hutchinson:  Letters. 

Jay,  John :  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers. 

Journals  of  Congress. 

Lee :  Arthur  Lee. 

Lincoln:  Constitutional  History  of  New  York. 

MacDonald:  Documentary  Source  Book  of  the  American  Revo 
lution. 

MacDonald :  Fundamental  Orders  of  New  Haven  Colony. 

Madison:  Writings. 

Minutes  of  the  Provincial  Congress  and  Council  of  Safety  of  the 
State  of  New  Jersey. 

Morris:  John  Adams. 

Otis,  James :  Rights  of  British  Colonies. 

Old  South  Leaflets. 

Rhode  Island  Calender  Records. 

Secret  Journals  of  Congress. 

Sparks :  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolution. 

Stevens :  Facsimiles  of  the  American  Revolution. 

Tyler :  Patrick  Henry. 

Van  Tyne :  The  American  Revolution. 

Virginia  State  Papers. 

Wharton :  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolu 
tion. 


INDEX 


Accounts,  36. 

Adams,  John,  as  Colonial  delegate, 

15,  17,  18,  20,  23,  28,  33,  34, 
35,  45,  54,  57,  59,  60,  61,  65; 
as  envoy  to  France,  71,  72,  73; 
76;    as    peace    envoy,    83,    84, 
85,  86,  87,  92,  94,  96,  97,  100, 
101,   105,  113;   as  Minister  to 
England,    114,    115,    119,    120, 
126,  127. 

Adams,  Samuel,  as  leader  of  oppo 
sition  in  Massachusetts,  5,  6, 
8,  10,  11,  12,  13,  15,  16,  17, 
18,  19,  21;  as  leader  in  Con 
gress,  24,  25,  26,  28,  31,  33, 
34,  35,  37,  38,  40,  45,  48,  50, 
51,  56,  57,  58,  59,  60,  61,  65, 
66,  68,  71,  72,  75,  82,  88,  90, 
95,  102,  127. 

Admiralty,  Board  of,  38. 

Affairs,  Minister  of,  64. 

Agent.  Colonial,  7,  8,  10,  13,  14, 
15;  French,  77;  Special,  64, 
69,  73,  79. 

Agreement,  Non-Importation,  27, 
28. 

Alliance,  56,  64,  65,  80,  86,  87,  97, 
98;  treaty  of,  76. 

Ambassadors,  65,  68,  73,  104;  Eng 
lish,  75. 

Amity.  70,  76,  78,  113. 

Ammunition,  64,  67,  70. 

Appeals,  Court  of,  103. 

Aristocracy,  21. 

Army,  21,  25,  43,  67;   French,  92. 

Assembly,  5,  6,  7,  9,  10,  11,  14,  15, 

16,  25,  28,  60. 
Assistance,  Writs  of,  23. 


Assistants,  2,  3. 

Association,  of  Colonies,  19,  28. 

Baltimore,   71. 

Barbary  States,  53. 

Bayard,  James,  delegate  from  Del 
aware,  17. 

Beaumarchais,  M.,  49,  67,  68,  75, 
76,  77. 

Berlin,  72;  Court  of,  102. 

Bernard,  Governor,  9,  11. 

Bills,  67,   125. 

Bill  of  Eights,  60. 

Bland,  Eichard,  delegate  from  Vir 
ginia,  38. 

Boards,  41,  57,  61,  62,  109;  of 
War,  102,  103;  of  Marine, 
103;  of  Commerce,  103;  of 
Treasury,  103. 

Bowdoin,  James,  delegate  from 
Massachusetts,  20. 

Boston,  4,  10,  12,  13,  21;  town- 
meeting,  5,  20. 

Bonvouloir,  Count,  79. 

Bourbons,  85. 

Burgesses,  House  of,  14,  18. 

Burke,  James,  delegate  from  Mas 
sachusetts,  53,  54. 

Cabals,  88,  129. 

Canada,  80,  81. 

Cambridge,  12. 

Carmichael,       William,       delegate 

from  Maryland,  53,  112. 
Celebration,  36. 
Charter,  2,  11,  59. 
Chase,      Samuel,      delegate      from 

Maryland,  48,  95. 


134 


INDEX 


Chief  Justice,   122. 

Christians,  12,  26. 

Church,  Benjamin,  leader  in  Mas 
sachusetts,  12. 

Clark,  Abraham,  delegate  from 
New  Jersey,  45. 

Clerk,  74,  124. 

Colonels,  58. 

Colonies,  British,  2,  3,  6,  7,  8,  9, 
13,  14,  15,  17,  20,  22,  23,  27, 
28,  29,  33,  36,  40,  41,  56,  57, 
59,  60,  61:  American,  65,  69, 
72,  75,  77,  98:  New  England,, 
18,  32,  34,  36,  39,  46,  52; 
Middle,  18,  28,  29,  32,  33,  34, 
36,  37,  39,  41,  42,  92;  South 
ern,  21,  22,  25,  28,  33,  34.  35, 
36,  37,  38,  39,  40,  63,  92. 

Commerce,  70,  76,  78;  Committee 
of,  173;  Department  of,  31, 
38. 

Commission,  Special,  94. 

Commission,  70,  71,  72,  95,  96, 
115,  119,  124,  126. 

Commissions,  53,  54. 

Commissioners,  American,  36,  44, 
45,  46,  48,  49,  50,  53,  64,  65, 
68,  70,  71,  72,  73,  74,  75,  76, 
77,  78,  82,  87,  92,  95,  98,  102, 
113;  English,  74. 

Compact,  115;  Family,  98;  Ply 
mouth,  2. 

Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs,  47, 
48,  49,  52,  53,  54,  55,  62,  63, 
67,  69,  71,  72,  74,  75,  78,  83, 
92,  100,  102,  103,  106,  112. 
121;  of  Correspondence,  12, 
13,  16,  22,  25,  26,  27,  43,  45, 
61,  65,  126;  of  Secret  Corre 
spondence,  8,  43,  44,  45,  46, 
47,  49,  55,  62,  66,  71,  95,  102, 
121;  of  Congress,  40;  "let 
ter,"  9,  30,  31,  61;  special,  35, 
38,  39,  45,  52,  53,  55,  61,  88, 
102,  106,  109,  115,  116,  126, 
128;  confederation,  58;  stand 


ing,  30,  31,  35,  38,  61,  109; 
"steering,"  39,  40;  weekly, 
39;  of  safety,  21. 

Communications,  30,  31,  36,  38,  90, 
105,  108,  114,  116,  126. 

Commonwealth,  26. 

Concord,  20. 

Confederation,  13,  23,  89,  118,  121, 
124. 

Connecticut,  13,  29,  33,  34,  36,  37, 
51,  59. 

Congress,  First  Continental,  9,  34. 
16,  28;  provincial,  18,  20,  21; 
Second  Continental,  20,  21, 
29 ;  Stamp  Act,  9,  27. 

Conservatives,  49,  52,  54,  55. 

Constructionists,  41,  47,  58,  62,  77, 
88,  90,  95,  96,  100,  103,  108, 
126. 

Constitution,  14,  18,  59,  60,  61,  121, 
123,  127,  130. 

Control,  Congressional,  40,  56,  67, 
92,  103;  of  foreign  relations, 
111;  of  consuls,  90. 

Cooper,  Samuel,  friend  of  Frank 
lin,  14. 

Cornwallis,  Lord,  91. 

Convention,  115. 

Crown,  3,  7,  8,  23. 

Council  of  State,  60,  121. 

Court,  French,  70,  118;  foreign, 
114;  European,  105;  Prus 
sian,  69;  Eussian,  69;  Span 
ish,  68,  69;  of  Tuscany,  69. 

Cushing,  Thomas,  delegate  from 
Massachusetts,  8,  10. 


Dana,  Francis,  delegate  from  Mas 
sachusetts,  38,  48,  94. 

Deane,  Silas,  delegate  from  Con 
necticut  and  envoy  to  France, 
13,  33,  44,  49,  50,  64,  65,  66, 
67,  68,  69,  70,  77,  78,  79. 

Debts,  American,  100. 

de  Berdt,  Denys,  colonial  agent,  8. 


INDEX 


135 


Declaration  of  Independence,  9, 
23.  25,  66;  of  Rights,  19,  20. 
21. 

de  Fleury,  M.,  French  statesman, 
63. 

Delegates,  2,  4,  5,  15,  16,  18,  19, 
21,  22,  24,  25,  28,  29,  33,  38, 
58,  60,  61,  81,  82,  88,  126. 

Delegation,  15,  17,  22. 

Delaware,  29,  32,  34,  37,  51,  63,  89. 

Democracy,  3,  31,  56,  63. 

Democrat,  21. 

de  Montmarin,  Count,  75. 

Departments,  41,  57,  61,  107,  112, 
122,  127,  129;  of  Domestic 
Affairs,  122;  executive,  102, 
121,  122,  124,  125,  127,  128, 
130;  heads  of,  121,  Foreign 
Affairs,  90,  93,  97.  103,  106, 
107,  108,  109,  110,  111,  112, 
116,  120,  121,  122,  123,  124, 
125,  126,  127,  129.  130;  Home, 
125,  127;  of  State,  121,  122, 
125,  127,  130 ;  of  Finance,  121, 
122;  of  Marine,  121;  of  Post 
Office,  121;  of  Treasury,  31; 
of  War,  121,  122,  124. 

D'Estaing.    Admiral,    89. 

de  Sartine.  French  statesman,  79. 

Dickinson,  John,  delegate  from 
Pennsylvania,  22,  27,  33,  42, 
54. 

Diplomacy,  46,  50,  61,  68,  70,  77. 
100;  "militia,"  77,  114. 

D'Ossun.  Marquis.  French  states 
man,  75. 

Drayton,  William,  delegate  from 
Georgia,  48,  49,  50. 

Duane,  James,  delegate  from  New 
York,  19,  54,  55,  89,  90. 

Duer.  William,  delegate  from  Ne\\ 
York,  49. 

Edict  of  Nantes,  79. 
Ellsworth,    Oliver,    delegate    from 
Connecticut,  54. 


Empire,  British,  26. 

Engineers,  43. 

Englishman,  3,  4,  15. 

Envoys,  46,  62,  69,  71,  72,  75,  77, 
78,  79,  83,  88,  92,  94,  96,  99, 
100,  101;  peace,  102,  108,  119, 
127;  special,  113,  129. 

Executive,  8,  28,  122 ;  council,  122. 


Fabian  policy,  57. 

Factions,  18,  19,  21,  24,  28,  43,  46, 

56,  64,  65,  77,  84. 
Finance,  56. 

Fisheries,  84,  100;  Newfoundland. 
99. 

Florida,  80,  84,  98. 

Folk-mote,  1,  2,  3,  7,  15. 

Foreign  Affairs,  34,  35,  36,  37.  38, 
42,  45,  46,  49,  50,  51,  54,  61, 
73,  77,  82,  89,  92,  95,  98,  100, 
104,  113,  115,  126,  129;  rela 
tions,  38,  45,  46,  62,  67,  83, 
89,  109,  111,  125,  128. 

French  minister,  36,  38,  50,  51,  54, 
55,  57,  80,  81,  82,  83,  88,  89, 
91,  96,  104. 

Frankfort,  17. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  as  colonial 
agent,  7,  8,  13,  14,  19;  as  com- 
mitteeman,  23,  38,  42,  44,  48; 
as  envoy  to  France,  50,  52,  55, 

57,  59,  62,  64,  65,  68,  69,  70, 
72,  73,  74,  75,  76,  77,  78,  79, 
81,  83,  84,  85,  87,  88,  89.  92. 
95,    96,   97,   98,   99,   100,    101, 
106,  110,  112,  113,  129. 

Galloway,  Joseph,  delegate  from 
Pennsylvania,  18,  19,  25. 

Gardoqui,  don  Diego,  Spanish 
minister  to  America,  115. 

General  Court,  2,  4,  10,  11. 

Gates,  General, -63,  64,  88. 

Generals,  58;   brigadier,  79. 

George  III,  King  of  England,  76. 

Georgia,  21,  29,  32,  38. 


136 


INDEX 


Gerard,  Rayneval,  French  minister 
to  America,  57,  58,  59,  76,  80, 
81,  82,  91,  118. 

Gerry,  Stephen,  delegate  from 
Massachusetts,  45,  54. 

Government,  2,  3,  4,  7,  11,  15,  22, 
23,  27,  40,  57,  58,  60,  64,  67, 
68,  70,  76,  94,  96,  101,  102, 
111,  112,  120,  122,  127;  fed 
eral,  112;  state,  60,  112;  plan 
of,  122,  129. 

Governor,  2,  7,  9,  10,  15,  16,  60, 
104. 

Grand  Order  of  Military  Merit,  79. 

Griffin,  Cyrus,  delegate  from  Vir 
ginia,  54. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  122,  127. 

Hancock,  John,  delegate  from  Mas 
sachusetts,  10,  20,  33,  58,  72, 
76. 

Harrison,  Benjamin,  delegate  from 
A7irginia,  33,  42,  59. 

Hawley,  Joseph,  delegate  from 
Massachusetts,  54. 

Henry,  Patrick,  delegate  from 
Virginia,  18,  21,  29,  54,  59, 
118. 

Heyward,  Thomas,  delegate  from 
South  Carolina,  47. 

Home  Department,  125,  127. 

Hooper,  William,  delegate  from 
North  Carolina,  48. 

Hopkins,  General,  79. 

House,  Massachusetts,  14;  of  Rep 
resentatives,  125. 

Hospitals,  58. 

Houston,  William,  delegate  from 
Georgia,  52,  54,  90. 

Hutchinson,  Thomas,  governor  of 
Massachusetts,  12,  14,  15. 

Independence,  4,  5n7,  8,  13,  14,  16 
17,  18,  21,  22,  23,  25,  28,  29, 
40,  46,  60,  62,  69,  70,  75,  82, 
84,  85,  86. 


Instructions,  8,  35,  36,  54,  55,  65, 

66,  70,  71,  72,  79,  80,  86,  87, 
88,   92,    95,   97,  99,    100,    101, 
105,  106,  124,  129. 

Ingersoll,    James,    delegate    from 

Pennsylvania,  54. 
Izard,    Ralph,    envoy    to    Tuscany. 

46,  50,  52,  72,  83,  94. 

Jay,  John,  delegate  from  New 
York,  19,  33,  42,  53,  57;  as 
President  of  Congress,  73;  as 
envoy  to  France,  83,  84,  87, 
98,  99,  100,  101,  105;  as  Sec 
retary  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
109,  110,  111,  113,  115,  116, 
117,  118,  119,  120,  121,  125, 
126. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  as  delegate 
from  Virginia,  44,  59,  60,  64; 
as  peace  envoy,  87,  108,  111, 
112,  117,  119;  as  Chairman 
Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
112;  as  Secretary  of  State, 
126,  127. 

Jenifer,  Daniel,  delegate  from 
Maryland,  53. 

"John,  the  Painter,"  69. 

Johnson,  Thomas,  delegate  from 
Maryland,  42. 

Journals  of  Congress,  28,  116;  Se 
cret,  119. 

Judges,  26. 

Judiciary,  13. 

King,  British,  7,  9,  10,  28 ;  French, 

67,  70,    76,    80,   91;    Spanish, 
117. 

Kingdom,  66. 

Lafayette,  General,  89,  104,  105. 
Langdon,     John,     delegate     from 

New  Hampshire,  53. 
Laurens,     Henry,     delegate     from 

South  Carolina,  55;  envoy  to 

France,  50,  54,  55,  71,  72,  74, 

87,  94,  108. 


INDEX 


137 


Lee,  Arthur,  as  colonial  agent,  8, 
13;  as  envoy  to  France,  33, 
35,  50,  51.  52,  59,  61,  64,  65, 
67,  68,  69,  77,  79,  83,  85,  88, 
92,  94,  96,  102. 

Lee,  Richard,  Henry,  delegate  from 
Virginia,  21,  23,  33,  34,  35, 
38,  46,  48,  57,  59,  61,  63,  81, 
82,  112. 

Lee,  William,  delegate  from  Vir 
ginia,  45,  50,  72,  94. 

Legislation,    23. 

Legislature,  Virginia,  112. 

Letters,  10,  11,  14,  31,  35,  36,  49, 
51,  54,  65,  66,  67,  71,  72,  89, 

91,  97,  105,  108,  112;   of  cre 
dence,  114. 

Liberty  Party,  38,  41,  43,  56,  64, 
128. 

Livingston,  B.  R.,  delegate  from 
New  York,  23,  37,  59,  89. 

Livingston,  Robert,  delegate  from 
New  York,  37,  52,  54,  59;  as 
Secretary  of  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  91,  92,  97, 
103,  105,  106,  107,  108,  109, 
110,  111,  121. 

Loans,  35,  53,  96,  106. 

London,  64,  67. 

Lovell,  James,  delegate  from  Mas 
sachusetts,  47,  53 ;  as  Secre 
tary  of  Department  of  For 
eign  Affairs,  72,  73;  as  mem 
ber  of  special  committee,  90. 

Louis  XVI,  King  of  France,  48. 

Low  Countries,  53. 

Loyalists,  100. 

Luzerne,  Chevalier,  de  la,  French 
minister  to  America,  54,  83, 
84,  85,  86,  87,  88,  89,  90,  91, 

92,  93,  118. 


McKean,    Thomas,    delegate    from 

Delaware,  38,  54. 
Madison,     James,     delegate     from 


Virginia,   54,   55,   59,    84,   89, 

107,  108,  110,  123,  127. 
Madrid,  50,  51,  53,  69,  84. 
Marblehead,  12. 

Maryland,   29,  32,  34,  36,  37,  42, 

51,  63. 
Marbois,  Count,  French  statesman, 

98. 
Mathews,     John,     delegate     from 

South  Carolina,  54,  55,  89. 
Memoranda,  69,  72,  89. 
Massachusetts,  3,  8,  9,  11,  14,  16, 

17,  18,  19,  20,  23,  24,  27,  28, 

29,  32,  33,  34,  35,  36,  37,  40, 

45,  47,  51,  52,  56,  59,  60,  61, 

82,  128;  Bay,  2,  5,  9. 
Memorials,  9,  54,  90,  114,  124. 
Merchants,  58. 
Mifflin,     Thomas,     delegate     from 

South  Carolina,  17. 
Militia,  57. 
"Militia"   policy,  38,  45,  53,  63, 

68,    70,    73,    77,    80,    94,    100, 

126. 

Military  Affairs,  57. 
Ministers,  American,  95,  104,  106. 

108,  113,    114,    115,   119,    126, 
127;    French,   80,   81,   82,   83, 
89,  90,  91;  foreign,  122,  124. 

Minister,    plenipotentiary,    48,    53, 

85,  94,  113. 
Ministry,    English,    6,    10,    15,    16, 

21,  69,  74,  75,  76,  77,  78,  81/ 

97;    French,    75,    76,    77,  •  79^ 

91,  97,  98,  99. 
Mission,  55,  86. 
Mississippi   River,   84,   89,  98,  99, 

113,  117,  118,  119,  120. 
Money,  53,  55,  63,  73,  96;  paper, 

85,  92. 

Molasses  Act,  4. 
Morris,    Governeur,    delegate    from 

New  York,  38,  45,  48. 
Morris,  Robert,  delegate  from  New 

York,  48,  53,  59,  71. 
Munitions,  55,  68. 


138 


INDEX 


Nation,  23,  71,  126. 
National  Party,  59. 
Navigation  Acts,  4,  5. 
Negotiations,    53,   55,    69,    73,    78, 

96,  98,  100,  101,  108,  117,  120; 

French,    95 ;     diplomatic,    79 ; 

peace,  86,  111. 
Nelson,     Thomas,     delegate     from 

Virginia,  53. 
Neutrality,  68. 
New    Hampshire,   22,    29,    32,    37, 

52,  53,  87. 
New    Jersey,    29,    32,    34,    35,    37, 

45,  51,  52,  59,  63. 
Netherlands,  94. 
Newport,  4. 
North  Carolina,  29,  32,  34,  37,  52. 

59,  63. 
New   York,  9,   19,  21,  29,   32,  34, 

36,  37,  45,  48,  49,  51,  52,  59, 

63,  84,  88,  89. 

Ordinances,  122. 

Officers,  67,  68. 

Otis,  James,  leader  in  Massachu 
setts,  6,  10. 

Oswald,  ,  English  peace  com 
missioner,  98. 

Paine,  Thomas,  47,  87. 

Paca,  William,  delegate  from 
Maryland,  50. 

Paris,  76,  84. 

Parliament,  English,  4,  7,  9,  18. 

Patriot  Party,  58,  64. 

Party,  Constructionist,  128;  Eas 
tern,  63;  Independence,  19, 
20,  22,  23;  National,  59;  New 
England,  65;  Patriot,  58,  64; 
Radical,  34,  80;  Southern,  63; 
State  Rights,  74,  78,  127. 

Passy,  73. 

Peace,  69,  71,  80,  83,  90,  97,  100, 
105,  129. 

Pendleton,  Edmund,  delegate  from 
Virginia,  33,  58. 


Pennsylvania,  7,  29,  32,  34,  36, 
43,  49,  51,  52,  59,  63,  89. 

Pensacola,  68. 

Petition,  11,  36. 

Philadelphia,  13,  14,  15,  17,  19, 
21,  24,  29,  56,  66,  71,  73. 

Pinckney,  Charles,  delegate  from 
South  Carolina,  122. 

Plymouth,  12;  colony,  2;  compact, 
3. 

Policy,  6,  7,  9,  33,  45,  46,  73,  90, 
104,  109,  113,  129;  federal, 
120,  127. 

Port  Bill,  Boston,  13. 

Portsmouth,  4,  13. 

Post,  Continental,   13. 

Post  Office,  102. 

President  of  Congress,  50,  71,  73, 
74,  85,  122;  of  the  United 
States,  122,  123,  124,  125;  of 
the  Senate,  122. 

Protestants,  79. 

Providence,  4. 

Province,  6,  9,  10,  11. 

Prussia,  67,  94. 

Puritanism,  56. 

Radicals,  22,  23,  39,  40,  41,  45,  47, 
48,  49,  50,  52,  53,  54,  55,  61, 
62,  63,  71,  77,  83,  84,  87,  89, 
90,  92,  97,  98,  103,  106,  107, 
108,  112,  113,  121,  126,  129. 


Reciprocity,  112. 

Reconciliation,  19,  59,  74,  76. 

Regulars,  57. 

Republic,  59,  75,  81. 

Republicanism,  60. 

Representation,  4,  6,  7,  36,  59,  60. 

Representatives,  41,  46,  98;  Euro 
pean,  102. 

Resolutions,  10,  12,  14,  15,  20,  22, 
23,  26,  27,  85,  125,  126,  128. 

Resolves,  15,  58;  Suffolk,  18,  19, 
20,  24. 

Revolution,  American,  10,  23,  26. 

Rights,  9,   12,  28. 


INDEX 


139 


Rochambeau,  Admiral,  86. 

Ehode   Island,  22,   29,   32,   34,  30, 

37.  51. 

Royalists,  11. 
Rodrigwez,    Hortalez    &    Company, 

67. 

Roxbury,  12. 
Rush,  Dr.  Benjamin,  delegate  from 

Massachusetts,  17. 
Rutledge,    Edward,    delegate    from 

Scuth  Carolina,  23,  60. 

Salary,  Governor,  5,  7. 

Salem,  15,  20. 

Seal,  36,  58,   125. 

Secretary  of  Commerce,  122;  of 
Congress,  71,  72,  108,  117, 
122,  125;  of  Domestic  Affairs, 
122;  of  Home  Department, 
125;  of  Foreign  Affairs,  47. 
74.  91,  93,  98,  103,  104,  105, 
106,  107,  108,  109,  113,  114, 
115,  120,  123,  124,  125,  126, 
127;  of  Marine,  122;  of  the 
Navy.  96;  of  the  Treasury, 
96;  of  State,  91,  96,  123,  125, 
126,  127,  130;  to  the  Presi 
dent,  123;  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  109,  110, 
111,  115,  116,  118,  119,  120, 
125;  of  War,  96;  to  plenipo 
tentiary,  53. 

Senate,  123,  124,  125. 

Sherman,  Roger,  delegate  from 
Connecticut,  23,  38,  48. 

Slavery,   16. 

Smith,  J.,  delegate  from  Pennsyl 
vania,  49. 

South  Carolina,  29,  32,  34,  36,  37, 
47,  49,  52,  63. 

Sovereigns,  23. 

Sovereignty,  23,  60. 

Stamp  Act,  8,  9;   Congress,  9,  27. 

States,  23,  26,  46,  50,  51,  56,  58. 
65,  68,  74,  75,  80,  84,  87,  120, 
125 ;  Council  of,  60,  123 ;  Mid 


dle,  62,  84,  89;  Northern,  100, 
118;  Southern,  98,  100,  113, 
1]8;  foreign,  124. 

Statesmen,  57,  62,  113,  118. 

States  Rights,  52,  58,  59,  61,  62, 

80,  113,    118;    Party,   74,    78, 
127. 

Stormont,   Lord,   English   minister 

to  France,  75. 

"Steering"  Committees,  39. 
Sugar  Act,  5. 

Suffolk,  Resolves,  18,  19,  20,  24. 
Sullivan,  John,  delegate  from  New 

Hampshire,  54,  55,  87,  89. 
Summary,    15,   24,  40,   61,   79,  92, 

100,  109;   General,  128. 

Taxation,  6,  7. 

Taxes,  6;  tea,  8. 

Temple,  Lord,  English  Commis 
sioner  to  America,  82. 

Territory,  Western,  93. 

Teutons,  1. 

Thomson,  Charles,  Secretary  of 
Congress,  72. 

Towns  4,  10,  11,  12,  13,  15,  16, 
25. 

Town-meetings,  2,  3,  4,  7,  15,  16, 
20,  31,  40,  56,  59,  60;  Boston, 
5,  20. 

Trade,  6. 

Treaties,  48,  55,  64,  65,  70,  74,  75, 
76,  77,  78,  90,  92,  96,  98,  100, 

101,  105;    of    commerce    and 
amity,  113,  115,  116,  117,  119, 
122,  126,  127,  129. 

Treasury  Department,  31. 
Truce,  54. 

Tuscany,  46,  69,  94;  Court  of,  102. 
Tyranny,  13. 

United  Provinces,  53,  105. 

United  States,  J7,  49,  50,  51,  53, 

81,  82,    86,    94,    98,    99,    100, 
106,   109,   111,   113,   114,   115; 
117,  119,   120,   122,   125,   126; 


140 


INDEX 


of  America,  98,  123,  127,  129, 
130. 
Union,  59,  69,  75. 

Van  Dyke,  Nicholas,  delegate  from 
New  Jersey,  54. 

Vergennes,  Charles  Gravier,  French 
foreign  minister,  51,  54,  64. 
65,  69,  75,  76,  77,  80,  81,  84, 
85,  86,  87,  88,  89,  91,  96,  98. 

Versailles,  50,  51,  53,  54. 

Veto,  60. 

Vienna,  45,  69,  94;  Court  of,  102. 

Virginia,  14,  16,  17,  18,  21,  23, 
27,  29,  32,  33,  34,  35,  37,  38, 
43,  44,  52,  59,  60,  61,  67. 

Vittoria,  68. 

Vote,  3,  19,  50,  52,  125. 

War,  19,  56,  58,  63,  71,  77,  80,  84, 
91,  93,  100;  Office,  102,  129; 


Board  of,  35,  38,  44,  58;  De 
partment  of,  121,  122,  124. 

Warren,  Joseph,  leader  from  Mas 
sachusetts,  12,  18. 

Washington,  George,  22,  33,  35,  36, 
38,  57,  59,  64,  67,  76,  81,  88, 
89,  91,  92,  102,  111,  123,  129. 

Wentworth,  Paul,  English  secret 
agent,  69. 

Weissenstein,  Charles  de,  76. 

Weymouth,  Lord,  English  states 
man,  75. 

Wilkes  -      —,11. 

Wilson,  James,  delegate  from 
Pennsylvania,  50,  95. 

Windsor,  4. 

Witherspoon,  John,  delegate  from 
New  Jersey,  37,  45,  48,  51,  53, 
54,  55,  57,  89. 

Worcester,  12,  21. 

Wythe,  George,  delegate  from 
Georgia,  45. 


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